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Marriage and the Income Tax Yesterday, Today, and 
Tomorrow: A Primer and Legislative Scorecard 
Ann F. Thomas· 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three years, in the 10Sth Congress and the first 
session of the present 106th Congress, members on both sides of the 
aisle introduced bil1s that offered a wide range of solutions to the 
much discussed problem of marriage penalties in the federal income 
tax. These proposals vary substantial1y in concept and in impact, 
representing a sometimes-inconsistent array of ideas about the 
taxation of married couples. Some attempt a more comprehensive 
reversal of the marriage penalty - the term now used to describe the 
additional income tax burden that most dual income couples bear 
when they are married. Other bil1s confine themselves to addressing 
only one of the many features of the penalty issue. But the various 
congressional initiatives to reduce marriage penalties al1 have a 
significant point in common. All of the anti-penalty proposals would 
preserve marriage bonuses - the income tax cut experienced 
predominantly by sole earner couples who are married. Indeed, some 
of the anti-penalty legislation would likely augment total marriage 
bonuses even more than it would reduce total marriage penalties. 
This article examines the trends in the proposals for income 
tax marriage penalty relief introduced in the 10Sth and 106th 
Congresses and the different concepts of the unit of taxation for 
couples that these proposals represent. Part I is a primer on income 
tax marriage penalties and bonuses, for readers unfamiliar with the 
technical and historical sources and the political background for the 
current proposals. Part II examines the anti-penalty bills introduced in 
the 10Sth and the first session of the 106th Congress, including the 
vetoed Taxpayer Refund and Recovery Act of 1999, and develops a 
frame of reference for analysis of the policy content of the bills that 
• Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. The author would 
like to thank Richard C.E. Beck and William P. LaPiana, colleagues at New York Law 
School, for their comments and Kim C. Arestad, NYLS '99, for her assistance in 
compiling the anti-penalty bills in the I05th Congress for use as materials for the 
Symposium. 
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can also be used to assess trends in future congressional proposals for 
marriage penalty relief. Four tables mapping the trends in 
sponsorship support for proposals over the three years, which are 
described in Part II, can be found in the Appendix. Part II itself 
includes a table scoring the scope and marriage penalty relief impact 
of the various proposals. In conclusion, this article suggests that as a 
cross section of attitudes among policy makers toward the taxation of 
married couples, the anti-penalty proposals of the lOSth and l06th 
represent two different and apparently parallel trends. 
The proposals evidence consistent support for traditional 
marriage values and a strong preference for the sole earner married 
couple family structure. Support for the traditional family structure of 
sole earner and homemaker is apparent in the tendency to favor 
solutions that would have a broad impact in reducing the tax for 
married couples in general rather than focussing more narrowly on 
techniques for reversing marriage penalties. But at the same time, 
proposals are being advanced to allow married couples to elect to be 
taxed, in part, as individuals and these ideas have won significant 
bipartisan support. This trend suggests that there is now substantial 
uncertainty among policy makers about the fairness of imposing the 
joint return on all married couples and a questioning of the tax equity 
imperatives that have linked marriage and the joint return since 1948. 
The anti-penalty bills are noteworthy not only for their place 
in the contemporary history of the theory of the unit of taxation, but 
they obviously also belong to the real time world of developing tax 
policy. To date, none of these proposals have been enacted into law. 
In the lOSth Congress, anti-penalty provisions gained enough support 
to be included in major bills in each chamber. 1 In the I06th Congress, 
I House Bill 4579, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1998, which was introduced 
by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer (R-TX) and passed in the 
House on September 26, 1998, included as section 10 1 of the bill a provision that would 
have eliminated the marriage penalty effect in the standard deduction for both joint filers 
and married separate return filers. See <http://THOMAS.loc.gov/> (visited Nov. 4, 
1999). Also in the 105th Congress, on June 10, 1998 the Senate agreed to add an anti-
penalty amendment proposed by Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) to the Universal Tobacco 
Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Congo (1997). See S. Amdt. 2689, 105th Congo (1998); 
see also 144 Congo Rec. S6012, S6031 (June 10, 1998). Gramm's amendment was "to 
eliminate the marriage penalty reflected in the standard deduction, to ensure the earned 
income credit takes into account the elimination of such penalty." Id. The tobacco 
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provIsIons identified as offering marriage penalty relief had a 
significant place in the Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, the 
$792 billion Republican sponsored tax cut bill vetoed by President 
Clinton on September 23, 1999. Marriage penalty relief proposals 
also figured in the Democratic alternative tax cut bills that failed to 
supplant the Republican bil1.2 Income tax marriage penalty relief is 
already on the list of campaign promises of the leading presidential 
candidates Gore, Bush, Bradley and McCain? With penalties being 
reported by the Congressional Budget Office as exceeding $28 billion 
a year for joint filers, the issue remains one of lively interest to 
taxpayers, politicians and tax scholars.4 The anti-penalty proposals 
presented in the 10Sth Congress and the first session of the 106th 
remain of current interest.· 
settlement bill itself did not pass. See <thomas.loc.gov!> (visited Nov. 4, 1999). For a 
discussion of House Bill 2488, the Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, vetoed by 
President Clinton on September 23, 1999, see infra notes 281-84, 302-308 and 
accompanying text. 
2 Although representing only $9.337 billion of the $155.863 billion tax cut 
projected over the first five years of the amendments proposed by the bill, the impact of 
the marriage penalty relief provisions would have risen to $112.881 billion by the year 
2009, representing 14.25 percent of the ten year projection of $792 billion. Compare 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, SUMMARY AND REVENUE ESTIMATES FOR CONFERENCE 
AGREEMENT ON H.R. 2488, TAXPAYER REFUND AND RELIEF ACT OF 1999, reprinted in 
BNA TEXT SUPP. August 6,1999 at S-31-32 & 42-43, pts. I & XV [hereinafter 1999 JOINT 
COMM. CONF. BILL SUMMARY AND REVENUE ESTIMATES). See text accompanying notes 
262,266-267,270 and 275 for discussion of minority views and proposals. 
3 See George W. Bush Presidential Campaign Website, (visited Nov. 7, 1999) 
<http://www.gerogewbush.com>; AI Gore Presidential Campaign Website, (visited Nov. 
7, 1999) <http://www.algore2000.com>; Bill Bradley Presidential Campaign Website, 
(visited Nov. 24, 1999) <http://www.billbradley.com>; Jim McCain Presidential 
Campaign Website, (visited Nov. 24, 1999) <http://www.mcain2000.com>. McCain's 
materials call the marriage penalty "obscene." Id. 
4 CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX, xiv-xv (1997) [hereinafter CBO STUDY]. An aggregate marriage 
penalty of $32 billion is projected for all married persons including those using the status 
of married filing separately. See I.R.C. § I(d»; CBO STUDY, tbl. C-4 . 
• As this article goes to press, President Clinton, in his State of the Union 
address on January 27, 2000, has for the first time called for legislation to reduce the 
income tax marriage penalty. In the same speech, he also stressed the importance of 
reducing the Earned Income Tax Credit [EITC] marriage penalty, linking it to his welfare 
reform efforts and pointing to the necessity of "making sure that it rewards marriage just 
as it rewards work." President Clinton's support makes it very likely that some form of 
6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVI 
marriage penalty relief will be enacted in the Second session of the 106th Congress. The 
President's proposal takes an approach not seen in any of the anti-penalty bills in the past 
three years although it shares certain features with a number of them. A brief and 
necessarily preliminary analysis follows. 
The Clinton Administration has not yet proposed specific language for the 
legislation that it will seek but the summary of the proposal released by the White House 
before the President's speech indicates that the Clinton Administration will call for an 
increase in the standard deduction for two-income married couples to double the amount 
allowed an unmarried individual. The total increase for dual income married couples 
would be $2,150 and would reduce the income tax marriage penalties of 9.1 million 
couples. A separate increase in the standard deduction of $500 for single-income married 
couples and $250 for single filers will also be sought. The reported revenue cost (loss) 
for all three increases is $45 billion over 10 years. The summary did not include any 
information about the President's E1TC marriage penalty relief plan although a general 
EITC increase costing $21 billion is described. See The White House, Office of Press 
Secretary, President Clinton's Tax Agenda for Community. Opportunity. and 
Responsibility, January 27, 2000, reprinted in 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 19-16, (2000). 
The President's proposal for a doubled deduCtion for dual income couples has 
a substantially more efficient marriage penalty relief focus than did the across the boards 
doubling for all joint return filers that was in the Republican tax cut bill that the President 
vetoed on September 23, 1999. It represents an important step toward recognizing the 
economic significance of individual incomes of spouses. While it is paired with a general 
increase in the standard deduction, the Clinton proposal directs more resources toward 
removing an important structural source of marriage penalties. 
But the Clinton proposal would leave much of the marriage penalty intact and 
apparently would have no impact on the majority of the 20.9 million marriage penalty 
couples. Structured as a "below the line" deduction through I.R.C. § 63 (1999), an 
increase In the standard deduction does not provide any relief from the phaseout marriage 
penalties based on adjusted gross income [AGI] found in numerous provisions, including 
the exclusion for social security old age benefits and the child tax credit. Further, it 
would not help couples who itemize deductions. Restricting marriage penalty relief to 
couples who elect the standard deduction may be a surrogate for imposing an income 
ceiling on such relief, as did the Moynihan dual earner deduction proposal in 1999. 
However, relying on the standard deduction for this purpose produces erratic and 
presumably unintentional results. There are significant geographic as well as income 
differences in taxpayer use of the standard deduction. Although only about 18% of filers 
itemize in Texas, a state with low taxes, New Yorkers, who live in a high state tax 
environment, itemize at twice that rate, with about 36% itemizing. Moreover, 
approximately 2.8 million low income returns (under $30,000 AGI) itemize in order to 
deduct medical expenses. Restructuring the marriage penalty relief deduction for two 
income couples as an "above the line" adjustment through I.R.C. § 62 (a) (1999) would 
make it available to all marriage penalty couples and also reduce most phaseout marriage 
penalties. (The Gramm proposals in 1998 used such a structure.) Of course such a 
restructuring would increase the revenue cost. 
One important detail in the President's proposal for a dual income deduction 
that requires immediate clarification is whether community property law is to apply in 
determining the income of each spouse. All married couples in community property 
1999] APR/MER 7 
I . MARITAL ST ArUS AND THE INCOME TAX 
For the vast majority of adult couples in the United States, 
marital status is a significant determinant of federal income tax 
liability. But while the impact of marital status on taxation is felt by 
upwards of 50 million American couples, both married and 
unmarried, the changes in taxation that changes in legal marital status 
produce are neither uniform nor unidirectional.5 Marriage no longer 
confers a tax cut on the large majority of couples as it did in the past.6 
states are dual income couples for federal income tax purposes according to Poe v. 
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), because that marital property regime gives each spouse an 
equal interest in all income of the marriage. The dual earner deduction in the 1980s and 
the recent proposals to re-enact it specified that community property laws would be 
disregarded in determining each individual spouse's earnings. Unless the legislation for 
the dual income standard deduction repudiates the Poe v. Seaborn principle for both 
earnings and property income, the old community property controversy will be re-opened 
and married couples in the common law states will again be paying higher taxes than 
those in the community property law states. 
5 See CBO STUDY supra note 4, at tbl. C-4 (showing for 1995 that 48.52 
million married couples had either penalties or bonuses and 2.35 million unmarried 
couples would have had penalties or bonuses if they had filed joint returns). Statistical 
and quantitative data on marriage penalties and bonuses used in this article is largely 
drawn from the important study of marriage penalties and bonuses published in 1997 by 
the Congressional Budget Office. See id. The study was undertaken at the request of 
then-Congresswoman Barbara Kennelly (D-CT) of the House Ways and Means 
Committee while the CBO was under the directorship of Dr. June O'Neill, an economist 
with substantial expertise in the taxation of marriage and of women. The 1997 CBO 
study is regarded as the authoritative source of quantitative information about the 
incidence, distribution and magnitude of marriage penalties and marriage bonuses and is 
relied upon in the literature. It also draws together the results of the ground breaking 
economics research of the 1990s on the behavioral impact of marriage penalties and 
marriage bonuses. In addition, the CBO study provides generic revenue estimates for five 
different proposals to reduce income tax marriage penalties. 
Dr. O'Neill gave the keynote address at the New York Law School Journal of 
Human Rights Symposium, the publication of which includes this article. See June 
O'Neill, Keynote Address: Marriage Penalties and Bonuses in the Federal Income Tax, 
16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM RTS. 119 (1999). Symposium panelists Diana Furchtgott-Roth 
and C. Eugene Steuerle also contributed to the CBO Study. See Preface to CBO STUDY. 
6 See· CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 37-46 and tbl. 18 (showing 64% of 
married couples with bonuses in 1969 and 48% in 1996). Different simulations included 
in the CBO study produce different estimates for the current period. See, e.g., id, at tbl. 
C-4 (showing 39% of all married couples had bonuses and 49% had penalties in 1995); 
also id at Summary tbl. 1 (showing in 1996, 51 % of joint return filing married couples 
had bonuses and 42% had penalties). However, the trend toward a higher proportion of 
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Indeed, for as many as 47 percent of joint return filers in a recent year 
marriage meant an increased tax burden. These are the marriage 
penalty couples; the income tax marriage penalties that they paid in 
1996 alone are estimated to have ranged between $28.8 billion and 
$42 billion. At the same time, about 49 percent of joint return filing 
couples found that marriage reduced their taxes. These marriage 
bonus couples saved about $32 billion in federal income taxes in 1996 
simply because they were entitled to file joint returns.7 
The distinguishing characteristic of marriage penalty couples 
is that each of the spouses has some individual income. Typically this 
means that both husband and wife are working in paid employment. 8 
The more the incomes of the two partners are in parity, the more 
likely the couple is to trigger marriage tax penalties. Couples in 
which the wife earns at least half as much as the husband does, and 
vice versa, are the most likely to experience marriage penalties. In 
1996 some 90 percent of the joint returns in this category showed 
marriage penalties and the couples filing those returns paid a total of 
$15 billion in additional tax because they were married. About two-
thirds of dual earner couples with less equal incomes also incurred 
marriage penalties in that year. Overall, the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) study that is the leading source of quantitative 
information on the subject indicates that 76 percent of all two earner 
joint return couples paid marriage penalty taxes in 1996.9 
penalty couples and a lower proportion of bonus couples is well documented. E.g., James 
AIm & Leslie A. Whittington, The Rise and Fall and Rise . .. of the Marriage Tax, 49 
NAT. TAXJ. 571 (1996). 
7 See CBO STUDY supra note 4, at tbl. 4. Five different measures of marriage 
penalties and bonuses are presented in Table 4. The statistics used in the text are drawn 
from the "Broader Measure" and the "Basic Measure." Differences arise from the 
assumptions made about the basis on which the married couples would be able to report 
their incomes as unmarrieds, including such issues as allocation of children, choice of 
itemized or standard deduction and presence or absence of Earned Income Tax Credit, as 
well as head of household provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. The CBO's basic 
measure allocates itemized deductions between the spouses proportionately, and its 
broader measure gives all itemized deductions to the high earner and claims a standard 
deduction for the low earner. See id. at 29, 30. 
8 See id. at tbl. 7, p. xv. The CBO simulation reported here assumed all 
income was from earnings but extended its observations to incomes generally. 
9 1d. at tbl. 7, pp. 35·36. Table 7 shows 27.5 million joint returns (or married 
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While the marriage of two wage earners tends to result in . 
marriage tax penalties, the pairing of a wage earner and a fulltime 
homemaker produces marriage tax bonuses. Marriage bonus couples 
tend to be couples in which the spouses have very unequal money 
incomes. Married couples in which only one of the spouses works in 
paid employment receive the greatest share of marriage bonuses. 
Although these sole earner couples represented only 44 percent of 
joint returns filed, more than three-quarters of them received marriage 
bonuses in 1996. . Indeed, in 1996 the 19.4 million sole earner 
marriage bonus couples saved a total of $28.5 billion by reason of 
their marital status. \0 Overwhelmingly, sole earner married couples in 
the United States are couples in which it is the husband who is the 
market earner and the wife who is the homemaker.1I In 1996 a total 
of 25.3 million couples received marriage bonuses and 20.9 million 
paid penalties. 12 
For the 2.7 million reported unmarried adult couples in the 
United States in 1995, the penalty and bonus profiles are somewhat 
different. About 56 percent were likely to have owed more income 
tax if they had been married and 33 percent would have owed less. 
Overall, marital status is estimated to affect the tax liability of about 
89 percent of unmarried couples. Of the 54.7 million married couples, 
the eBO Study projected that 88 percent are affected by marital 
status, experiencing either penalties or bonuses.13 Thus marriage 
penalties and marriage bonuses can be said to have an impact on some 
50.7 million adult couples, or more than 100 million individuals. 
couples) in the two earner categories, with 20.9 million paying marriage penalties. 
10 See id. at tbls. 7-8, p. 35. 
II See id. fig. 5, at 37 (showing that in approximately 25 % of married 
couples the husband was the sole earner and in 5% the wife was the sole earner; hence in 
more than 80% of sole earner couples, the husband was the earner). 
12 See id. at tbl. 7. 
13 These statistics are for 1995 and are drawn from the CBO 1997 Study. 
The CBO Study defines unmarried couples as unmarried adults self-identified as partners 
in the March 1996 Current Population Survey and notes that 3 percent of the unmarried 
couples so identified were same-sex couples. See id. at tbl. 2, n.18, p. 13. The CBO 
Study gives two different totals for the number of unmarried couples. Tables C-I and C-
4 show 2,650,000 unmarried couples in 1995 and table 2 reports 2,700,000, also in 1995. 
See id. at tbls. 2 & C-4. 
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Marriage penalties and marriage bonuses are important for 
several reasons. With increasing intensity since 1993, the marriage 
penalty effects of the federal income tax have been criticized on 
behavioral, feminist, moral and religious grounds. Observers have 
questioned whether penalties and bonuses of the magnitude now being 
seen are affecting marriage decisions and other life choices involving 
work and family, especially for women. The empirical research on 
these questions is mixed at this time, although beginning to show that 
marriage penalties are affecting marriage behavior. For many 
policymakers and taxpayers, the idea that the tax system discourages 
marriage and perhaps encourages divorce is politically unacceptable 
and morally repugnant. But marriage penalties and marriage bonuses 
are also important for another reason. As the value laden vocabulary 
in which the issue is now universally discussed indicates, something is 
going on in the taxation of married couples that we are finding to be 
anomalous and inconsistent with our ideas of fairness in taxation. 
In order to evaluate this policy debate and the numerous 
legislative initiatives in the three most recent Congresses aimed at 
reducing or eliminating the marriage penalty, some background in the 
technical aspects of the issue is necessary. The combined effects of 
many provisions of the Internal Revenue Code impose the regime of 
marriage penalties and marriage bonuses. It derives from a number of 
tax policy decisions, including the long standing policy choice to tax 
married couples on a unitary basis through the income splitting joint 
return. The sections that follow provide an overview of the statutory 
sources of the marriage penalty and the marriage bonus in the federal 
income tax and the development of the joint return. 14 
14 There is an extensive tax literature that discusses marriage penalties and 
bonuses. The trends and major contributions in this body of scholarship are discussed 
infra at notes 78-89 and 153-58. Marriage penalty and marriage bonus effects are also 
seen in the Social Security system and numerous other transfer programs at the federal 
and state levels. See, e.g., Symposium: Panel IV: The Social Security System and Women 
Today, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 217 (1999); Symposium: Panel V: Social Security 
Reform: The Impact on Women, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 253 (1999); Eugene 
Steuerle, The Uncertain Support Behind 'Marriage Penalty' Relief, 84 TAX NOTES 1539 
(1999). For a discussion of the joint and several liability consequences of joint return 
filing, arguably a penalty that particularly burdens women, see Amy Christian, 
Unintended Consequences of Marriage Penalty Relief The Effect on the Married 
Couple's Choice of Filing Status, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUMAN RIGHTS 172 (1999). 
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A. The Mechanics Of Marriage Penalties And Bonuses - The Joint 
Return 
There is, of course, no actual marriage tax, nor marriage 
penalty and bonus section or subtitle in the Internal Revenue Code. 
The technical source of both marriage penalties and marriage bonuses 
in the income tax is what might be called the joint return system for 
the taxation of married couples. Its central feature is the joint return 
itself, which requires husband and wife to aggregate their incomes and 
compute their tax liability on a more or less unitary basis. ls The 
Different than the marriage penalties and bonuses discussed here are the singles penalties. 
Singles penalties are measured by the income tax benefits that are allowed all couples 
whose marriages are recognized for tax purposes and denied all couples whose marriages 
or domestic partnerships are not so recognized. One of the more apparent examples of 
this is I.R.C. section 1041 (1999), a provision which allows spouses to transfer or 
exchange property incident to divorce without recognition of gain or loss. Couples who 
are not treated as married for tax purposes generally are subject to tax on property 
settlements in palimony situations. Another potentially sizable, but as yet unmeasured, 
singles penalty exists in the area of employee benefits and fringe benefits. Substantial 
amounts of income are excluded as employee benefits or fringe benefits by numerous 
sections of the Internal Revenue Code. For example, the tax the expenditure budget 
shows that the tax saved (revenue lost) by the exclusion of employer paid medical 
insurance premiums and medical care costs (pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 105 & 106 (1999)) was 
$ 76.2 billion for 1999. The tax saved/revenue lost from the exclusion that I.R.C. section 
119 (1999) creates for employer provided meals and lodging in 1999 was $ 680 million. 
See Tax Expenditure Chapter from the President's Fiscal 1999 Budget, 78 TAX NOTES 
911, 922, tbls. 5-2 (1998). Many of the statutory exclusions of employee benefits and 
fringe benefits encompass the value of benefits given to the employee's spouse. See, e.g., 
I.R.C. § 119 (a) (1999) (excluding from gross income food and lodging provided by 
employer "to [the employee], his spouse, or any of his dependents").; I.R.C. § 105 (b) 
(1999) (excluding from gross income reimbursement of amounts attributable to medical 
care for "taxpayer, his spouse, and his dependents"). Same-sex couples and other couples 
who cannot marry are taxed on the value of employee benefits extended to partners, an 
increasingly common practice in some parts of the United States and now in the European 
Union. See Kate Hilpern, Tide Begins to Turn in Favour of Gay Employees; 
Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexuality May Soon be a Thing of the Past, THE 
INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 31, 1999, at 3 (discussing the trend among employers 
toward extending benefits to same sex partners even when not required by law). I would 
like to thank my colleague Arthur Leonard for bringing this issue to my attention. 
For purposes of measuring the impact of marriage on taxation, the excluded 
spousal employee benefits and fringe benefits would. be a consistent enhancement of the 
tax benefits of marriage. At an individual level, such tax benefits may be seen to 
outweigh marriage penalties for particular couples. 
15 See I.R.C. § 6013 (a), (d) (3) (1999). 
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Internal Revenue Code's joint return system is further reflected in the 
distinctions made between joint return filers and other taxpayers in the 
progressive tax rate tables, the standard deduction, the rules for 
utilization of personal exemptions, the taxation of social security 
benefits and certain transfers of property, as well as in a growing array 
of credits and deductions that utilize income-based phaseouts, 
including, notably, the earned income tax credit ["EITC,,].16 
Once a couple is married, husband and wife cannot escape the 
marriage penalty and marriage bonus effects of the joint return 
system. 17 While married couples are not literally obligated by the 
Internal Revenue Code to file a joint return, the only alternative 
available to them, unless they are divorced or legally separated, is the 
filing status of "married individuals filing separate returns.,,18 
Married persons are not permitted to use either of the two filing 
statuses applicable to unmarried people - the "unmarried individual" 
status and the "head of household" status· assigned to unmarried 
taxpayers with dependents in the home. 19 
The married separate filing status is generally a more onerous 
version of the joint return status on which it is based. Its primary 
advantage to taxpayers is that it permits couples to avoid the joint and 
16 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ I (rate tables); 63 (standard deduction); 151 (a) 
(personal exemptions); 86 (partial exclusion of old age benefits); 21 (child care credit); 24 
(child credit); 25A (education credits); 267 (losses, etc. in transactions between related 
taxpayers); 1041" (transfer of property incident to divorce); I.R.C. § 32 (1999) (earned 
income tax credit). See also, CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 15-26; Hearing on the 
Marriage Penalty Before the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 105th Congo (1998) 
(statement of David Lifson, Vice Chair, Tax Executive Comm., American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants). 
17 The words "husband and wife" are used advisedly here. The Internal 
Revenue Service recognizes only formal, legally valid male-female marriages for tax 
purposes. See, e.g., Ronnie Cohen & Susan B. Morris, Tax Issues from 'Father Knows 
Best'to 'Heather Has Two Mommies " 84 TAX NOTES 1309 (1999). 
18 Divorced or legally separated spouses are not considered married. See 
I.R.C. § 7703 (1999). 
19 I.R.C. § I (a)-(d) (1999) specifies the rate tables applicable to each of the 
four filing statuses. The CPI adjusted version of these tables applicable for 1999 can be 
found infra note 42. For the definition of head of household see I.R.C. § 2 (b); for marital 
status rules see I.R.C. §§ 2(b)(2), (c), & 7703 (1999). 
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several liability imposed by the joint return?O The tax brackets for 
married persons filing separately are half as wide as those for joint 
return filers,21 the standard deduction for this status is also half the 
amount allowed a married couple,22 and married couples who file 
separately are disqualified from using many tax deductions and 
credits, including the child and dependent care credit.23 In terms of 
marriage penalties and bonuses, separate filing by a married couple 
would typically tum a marriage bonus into a marriage penalty or 
simply increase the marriage penalty that would otherwise be imposed 
by the joint return.24 No more than five percent of married couples 
20 For married couples in the common law jurisdictions, the choice of the 
married filing separately status can insulate a spouse from the joint and several liability 
for tax on the other partner's income that attaches when a joint return is filed. See I.R.C. 
§ 6013(d)(3) (1999). For married couples who are residents of community property law 
states, filing separate returns does not eliminate tax liability for shared marital income. A 
statement declaring the intention to end the marital community is required as well. See 
I.R.C. § 66 (1999); Richard C.E. Beck, Joint Return Liability and Poe v. Seaborn Should 
Both Be Repealed, 49 TAX NOTES 457, 464-66 (1990). The primary advantage of the 
married filing separate returns status for the Treasury may be that it provides a basis for 
distinguishing the joint return system of the federal income tax from the joint return 
system of the Wisconsin income tax that the U.S. Supreme Court held unconstitutional in 
Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, 284 U.S. 206 (1931). See Ann F. Thomas, 
Taxing Women's Lives: Taxation and the Economic Identity of Married Women (Nov. 
1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
21 Compare I.R.C. § I(a) and (d)(1999). 
22 The standard deduction specified in the Internal Revenue Code for joint 
return filers is $5,000; it is $2,500 for married filing separately. Again unmarried 
individual filers are assigned yet another amount - $3,000. These are the statutory 
values, unadjusted for the Consumer Price Index [hereinafter CPI]. Compare I.R.C. §§ 
63 (c) (2) (A), (C) and (D) (\999). 
23 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 21 (\ 999); see also Christian, supra note 14 for a fuller 
description of the penalty effects of the choice of the married filing separately tax status 
and the impact of this status on women. 
24 For example, the ceiling of the bottom bracket of 15% is $36,900 for joint 
returns; $18,450 for married filing separately; $22,100 for unmarried. (These are the 
statutory amounts provided in I.R.C. § 1 (\999), without adjustment for inflation). See 
infra note 42 (containing the 1999 tax rate tables with CPI adjustment.) A sole earner 
spouse with taxable income of $40,000 in the married filing separately status, would have 
a tax of $8,802. By filing a joint return, the tax on the same $40,000 would be reduced to 
$6,403. An unmarried individual with $40,000 of taxable income would owe $8,327. 
Here the joint filer has a marriage bonus, as compared to the unmarried sole earner, and 
the married separate filer who pays the most tax of all three, has a marriage penalty 
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made use of the married separate filing status. Professor Amy 
Christian estimates that in 1993, some 95 percent of married couples 
filed joint returns.25 
The joint return system is then the necessary focus if the 
taxation of married couples is to be understood. The five key 
elements of the statutory framework of the joint return system are 
described below: 1) the standard deduction; 2) the personal 
exemptions; 3) the income tax rate tables; 4) the earned income tax 
credit; and 5) phaseouts. 
1. The Standard Deduction 
The standard deduction, which is an important factor in 
determining tax liability for all individuals, is also an important part of 
the joint return system. Its design and its function in the taxation of 
couples illustrate how distinctions based on joint return filing status 
create marriage penalty and marriage bonus effects. After 
determining adjusted gross income [AGI], taxpayers are permitted 
certain deductions in arriving at taxable income, the amount that will 
be the basis for computing their personal tax liability. In addition to 
personal exemptions, taxpayers generally may choose to claim either 
the permitted itemized deductions or the standard deduction?6 Some 
70 percent of tax returns use the standard deduction.27 
In 1999, the standard deduction for married couples filing a 
joint return is $7,200 and the standard deduction for unmarried 
individuals is $4,300.28 An unmarried wage earner might view the 
instead. A dual earner.couple with $20,000 of income a piece would have the same total 
tax on a joint return or filing separately ($3,201.50 times 2 or $6,403). If they were 
allowed to file as unmarried individuals, their tax burden would be only $3,000 each or 
$6,000 total. Their marriage penalty is not increased or reduced by separate filing after 
marriage. But any division of income between the two spouses other than an equal split 
tends to increase tax unless there is an unusual matching of spousal income and, for 
example, medical expenses that become deductible when the absolute dollar amount of 
the 7.5% floor diminishes by reference to the lower income of one spouse. See, I.R.e. § 
213 (1999). 
25 See Christian, supra note 14. 
26 See I.R.e. §§ 1,62,63 (1999). 
27 
SEE CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 15. 
28 I.R.e. section 63(c)(2) provides for standard deductions of $5,000 and 
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$2,900 difference between his smaller deduction and the larger 
deduction given to married couples as a tax benefit that they have and 
he would like to get.29 This potential tax reduction would indeed 
become real for him, if he got married and the wife with whom he 
filed a joint return had no income of her own. As husband and wife, 
the sole earner and his spouse would enjoy, in effect, a tax bonus. 
The amount of the tax bonus would depend on his marginal tax 
bracket. If as an unmarried filer, this $2,900 of income would have 
been subject to tax at the rate of 28 percent, marriage has saved him 
$812 in tax, in effect a marriage tax bonus. 
If the new wife has income of her own, however, and it 
exceeds $2,900, the marriage bonus would tum into a marriage 
penalty.30 In their unmarried state, the taxpayer and his partner are 
each permitted a standard deduction of $4,300. If they each have at 
least that much income, they are able to use their combined standard 
deductions to exclude a total of $8,600 from taxation. Marriage 
reduces the combined standard deductions of the dual income couple 
from $8,600 to $7,200, a difference of $1,400. Hence marriage 
imposes tax on $1,400 more of their income than was taxed before. If 
this previously untaxed $1,400 is placed in the 28 percent bracket by 
their joint return, the dual income couple will have a marriage tax 
penalty of $392. The term marriage penalty thus refers to increases in 
tax that occur when a couple changes from filing as two unmarried 
taxpayers to filing a joint return. This example and the one in the 
$3,000, respectively, for joint filers and unmarried individuals but allows adjustments for 
CPI which have brought the joint filer and unmarried individual standard deductions for 
1999 to the levels stated in the text. I.R.C. section 63(c)(2) tracks all four filing statuses 
of section I, providing a different standard deduction for unmarried persons who are 
heads of household ($4,400 in the statute and $6,350 with the CP1 adjustment) and a 
fourth one for marriea persons fiI ing separate returns ($2,500 in the statute and $ 3,600 
with the CPI). See Rev. Proc. 98-61, 1998-52 IRB 18, for the 1999 amounts with CPI 
adjustments. 
29 A comparison of the unmarried individual standard deduction of $3.000 
with the standard deduction of $2,500 allowed a married person filing separately shows 
that the unmarried individual status has the advantage if a joint return is not filed by the 
married taxpayer. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
30 They have neither penalty nor bonus if the wife has an individual income 
equal to $2,900. These examples assume that there is $2,900 of additional income to deal 
with after giving effect to any applicable personal exemptions for the wife. 
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preceding paragraph are typical as well as illustrative. Sole income 
couples experience marriage bonuses and dual income couples with 
relatively equal incomes tend to incur marriage penalties.3 ) 
The penalties and bonuses do not occur because the sole 
earner and dual earner married couples filing joint returns are 
distinguished from each other in any way. The same standard 
deduction is allowed to all joint return filers; no distinction is made 
between married couples in that sense. If in one couple, one spouse 
earns $50,000 and the other spouse has no income at all, the joint 
return will treat this couple as having adjusted gross income of 
$50,000, just as it will treat a married couple in which each spouse 
earns $25,000 as having adjusted gross income of $50,000. The joint 
return requires husband and wife to aggregate their incomes and only 
takes notice of the sum and not the parts. Assuming their personal 
exemptions are the same, these two couples will have equal taxable 
incomes as well, after the joint filers' standard deduction is applied. 
That in one couple there is only one earner and there are two earners 
in the other couple is inconsequential to the joint return computations 
and the determination of the applicable standard deduction. Indeed, 
this homogeneity of tax outcomes for married couples with different 
income configurations but the same aggregate income is the essence 
of the joint return. But the existence of individual incomes within the 
marriage, the factor that the joint return ignores, is the essence of the 
marriage penalty/marriage bonus phenomenon. 
Looking again at the standard deduction examples, it can be 
seen that the penalties and bonuses discussed above were the result of 
the proportional relationship between the amount of the standard 
deduction for joint filers and the amount of the standard deduCtion for 
unmarried individuals. The relationship between the two can be most 
simply described as being more-than-one, but less-than-two. 
For the sole earner couple, it is the "more-than-one" part of 
the relationship that causes the marriage bonus when the joint return 
status can be used. In the unmarried status, the couple gets to use one 
standard deduction for an unmarried individual and no more. The sole 
earner claims and uses his "one" to offset some of his income. But 
3) See. e.g., CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at tbl2. 
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the standard deduction of the non-earner partner (assuming she has no 
other income) cannot be used by either of them. She has no income to 
reduce and she cannot transfer her unused deduction to him except by 
marriage. The married joint filers' standard deduction at present is 
1.67 times greater than that allowed an unmarried individual.32 
Marriage allows the sole earner to use about 67 percent of what would 
have been the non-earner's individual standard deduction. 
For the dual earner couple, it is the "Iess-than-two" part of the 
relationship between the standard deductions for the joint return. and 
the unmarried individual that causes the penalty. The married 
couple's deduction is larger than the standard deduction allowed to 
one unmarried individual, but it is smaller than the two deductions 
that the dual earners could claim as two unmarried individuals with 
equal incomes. To dual earners the joint filers' deduction represents 
only about 84 percent of the total of the two deductions that they 
could claim if unmarried.33 · The more-than-one, less-than-two 
relationship between filing statuses means that marriage adds to the 
sole earner couple's useable tax deductions and takes away a portion 
of the deductions that dual earner couples would be able to use if they 
were filing as unmarried individuals. 
2. Personal Exemptions 
In addition to the standard deduction, the Internal Revenue 
Code generally allows taxpayers to claim a personal exemption that 
also reduces the amount of income subject to tax. At present the 
amount of the personal exemption, after giving effect for inflation 
adjustments, is $2,750.34 The amount of the personal exemption does 
not vary with marital status, but marriag'e can. change its value 
significantly. The impact of the joint return system on personal 
exemptions is seen in the utilization rules that vary with marital status. 
Further, marital status also has an impact on the phaseout of the 
32 See I.R.C. § 63 (1999). The ratio is constant between the statut~ry 
amounts (5,000/3,000) and the CPI adjusted amounts (7,200/4,300). 
33 See I.R.C. § 63 (1999). Two unmarried individual standard deductions 
would add up to $8,600 and the joint return deduction is $7,200 (7,200/8,600 = .8372). 
34 See Rev. Proc. 98-61; I.R.C. § 151 (1999). 
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personal exemption that is set at different income levels for joint 
return filers and those in the unmarried filing statuses. 
Each tax return filer is permitted one personal exemption for 
himself or herself and additional personal exemptions for qualifying 
dependents, including children. Hence an unmarried individual with 
no dependents is allowed one personal exemption. Each partner in a 
dual earner couple is allowed one personal exemption when filing in 
the unmarried status. Filing a joint return does not alter their 
entitlement to the same two personal exemptions. Both joint filers are 
individuals "computing taxable income," which is the statutory basis 
for the taxpayer's claim to the personal exemption.35 Thus for the 
dual earner couple, marriage appears to impose no penalties on the 
utilization of their personal exemptions. 
For a sole earner couple, the joint return confers a marriage 
bonus in the form of an extra personal exemption. In an unmarried 
sole earner couple, the earner uses his own personal exemption in the 
normal course; the non-earner's personal exemption goes unused 
because she has no income. But the joint return aggregation concept 
allows the married non-earner to transfer her personal exemption to 
the marital unit, as she did with a portion of her individual standard 
deduction. Marriage converts the valueless personal exemption of the 
non-earner into an additional personal exemption that can be applied 
to reduce the sole earner's taxable income. The value of the 
transferred personal exemption will be measured by the marginal rate 
at which this $2,750 would have been taxed to the sole earner in his 
unmarried filing status. From this point of view, the marital status 
differential for the utilization of personal exemptions appears to have 
only a positive effect, all marriage bonus. The relationship between 
the joint return status and the unmarried individual status here is that 
more than one and up to two individual personal exemptions may be 
used in the joint return, depending on whether the aggregate income 
of the couple can absorb both exemptions. 
But another way to think about this marriage bonus is that it is 
a tax incentive or tax subsidy to the married couple to continue to 
have one spouse out earning in the labor force and the other at home, 
35 See I.R.C. § 151 (a) (1999); see also I.R.C. § 6013 (a) (1999). 
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engaged in home production, which is a valuable but untaxed 
economic activity.36 Looked at from this point of view, the marriage 
bonus that the transfer of the non-earner's personal exemption creates 
contains in it a tax disincentive to enter or remain in paid 
employment. The issue that the transfer of the standard deduction and 
the personal exemption from the non-earner to the marital unit poses 
is the apparent cost of recapturing these tax benefits. 
If the non-earner begins to work, her income will either be 
seen as being fully subject to tax without the benefit of these 
reductions, or as recapturing these valuable income exclusions that her 
husband has been using. Whichever way it is viewed, the highest 
marginal tax rate applicable to the first earner's income, the rate at 
which his last dollar of income is taxed, would seem to apply to the 
first dollar of income that the former non-earner now produces. There 
is considerable concern about the impact of this tax disincentive on 
married women, who are still much more likely to be the non-earner 
spouse in the marriage, engaged for longer or shorter periods in 
fulltime homemaking or child rearing?7 The transfer of her tax 
benefits to her husband through the joint return, in effect, imposes a 
higher effective tax rate on all of her income when she re-enters paid 
employment.38 
36 Home production is a term that economists use to' describe the value of 
goods and services created within the household for consumption by members of the 
household. Tax theory generally describes this economic income as imputed income 
although it may be barter to the extent that there is an exchange between household 
members. By long tradition it is not taxed in the federal income tax. For a thorough 
discussion of the exclusion from income of the value of housework, see Nancy Staudt, 
Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L. J. 1571 (1996) (arguing that the productive and political 
value of women 's housework should be taxed in order to make its value more visible). 
37 See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at pp. xv, xiv; see also discussion of 
secondary worker issue and sources, infra note 39. 
38 During the 1990s, both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands adopted 
individual taxation for husbands and wives but included mechanisms that permit the 
transfer of personal exemptions between the spouses. The Netherlands adopted its new 
system as part of an effort to remove tax disincentives to market employment for married 
women. At the time, the labor force participation of married Dutch women was reported 
to be the lowest in Northern Europe. The Netherlands now allows the transfer of personal 
tax exemptions within the common household, defined as a registered adult household of 
more than 18 months duration. See HETTIE A. POTT-BuTER, FACTS AND FAIRY TALES 
ABOUT FEMALE LABOR, FAMILY AND FERTILITY 1, 25-34, 256 (1993); COMPARATIVE 
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For example, if she could earn $10,000, with her $2,750 
personal exemption and the $2,900 of standard deduction that she 
appeared to bring to the marriage, these earnings would result in a 
taxable income of $4,350. If the aggregated taxable income of this 
married couple put them into the 28 percent bracket on the joint 
return, her income would bear a tax of $1,218. The simpler and 
probably more conventional view of her new $10,000 income is that it 
comes in on top of her husband's income, and is fully subject to tax at 
the applicable marginal rate at that level. Assuming that this 
aggregation of incomes does not push the new $10,000 into a higher 
bracket, it would bear a tax of 28 percent or $2,800. By contrast, if 
she were unmarried and could use her full standard deduction of 
$4,300 as well as her personal exemption and the unmarried 
individual rates, her tax would be only $443. This is an example of 
what is commonly called the secondary earner or stacking problem. 
Both marriage bonus and marriage penalty outcomes can be 
seen in the phaseout formula applicable to personal exemptions since 
1988.39 The Internal Revenue Code now limits many credits, 
deductions and exclusions through the application of means tested 
phaseout rules. Phaseouts limit the use' of these tax benefits to 
particular income categories but also have the result of raising the 
INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 274 (Hugh J. AuIt ed., 1997). In the United 
Kingdom, husband and wife each receive a personal exemption, which is not transferable, 
and a married couple's exemption, which can be shifted. The U.K. Treasury announced 
its new tax system of transferable allowances as a program that would enable wives to 
stay out of the labor market without loosing tax benefits. The new U.K. system ended the 
longstanding rule that made the husband the taxpayer for the marital unit. See 
CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, GREEN PAPER: THE REFORM OF PERSONAL TAXATION 
chap. 2 (March 1986); INLAND REVENUE, IR 80 INCOME TAX AND MARRIED COUPLES 
(Nov. 1997) (instruction for taxpayers) (on file with author). In 1997, press reports 
described the anticipated announcement by the government of John Major of a plan to 
extend the transferability of allowances to include the transfer of the personal exemption 
from a non-earner spouse to the earner spouse as a "radical plan by the Conservatives" 
and a tax reform "encouraging couples to marry and also giving a strong fiscal incentive 
for married women to stay home and look after their children." Robert Preston, Tories 
Plan Radical Tax Break: Married Women WOllid Get Incentive to Stay at Home, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), April 2, 1997, at § I, p.1. 
~ . 
See I.R.C. § 151 (d) (3) (1999) and STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, GENERAL Ex PLANA TION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, JCS-10-87, at 23 
(1987). [Hereinafter 1986 JOINT COMM. GENERAL EXPLANATION)' 
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effective tax rates for upper income taxpayers without altering the 
stated rates in the tax tables.40 
In the current year, the phaseout of the personal exemption· 
begins at $126,600 for an unmarried individual filer and is completed 
at $249,100. Following the pattern of more-than-one, but less-than-
two, the phaseout for joint return filers starts at $189,950 of 
aggregated adjusted gross income and the exemptions are eliminated 
entirely at $312,450. In other words, the joint return phaseout begins 
at 1.5 times the income at which the unmarried individual starts to 
reduce her personal exemptions. For a sole earner couple this 
represents a marriage bonus. But it also creates a marriage penalty for 
dual earners. The partners in an unmarried equal earner couple with a 
combined income of $312,450 - the point at which the personal 
exemption has been reduced to zero for the joint return - would stiII 
have 75 percent of their personal exemptions.41 Indeed, for dual 
income married couples, if the income of each of the spouses is in the 
range of $95,000 to $126,600, the joint return will result in the 
reduction of personal exemptions that would have remained intact if 
the spouses had been able to file as two unmarried individuals. 
3. The Rate Tables 
When the progressive tax rate tables of the federal income tax 
are added to the picture, the marriage penalty and marriage bonus 
effects for dual income and sole income couples become more 
pronounced. Current law encompasses five stated marginal tax rates: 
15 percent, 28 percent, 31 percent, 36 percent and 39.6 percent. Tax 
tables ordaining the income levels, or brackets, at which these 
marginal rates apply are assigned to each of the filing statuses. The 
40 See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING 
TO INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVE MARGINAL RATES, JCB-3-98, at 93- 102 (1998) [hereinafter 
1998 EFFECTIVE MARGINAL RATE STUDY)' 
41 See Rev. Proc. 98-61, 1998-52 IRB 18, § 3.08, for the personal exemption 
phaseouts for 1999. The unmarried equal earner couple with $156,225 each of adjusted 
gross income will have reduced their two personal exemptions by about 24%. The 
phasesout occurs at the rate of 2% per $2,500 in excess of adjusted gross income of 
$156,225 over the threshold of $126,600 applicable to them. See I.R.C. § 151(d)(I) 
(1999). 
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brackets are different for the different filing statuses, except at the top 
rate. 
The marginal tax brackets for joint return filers are more 
generous than those assigned to other taxpayers. The more-than-one, 
less-than-two relationship between the joint return and the unmarried 
individual filing statuses seen in the standard deduction is largely 
maintained. Except in the top two rates when they converge, the 
breakpoints for the joint return brackets are set at income levels that 
are higher than, but not twice as high as those for unmarried 
individuals.42 The two examples presented below demonstrate how 
42 Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code provides different rate tables for 
each of the four income tax filing statuses. Section 1(f) requires an annual cost of living 
adjustment. I.R.C. § 1 (1999). Rev. Proc. 98- 61, 1998-52 IRB 18, announced the 
adjustments and tables for 1999. They are as follows: 
TABLE 1- § 1 (a). MARRIED INDIVIDUALS FILING JOINT RETURNS 
AND SURVIVING SPOUSES 
If taxable income is: 
Not over $43,050 
Over $43,050 
but not over $104,050 
Over $104,050 
but not over $158,550 
Over $158,550 
but not over $283,150 
Over $283,150 
The tax is: 
15% of the taxable income 
$6,457.50 plus 28% of 
the excess over $43,050 
$23,537.50 plus 31 % of 
the excess over $104,050 
$40,432.50 plus 36% of 
the excess over $158,550 
$85,288.50 plus 39.6% of 
the excess over $283,150 
TABLE 2 - § l(b). HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS 
If Taxable Income Is: 
Not Over $34,550 
Over $34,550 
but not over $89,150 
Over $89,150 
but not over $144,400 
Over $144,400 
but not over $283,150 
Over $283.150 
The Tax Is: 
15% of the taxable income 
. $5,182.50 plus 28% of 
the excess over $34,550 
$20,470.50 plus 31 % of 
the excess over $89,150 
$37,598 plus 36% of 
the excess over $144.400 
$87,548 plus 39.6% of 
the excess over $283,150 
TABLE 3 - § l(c). UNMARRIED INDIVIDUALS (OTHER THAN 
SURVIVING SPOUSES AND HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS) 
If Taxable Income Is: The Tax Is: 
Not Over $25,750 15% of the taxable income 
Over $25,750 $3,862.50 plus 28% of 
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the joint return system is expressed in the present structure of the tax 
rate tables. 
Married couples filing a joint return are assigned a rate 
schedule that allows the first $43,050 of their aggregated taxable 
income to. be taxed at the 15 percent rate. But for unmarried 
individuals, the 15 percent bracket ends at $25,750 and the 28 percent 
bracket begins at $25,751. This means that for the sole earner, 
marriage and the joint return will pull an additional $17,300 out of the 
28 percent bracket and into the 15 percent bracket. For a sole earner 
with taxable income of $50,000, marriage will reduce income tax 
liability from $10,653 to $8,404 - a marriage bonus of $2,249.43 
On the other hand, a dual earner couple with $25,000 each of 
taxable income finds that marriage adds $903.50 to their tax burdens. 
Computed using the tax brackets for unmarried individuals, each 
partner would owe tax of $3,750. Adding their tax bills together 
would show a total liability of $7,500 for the couple. But, if taxed on 
the basis of a joint return, like the sole earner couple above, they 
but not over $62,450 
Over $62,450 
but not over $130,250 
Over $130,250 
but not over $283,150 
Over $283,150 
TABLE 4 - § I(d). MARRIED 
RETURNS 
If Taxable Income Is: 
Not Over $21,525 
Over $21,525 
But not over $52,025 
Over $52,025 
But not over $79,275 
Over $79,275 
But not over $141,575 
Over $141,575 
the excess over $25,750 
$14,138.50 plus 31% of 
the excess over $62,450 
$35,156.50 plus 36% of 
the excess over $130,250 
$90,200.50 plus 39.6% of 
the excess over $283,150 
INDIVIDUALS FILING SEPERA TE 
The Tax Is: 
15% of the taxable income 
$3,228.75 plus 28% of 
the excess over $21,525 
$11,768.75 plus 31% of 
the excess over $52,025 
$20,216.25 plus 36% of 
the excess over $79,275 
$42,644.25 plus 39.6% of 
the excess over $141,575 
43 Applying the table 3 rate schedule for unmarried individuals, the tax due 
on taxable income of $50,000 would be $3,863 + 28% (50,000-25,750) or $10,653. 
Applying the table I rate schedule for joint return filers, the tax due on $50,000 would be 
$6,458 + 28% (50,000- 43,050), or $8,404. See supra note 42. 
24 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVI 
would instead owe $8,404.44 Filing as unmarried taxpayers would 
keep the entire income of each partner within the 15 percent bracket. 
The joint return, which requires them to aggregate their incomes, 
pushes $6,950 of income into the 28 percent bracket. 
The breakpoints for the four bottom tax rates are consistently 
higher for joint return filers than for unmarrieds, allowing more of the 
aggregated income of married taxpayers to be taxed at lower rates. 
These wider brackets - the more-than-one factor - reduce tax for 
sole earner couples. But the penalty effects of the less-than-two factor 
are also seen. Although joint return brackets are wider than those for 
unmarried individuals they are still not capacious enough to contain 
twice the income allowed to unmarried individuals in each marginal 
bracket. 
The 15 percent bracket ends at $25,750 for unmarrieds and at 
$43,050 for joint filers, placing 1.67 times more income into this 
bracket for married couples than for unmarried individuals. Similarly, 
the ceiling of the 28 percent bracket for unmarried individuals is 
$62,450, while joint filers do not reach the top of their 28 percent 
bracket until taxable income exceeds $104,050. Again, married joint 
filers are allowed 1.67 times more income before they are exposed to 
the next (higher) level of tax rates.45 These ratios are similar to the 
ratio between the standard deduction for joint return filers and the 
standard deduction for unmarried individuals. 
For the 31 percent rate, the breakpoint for the joint return is 
sti II higher but the top of the bracket is only 1.217 times that of the 31 
percent bracket ceiling for unmarrieds. At this point the bonus effect 
of the rate tables begins to shrink and the penalty effect becomes more 
dominant. This shift is even more apparent in the 36 percent bracket, 
which begins at $130,250 for unmarried individuals and at $158,550 
for joint filers. In effect, the marginal differences between the 
brackets for joint returns and unmarried individuals ends at $158,551 
of taxable income, which both tax rate schedules place in the 36 
percent bracket. In all filing statuses, except married filing separately, 
the 39.6 percent rate starts applying at the same amount taxable 
44 See supra note 42. 
45 Compare tbl. 1 and tbl. 3, supra note 42. 
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income - above $283,150 . For the married separate til ing status, the 
39.6 percent rate starts at $141,575, half the joint return breakpoint.46 
Only penalty effects are seen in the top bracket. If two 
unmarried individuals each had $283,150 of taxable income, their 
individual tax burdens would be $90,200.50, .or $180,401 combined. 
If they filed a joint return and aggregated their incomes as required, 
their joint tax would be $197,416 a marriage penalty of $17,416 for 
each year in which they were married and lucky enough to have this 
income. A sole earner with the same $566,300 of taxable income who 
filed as an unmarried individual would owe a total of $202,328, 
representing $90,201 on the first $283,150 and $112,127 on the 
second $283,150. If she and her spouse filed a joint return, the tax for 
this sole earner couple would be only $197,416,· but the $4,912 
marriage bonus arises entirely in the taxation of the income below the 
$283,150 mark. The second $283,150 bears a tax of $112,127 in the 
joint return as it would in the unmarried individual return.47 
The $17,000 that the dual earner couple with individual 
taxable incomes of $283,150 pays in the example above for the 
privilege of being married is a large amount of money by any 
standard. However, this is not the most onerous marriage penalty that 
the joint return system creates. If the two high-income spouses share 
this additional tax burden, it would amount to 3 percent of taxable 
income for each. Although the incidence of this tax may be hard to 
defend, the federal income tax has imposed even greater tax burdens 
on very large incomes within the past fifteen years. But marriage 
penalties that can grow to 8 to 10 percent of adjusted gross income for 
minimum wage earners simply seem unconscionable.48 
4. The Earned Income Tax Credit 
Unusually severe marriage penalties can occur in connection 
with the earned income tax credit. The earned income tax credit is a 
refundabl~ tax credit "intended to provide tax relief to low-income 
working individuals with child~en and t6 improve incentives to 
46 Compare tbls., supra note 42. 
47 . 
Compare tbl. 1 and tbl. 3, supra note 42. 
48 . CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 17-23. 
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work.,,49 In large measure the tax relief that it provides is 
compensation for social security and other flat rate payroll taxes 
collected from the earnings of minimum wage workers; it applies at 
income levels so low that regular federal income tax typically is not 
incurred. But these refundable credits are also clearly social welfare 
transfer payments to the working poor. 50 Nonetheless, earned income 
credits should be considered in assessing income tax marriage 
penalties and bonuses. Unlike most of the other social welfare 
payment systems, this one is included in the Internal Revenue Code 
and governed by the tax law's concepts of income.51 In particular, the 
explicit use of the joint return and the concept of unitary taxation of 
married couples in the determination of earned income tax credits 
make this regime very much a part of the joint return system. 
Earned income credits can be very substantial. The maximum 
credit payment of $3,816 is available to qualified working families 
with earned incomes between $9,540 and $12,460 and two or more 
children. At the bottom of this income range, receiving the full credit 
would represent a 40 percent increase in disposable income. Working 
parents with one qualified child in the home can also qualify for 
credits. The maximum for the one child family is $2,312 and is 
applicable when income is within the $6,800 to $12,460 range. The 
credits begin to phase out for all working parents at incomes above 
$12,460. The credits reach zero at the $30,580 income level for 
families with two or more children and at $26,928 for the one child 
unit. Childless adults with earned incomes in the range of $4,530 to 
$5,670 can also qualify for up to $347 of credits which are phased out 
completely at $10,200.52 
The income tests described above are applied to married 
couples on a completely unitary basis. The aggregated incomes of the 
married couple and the individual income of the unmarried person are 
both tested against the same income, or perhaps need, standard to 
determine eligibility for the EITC. The standard deduction, the tax 
49 1986 JOINT COMM. GENERAL EXPLANATION, at 27. 
50 See Anne L. Aistott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations 
of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 533-544 (1995). 
51 See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 17-23. 
52 See Rev. Proc. 98-61. 
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rate tables and most of the other credits require the married couple to 
aggregate income but then moderate the impact of the unitary income 
theory of married couples by adopting breakpoints that treat the 
married couple as more-than-one unit, although generally less-than-
two units. The earned income tax credit (EITC) does not make use of 
different income tests for taxpayers of different marital statuses. The 
same income floors and phase-out ceilings are applied to all 
taxpayers, married joint filers and unmarried individuals or heads of 
household alike. For purposes of determining eligibility for and the 
amount of the earned income credit, the married couple as a unit is 
equated to the unmarried individual.53 
In the earned income credit, the relationship between the joint 
return filing status and the unmarried individual filing status is not the 
more - than - one, less - than - two relationship seen in the tax rates 
and the standard deduction, but simply a one - to - one relationship. 
Thus, a married couple with earned income of $11,000 and one child 
is eligible for an earned income tax credit of $2,312. An unmarried 
individual who also has $11,000 of earned income and one child is 
entitled to the same refundable credit of $2,312.54 The marriage 
penalty potential in this structure is substantial. 
If the unmarried mother with one child and minimum wage 
level earnings of $11,000 mentioned above marries a father with his 
own $11,000 of earned income and his own child, they will suffer a 
marriage penalty equal to 12.8 percent of their newly aggregated 
. adjusted gross income of $22,000. As unmarried parents, neither 
owed any regular federal income tax (after giving effect to personal 
exemptions and standard deductions) and each was entitled to an 
earned income tax credit of $2,312. While they were unmarried, their 
combined refundable earned income tax credits equaled $4,624. 
Marriage reduced their total refundable credits to $1,807. They lost 
$2,817 in earned income credits, about 60 percent of what they had. 55 
53 Consistent with this unitary view, married persons are only eligible for the 
earned income tax credit at all if they file joint returns. See I.R.C. § 32(d) (1999). 
54 See I.R.C. § 32 (1999); see also Rev. Proc. 98-61, § 3.03. 
55 This example was computed using the following assumptions. Each 
unmarried parent had one child and qualified for the head of household standard 
deduction ($6,350) as well as two personal exemptions, eliminating taxable income for 
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In addition to the obvious marriage penalty potential here, 
there is also a marriage bonus opportunity that arises from the positive 
impact of increases in the number of children in the household on the 
available credits. If a childless sole earner whose income is within the 
maximum credit range marries the non·earner father of two children, 
they can qualify for the $3,816 credit.56 Indeed, as long as the 
marriage does not result in aggregate income that exceeds the phase 
out threshold, the marriage of a low-income parent and a low-income 
non-parent may increase rather than decre~se credits. But the income 
range within which credit increases could occur or within which credit 
decreases could be avoided by dual earner couples is very small in 
reality. The phaseout for the credit begins at $1.2,460 for families 
with children and at $5,670 for childless households. The minimum 
wage earning mother of two children who has an income of $9,540 is 
entitled to the maximum credit. If she marries a man whose earned 
income is· more than $2,920, she wiil start to lose her credits.57 
An even more drastic EITC marriage penalty was found to 
exist in an example qeveloped by the Congressional Budget Office. 
Computed on the basis of 1996 conditions, the CBO found that for a 
the adjusted gross incomes of $11 ,000. At $22,000 of joint return adjusted gross income, 
the married couple with two children would have taxable income of $1,800 and tax of 
$270. They can offset the $270 with the new nonrefundable child credit of $500 per child. 
I.R.C. § 24 (1999). While unmarried the two parents would each be entitled to an earned 
income tax credit of $2,312 or $4,624 in total. Married, they would compute their credit 
as follows: 3,816 - 21.06% (22,000 - 12,460) = $1,807. See I.R.C. § 32(a)(2) (1999); 
Rev. Proc. 98-61. This example is based on an illustration in the CBO Study that found a 
larger marriage penalty based on 1996 rates and without giving effect to the child credit 
which was not enacted until 1997. See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 21. Tax analyst 
Laura Wheaton runs the same example and finds a smaller penalty because she gives both 
children to one spouse and does not use two head of household deductions. Laura 
Wheaton, Low-Income Families and the Marriage Tax, 81, 125 (1998). It seems just as 
valid to compare the married earned income credit couple to two unmarried heads of 
household for two reasons. First, households and families composed of adults with 
children from different marriages are common today. Second, if we assume that 
taxpayers respond to tax incentives and disincentives as strong as those found with the 
earned income credit, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that they would try to 
optimize their tax outcomes by making use of existing tax benefits. Further, the CBO 
report also used two heads of household in a number of its simulations. 
56 . 
See I.R.C. § 32 (1999); accord Wheaton, supra note 55, at 126. 
57 See Rev. Proc. 98-61, 1998-521RB 18, § 3.03. 
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couple in which each spouse had earned income of $11 ,610 and there 
were four or more children, marriage caused a tax penalty of more 
than 25 percent of income. Filing as an unmarried parent with two 
children, each spouse would have had an earned income tax credit of 
$3,556. If they married, their aggregate credit was reduced to $1,111. 
The marriage penalty for this couple was $6,001, representing about 
25.8 percent of joint adjusted gross income.58 This couple's marriage 
penalty would be slightly increased to about 26 percent if the rates and 
limitations for 1999 were applied.59 
In essence, in the earned income tax credit, the joint return is 
used to aggregate incomes of husband and wife and then tax the 
aggregated sum under the same ability-to-pay tests applied to an 
unmarried individual. This use of unmoderated unitary taxation of 
married couples is reminiscent of the pre-1948 mandatory joint return 
idea, which was repeatedly advanced as a general solution to .the 
community property and income shifting controversies, but never 
adopted in the federal income tax.60 
5. Phaseouts 
Phaseouts are another source of income tax marriage penalties 
and bonuses that are growing in number and importance even as 
Congress is beginning to consider relief proposals. At an accelerating 
pace since the 1986 tax reform, Congress has been enacting new 
deductions and non-refundable tax credits for individuals. A 
58 CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 23. The CBO study also describes the 
potential for a marriage bonus in the earned income tax credit, which could occur when a 
low income non-parent forms a sole earner marriage with the parent of a qualifYing child. 
[d. at 20. 
59 Using 1999 rates and adjustments, there is no taxable income in either the 
married or unmarried scenario. The only issue is the limitation on the earned income 
credit. With adjusted gross income of $23,220, there would be $10,760 above the 
$12,460 phaseout threshold amount. Applying the phaseout percentage of 21.06% to the 
$10,760, and subtracting the product from the maximum credit of $3,816 produces an 
earned income credit of $1 ,550, which is $6,082 less than the total credits the two parents 
could have had as two unmarried heads of households. See I.R.C. § 32 (1999); see a/so 
Rev. Proc. 98-61. 
60 See infra notes 109-110 and accompanying discussion of mandatory joint 
returns. 
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substantial number of these provisions are limited in their application 
to taxpayers within specified income ranges through the mechanism 
of phaseouts based on adjusted gross income. By using income limits 
and the phaseout mechanism, Congress has been able to enact new 
and popular targeted tax cuts at lower revenue costs. This 
increasingly utilized technique allows not only programatic targeting 
but also income class targeting. Arguably it increases progressivity 
by excluding upper income taxpayers. Typical examples are seen in 
the new education tax breaks and the child credit. Older and equally 
problematic phaseout penalties are found in the exclusion for social 
security old age benefits and the dependent care tax credit, applicable 
to working parents. A recent congressional study confirms that 
because of special deductions and phaseouts very few taxpayers can 
determine their effective tax rate from the tax table's alone.61 
The new phaseouts have added visibility to the issue of 
marriage penalties and bonuses. But some of the older phaseout 
provisions continue to have a wide impact.62 With few exceptions, the 
phaseouts follow the familiar pattern of treating joint return filers as 
more than one unmarried taxpayer but less than two. Generally, the 
income ceiling for joint return filers is set at an amount that is greater 
than but not twice the amount of income allowed an unmarried filer. 
Hence phaseouts introduce both marriage penalties and marriage 
bonuses. 
The 105th Congress in 1997 made two noteworthy additions to 
the list of phaseouts. The first is the child tax credit. The child tax 
credit awards a $500, non-refundable tax credit per child. The 
phaseout for this credit begins at $110,000 of adjusted gross income 
for joint return filers but at $75,000 for unmarried parents, creating 
both a marriage bonus in the phaseout of $35,000 for sole earner 
61 1998 EFFECTIVE MARGINAL RATE STUDY, supra note 40 at 93-95. 
62 There are now some 60 different provisions in the Internal Revenue Code 
that can contribute to marriage penalties and marriage bonuses. See Hearing on the 
Marriage Penalty Before the House Cornrn, on Ways and Means, 105th Congo (1998) 
(statement of David Lifson, Vice Chair, Tax Executive Comm., American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants [AICPA]). TheAICPA testimony noted that it had found 
"at least 63 provisions in the Internal Revenue Code where tax liability depends on 
whether a taxpayer is married or single." [d. In addition, the AICPA identified 18 
different phaseout tests in 18 different provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. [d. 
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couples and a marriage penalty of $40,000 for dual earner couples.63 · 
The other newcomer that makes use of phaseouts based on marital 
status is the deduction for interest on student loans. The phaseout for 
this deduction begins at $40,000 for unmarried individuals and at 
$60,000 for joint return filers.64 Like the child credit phaseout, it 
confers a marriage bonus on sole earner couples and a marriage 
penalty on dual earner couples, following the pattern of a more 
generous benefit for the joint return filers that is still less than twice 
the allowance for unmarried individual filers. 
Another important provision in the penalty/bonus arena is the 
child care credit for working parents, which has long embodied 
numerical limits and income tests based on unitary income. Both of 
these features create marriage penalties. The child care credit sets 
$10,000 as the income ceiling for the maximum credit of $1,440 
applicable when the working parent or parents have two qualified 
children. Although this maximum is not attainable by either married 
or unmarried parents under present conditions, the $10,000 income 
ceiling for it is also the beginning of the phasedown of the credit rate 
from 30 percent to 20 percent.65 Like the earned income credit, the 
income test for the child care credit is applied to married couples on 
an unmodified unitary basis - the same income ceiling that is applied 
to the unmarried individual is also applied to the joint return of the 
two working parents. The marriage penalty created can be seen in the 
example of the dual earner couple who each has $15,000 of income. 
If unmarried, the child care credit rate applicable to each of them 
would be 27 percent. If married, with $30,000 of aggregate income, 
the credit rate would be reduced to 20 percent.66 Further, the amount 
of creditable child care expenditures is fixed by the statute and capped 
at $4,800 for each taxpaying unit, whether married or unmarried. An 
unmarried couple in which each partner has two children may be able 
to qualify for twice the child care credit that they could receive if 
63 See I.R.C. § 24(b )(2) (1999). 
64 See I.R.C. § 221 (b )(2) (1999). 
65 See I.R.C. § 21 (1999). See also Symposium: Panel III: Women. Child 
Care and Tax Treatment, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 203, 204 (remarks of Ann F. 
Thomas). 
66 See I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (1999). 
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married.67 
Marriage penalties and bonuses are also created by the 
individual retirement account (IRA) provisions. Unlike the other 
provisions of the tax law described in this section, the rules governing 
eligibility for the tax benefits of IRAs can create substantially 
different tax outcomes for married couples with the same aggregate 
incomes. Recent amendments allow sole earner married couples to 
create a homemaker's IRA and use tax deductible payments to fund it, 
even when their joint return income exceeds the levels at which dual 
earner married couples may be disqualified.68 The income tax 
differences that can result are substantial. But even more noticeable is 
that two lower income earners, whose combined efforts are required to 
bring them into the middle income range, lose the opportunity to use 
tax deferrals to enhance their retirement income security when a sole 
earner couple with more than twice the income continues to have such 
tax benefits available to them. 
For unmarried individuals, the basic version of the IRA allows 
a deduction of up to $2,000 for contributions to retirement savings 
accounts, provided the taxpayer is not an active participant in any 
other qualified plan for the year. There are no income limits for the 
IRA deduction unless the taxpayer is an active participant in another 
qualified pension plan during the year. Contribution deductions for 
unmarried individuals who are active participants in other plans begin 
to phaseout at a modified adjusted gross income of $31,000. For a 
married taxpayer who is also an active participant in a qualified plan, 
the phaseout starts at $51,000 of joint income.69 Hence two unmarried 
workers who each earn $30,000 and are each included in a pension 
plan at work, whether it is generous or stingy, may continue to claim a 
deduction for whatever they can manage to put aside for retirement 
67 See I.R.C. § 21 (1999). 
68 See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text; CBO STUDY, supra note 4, 
at 25 (describing penalty and bonus effects of lRAs before the changes in law described 
here). 
69 See I.R.C. § 219(a), (b), & (g) (1999). A new joint return income test for 
deductible contributions by one spouse when the other spouse is an active participant in 
an employer pension plan was added in the Tax Relief Act of 1997. See Tax Relief Act 
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 6005(a)( I )(A), III Stat. 788. 
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savings, up to $2,000 each. But marriage will reduce their permitted 
IRA deduction from $2,000 each to $200 each.70 
On the other hand, marriage and the availability of the higher 
income threshold for joint returns, will enable the sole earner of 
$60,000 who also participates in her employer's pension plan to 
qualify for a $200 IRA contribution deduction, providing there is no 
other income. On the basis of marital status, the sole earner became 
eligible for a deduction of $200 when she had had none as an 
unmarried person. The dual earner couple whose aggregate income is 
the same as the sole earner couple's is allowed two deductions of 
$200 each, for a .total of $400. Marriage causes them to lose a total of 
$3,600 in IRA contribution deductions. Until recently this result 
seemed to justify ascribing a one couple, one pension goal to the IRA 
retirement savings incentives. 
However, since 1998, sole earner couples like this one have 
been permitted to create a spousal IRA for the non-earner spouse and 
make up to $2,000 in deductible contributions for the year to his 
account.71 Thus a married couple with $60,000 of aggregate income 
can end up with IRA contribution deductions of $2,200 if it is a sole 
earner couple, and $400 of deductions if it is a dual earner couple, 
assuming all the earners are pension plan participants. Moreover, the 
70 The phaseout formula reduces the contribution deduction by 10% for every 
$1,000 that adjusted gross income exceeds the statutory amount. The reducing ratio is 
described in the statute as the ratio of the excess of adjusted gross income over the 
statutory amount for the year to $1 0,000 (going up to $20,000 for joint returns in the year 
2007). The statute includes a schedule of increases for the beginning of the phaseout that 
bring it up to $50,000 for unmarrieds and $80,000 for marrieds in the year 2007. See 
I.R.C. § 219(g) (1999). The IRA deduction is particularly valuable because it is an 
unreduced "above the line" adjustment to income. See I.R.C. § 62(a)(7) (1999). 
71 See I.R.C. § 219(g)(7) (1999). Before 1997, the spousal IRA gave rise to 
only $250 in contribution deductions. The amendments bringing it up to $2,000 were the 
result of an effort to give homemakers their own pensions. Rep. Nancy R. Johnson (R-
CT) and Senators Kate Hutchison (R-TX) and Barbara A. Mikulski (D-MD) introduced 
identical bills on January 26, 1995, described in their official titles as an amendment "to 
allow homemakers to get a full IRA deduction." The substance of these bills was 
included 'in the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, sec. 
1427, § 219(c), lIO Stat. 1755,1802. Rep. Johnson described the impact of the bill as 
enabling a non-working spouse to make deductible contributions "just as working spouses 
do under current law." Johnson's bill was entitled the Homemaker Relief Act of 1995. 
See H.R. 708, I04th Congo (1995). See also S. 287, I04th Congo (1995). 
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full IRA deduction is available to the spouse of a sole-earner pension-
plan participant at much higher income levels, up to joint return 
income of $150,000.72 It is unlikely but not impossible that the 
pensions of the husband and wife who both earn $30,000 would 
together match the pension benefits that the sole earner of $60,000 
will receive. It is certain that the employer provided pensions of the 
dual earners of $30,000 each will not produce anything like the level 
of income security that the earner of $150,000 will have from her 
pension. The spousal IRA contribution deduction creates a sizable 
income tax marriage bonus for sole earner couples and the spousal 
IRA itself creates a pension for the spouse engaged in home 
production rather than market work, as it was intended to do.73 These 
outcomes are the result of the policy choice to recognize differences in 
the income configurations of the sole earner couple and the dual 
earner couple, a choice that that joint return system generally rejects. 
Another noteworthy phaseout penalty has its impact on the 
elderly. Much of the focus of the controversy is on the impact of 
penalties and bonuses on the work force participation decisions of 
married women. However, the marriage penalty has also long been 
identified as a disincentive to marriage for the retired elderly who live 
on fixed incomes.74 A widow and widower each of whom has some 
72 This is the newly adopted ceiling for individuals whose spouse is an active 
participant and applies to dual earners as well when only one is a pension plan participant. 
See I.R.C. §§ 219(c), (g)(7) (1999). 
73 The Roth IRA, a retirement savings program that creates tax-free 
retirement benefits but is funded by after tax contributions, went into effect starting in 
1998. It also allows a spousal IRA for a non-earner spouse. Income ceilings do apply, 
phasing out at $160,000 for joint return filers and $110,000 for unmarrieds. There is a 
unitary income ceiling of $100,000 applicable to married couples and unmarried 
individuals in determining eligibility for roll over of other lRAs into a Roth IRA. See 
I.R.C. § 408A (1999); Treas. Reg. § 1.408A-3, 1.0408-4 (1999). 
74 See, e.g., Meylinda Dovel Wilcox, Love and Money, Senior Style, 
KIPLINGER'S PERSONAL FINANCE MAGAZINE, Oct. 1996, at 83 (reporting that "for many in 
the social security set, matrimony is out, pragmatism is in" because marriage can mean 
loss of spousal social security benefits and increased income taxes); Gail Levin 
Richmond, Taxes and the Elderly: An Introdllction, 19 NOVA L. REv. 587 (1995). The 
new exclusion of capital gains from the sale of the principle residence which was intended 
to remove tax disincentives to the sale of what for many Americans represents the greater 
part of their assets, contains a sizable marriage bonus and a widow's penalty. Joint return 
filers can exclude up to $500,000 of gain but for unmarried individuals, including widows 
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income in addition to their social security benefits may face a 
marriage penalty peculiar to their part of life, in addition to the general 
marriage penalties in the standard deduction and the tax rate tables. 
The extent to which social security old age benefits are taxable in 
current law depends upon the amount of income from other sources 
that the taxpayer has. For married couples, individual incomes must 
be aggregated and reported on a joint return in order to qualify for the 
most beneficial outcome under the exclusion formula. The formula is 
based on income tests that allow joint return filers more than an 
unmarried individual is allowed but much less than twice as much. 
The ratio is closer to 1.36.75 
B. Measuring Penalties and Bonuses 
These then are the mechanics of the taxation of married 
couples and the tax law rules that give rise to the more prominent 
marriage penalties and bonuses.76 The actual impact of marital status 
on any particular couple is determined by the couple's individual 
circumstances and which of a myriad of provisions could be 
applicable to them in a given year. Individual examples therefore may 
be illustrative of structural sources of penalties and bonuses but 
cannot convey the magnitude of the issue very well.77 Broader 
and widowers who no longer qualify as surviving spouses, the exclusion is reduced by 
half, to $250,000. See I.R.C. § \21 (\999). 
75 See I.R.C. § 84(c) (\999). The base amount for married joint filers is 
$34,000; for unmarried individuals it is $25,000. 
76 See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 25 (finding most significant sources of 
bonuses and penalties for low incomes are standard deduction, non-earners personal 
exemption and earned income credit; for high incomes, tax-brackets are described as the 
primary source of bonuses and penalties). 
77 The actual marriage penalty or marriage bonus to which any given couple 
is subject depends upon which of the many provisions that now carry penalty and bonus 
consequences will be applicable to them in the tax year in question. There is much 
variation between individuals. One taxpayer may, for example, claim the child care credit 
while another makes use of the social security old age benefit exclusion formula and a 
third uses both, the child care credit also being applicable to expenses in connection with 
the care of other dependents, including an elderly spouse or sibling in the household who 
suffers from Altzheimer's. See I.R.C. § 2\(b)(l) (\999) (qualifying individual includes a 
spouse or dependent who is "physically or mentally incapable of caring for himself'). Of 
course, for any given couple, marriage penalties and marriage bonuses may change from 
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statistical analysis and more generalized estimates such as those 
reported in the 1997 Congressional Budget Office report are necessary 
for an understanding of the economic and social impact of marriage 
penalties and bonuses as well as the revenue implications of proposed 
changes.78 These simulations more clearly indicate the magnitude and 
distribution of marriage penalties and bonuses, both of which vary 
significantly across income classes and racial groups.79 
From the point of view of the fisc, the joint return system is a 
revenue loser. The latest estimates, which are for 1996, show total 
marriage penalties of about $28.8 billion and marriage bonuses of 
some $32.9 billion.80 These numbers indicate that if the joint return 
were repealed and all married couples were required .to file as if 
unmarried, total federal income tax liability, and likely, revenue, 
would go up by $4.1 billion. Average penalties and bonuses give 
some indication of the substantial size of these shifts for the 
individuals. Penalties averaged $1,380 and bonuses $1,300; some 
20.9 million married couples paid penalties and 25.3 million received 
year to year as the individual incomes change in absolute amount and relative to each 
other and different choices are made about claiming the standard deduction or itemizing. 
78 The key issues in measuring marriage penalties and bonuses are division 
of earnings, income from investments and deductions and also the filing status that are 
used in the unmarried comparison model. Accord Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the 
Income Tax. 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 339,381-401 (1994) (discussing choices to be made in 
the design of a mandatory separate filing system). The primary measure ("basic 
measure") in the CBO simulations assigned earnings to the earner, deductions to 
associated income and investment income in proportion to earned income. The standard 
deduction was used when it exceeded itemized deductions. In constructing the unmarried 
taxpayer model for comparison to the joint return filer, the presence or absence of 
children in the household can be significant because it may enable the parent to use the 
head of household filing status and its more generous rate tables and standard deduction. 
The CBO basic measure used head of household status for both partners when the 
presence of two or children would make it applicable, producing larger penalties and 
smaller bonuses than are seen when the unmarried individual status is the standard for 
comparison. The earned income credit was also allowed to both where applicable. Both 
choices seem reasonable if one of the goals is to understand existing tax incentives and 
disincentives. See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 27-29, see also supra notes 6, 7, & 55. 
79 See infra note 95 and accompanying text for disc.ussion of impact of race 
on distribution of marriage penalties and bonuses. For a fuller discussion of this issue: 
see Dorothy Brown. The Marriage Penalty/Bonus Debate: Legislative Issues in Black and 
White, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 287 (1999). 
80 CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at tbl. 4 (basic measure). 
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bonuses.81 
The largest average penalty and bonus amounts were seen at 
income levels above $100,000, not very surprising since the higher 
marginal rates at that level would magnify the impact of deductions 
gained or lost as a result of filing status. But the amounts are 
themselves noteworthy. At this level, the average penalty was $2,640 
and the average bonus was $2,970, representing 1.4 percent and 1.2 
percent of adjusted gross income, respectively.82 
In comparison, at the lowest end of the income scale, the 
impact of penalties and bonuses is much greater although the average 
dollar amounts are smaller. For joint returns with adjusted gross 
income below $20,000 average penalties were $770 and bonuses 
$680. But in this income range such amounts represent a more 
significant portion of income. The average penalty for incomes below 
$20,000 represented the loss of 7.6 percent of adjusted gross income. 
The average bonus represented a gain to disposable income of 5 
percent of adjusted gross income. From the earned income credit 
example discussed above, it is easy to see how marriage penalties as 
large as 8 percent and even larger could be created for very low-
income people. It is more difficult to find a distributive justice or 
social policy goal that is served by such outcomes. 
About 70 percent of joint returns for 1996 reported aggregate 
adjusted gross income in the range of $20,000 to $100,000. In this 
middle range, the picture of marriage penalties and bonuses is more 
complex and a significant shift occurs at the $50,000 mark.83 Joint 
return filers with incomes between $20,000 and $50,000 received the 
largest share of both penalties and bonuses measured by income class 
in the study. This income group paid some 38.5 percent of the 
penalties and other married couples in the same income range 
received about 41 percent of the bonuses.84 The number of couples 
with bonuses predominated and their average bonus was $870, equal 
to 2.6 percent of income. Marriage penalty couples in this income 
81 Jd. 
82 Jd. at tbl. 6. 
83 Jd. at tbls. 5, 6. 
84 Jd. at tbl. 6. 
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category paid penalties that were substantially greater, $1,190 on 
average, representing some 3.2 percent of income.85 In the $50,000 to 
$100,000 income category, the penalty couples outnumbered the 
bonus couples by 1.8 million but the bonus couples received $2.4 
billion more in bonuses than the penalty couples paid in penalties.86 
A verage bonuses jump to $1,880 at this income level and represent a 
larger share of income - 2.8 percent - than they do for couples in 
the $20,000 to $50,000 range. Penalties, which average $1,240 cost 
about 1.7 percent of income.87 
Overall, almost 60 percent of bonuses are received by joint 
returns with adjusted gross incomes above $50,000, an income group 
that includes. only 44 percent of joint return filing couples. Almost 62 
percent of the penalties are paid by this income group as well. The 
dollar amount of average penalties and bonuses rises with income, 
from bonuses of $680 at incomes below $20,000 to bonuses of $2,970 
at levels above $100,000. Penalties follow the same pattern: 
averaging $770 at the bottom and $2,640 at the top. On the other 
hand, penalties and bonuses become proportionately smaller as 
income rises, indicating that couples with lower aggregate incomes 
may be affected more profoundly in both directions than are couples 
with higher incomes and larger dollar amounts of penalties and 
bonuses.88 One measure of the severity of the marriage penalty for 
low-income families is that for those with incomes below $20,000, 
marriage penalties averaged 7.6 percent of income while the average 
penalty for couples with more than $100,000 of income was 1.4 
percent of income. 89 
C. Change and Context 
The marriage penalties and bonuses described and quantified 
above arise from many different provisions of the federal income tax 
85 /d. at tbl. 6. 
86 [d. at tbl. 6. 
87 /d. at tbl. 6. 
88 [d. at tbl. 32. 
89 See Wheaton, supra note 55, at 125-26. 
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statute. More fundamentally, they all arise from the joint return, 
which treats the married couple as one taxpaying unit, disregarding 
the income configuration within the marriage and looking at 
aggregated income only. The unitary view of married couples is 
adhered to more or less rigorously in specific provisions, more often 
moderated by treating the married couple as being more-than-one 
individual taxpaying unit but less-than-two. This approach to the 
taxation of married cO\Jples, typified by the standard deduction, 
simultaneously creates the potential for marriage bonuses and 
marriage penalties. The one provision that looks within the joint 
return to take individual income characteristics of spouses into 
account in order create a marriage bonus, the individual retirement 
account provisions, exacerbates its marriage penalties because it 
applies a more stringent aggregation of incomes requirement to dual 
earners. 
When presented with the tax outcomes described here, many 
people find income tax marriage penalties and marriage bonuses to be 
unfair or distasteful or irrational, as the terminology of the discussion 
suggests. One of the Republican Presidential candidates this year has 
called marriage penalties "obscene," an assessment that no doubt 
would have been shared by the feminist legal scholar whose path 
breaking 1971 critique on this subject was entitled Sexism in the 
Code.90 Writing in a law journal a generation ago, Grace Blumberg 
described the income tax law as perpetuating a pattern of work 
disincentives for married women "inconsistent with the principle of 
sexual equality enunciated in title VII" and arguing for the "social and 
political desirability of neutral taxation for married women.'.9i But it 
is necessary to go beyond the mechanics of the taxation of married 
couples to understand fully the choices that current tax policy reflects. 
An important part of this analysis lies in the realm of tax theory, in the 
relationship between the aggregation of income idea of the joint return 
and the progressivity of the income tax, a problem that is discussed in 
90 See John McCain Presidential Campaign Website, (visited Nov. 7, 1999) 
<http://www.mccain2000.com>; see also Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A 
Comprehensive Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. 
REV. 49 (1971). 
91 Blumberg, supra note 90, at 49, 95. 
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the next section which also traces the historical development of the 
joint return. 
Another aspect of the fairness question that underlies the 
discussion of marriage penalties and bonuses is that . increasing 
numbers of married couples are paying what they have come to regard 
as extra taxes. The profound changes in the labor force participation 
rates of married women have very significantly altered the incidence 
of marriage penalties and bonuses over the past 30 years. The 
structural choices in the income tax law that produce different tax 
outcomes on the basis of marital status have come to have a different 
meaning for increasing numbers of. married women and their 
husbands. 
The extent to which increases in marriage penalties can be 
attributed to the increased labor force participation of married women 
was demonstrated in a 1996 study by Aim and Whittington described 
in the eBO report. The study examined what the marriage penalty 
and marriage bonus effects would have been for married couples in 
1969 had current income tax law applied to their joint returns. Only 
about 30 percent of married couples in 1969 would have been penalty 
couples if present tax law had applied to them, while 64 percent 
would have been marriage bonus couples. But this study found that 
by 1996 the two groups were almost equal: some 47 percent paid 
marriage penalties and some 48 percent received bonuses.92 The 
proportion of penalty couples during this period increased by more 
than 50 percent while the percentage of bonus couples declined to 
about three quarters of its prior level. 
The period during which this shift occurred saw massive 
changes in the work force participation of married women. Almost 52 
percent of working-age married couples in 1969 were sole earner 
couples, however, by 1995 the percentage of sole earner joint returns 
had diminished to less than 40 percent. During these two and one half 
decades, the increase in dual earner couples with relatively equal 
incomes has been even more dramatic. The 1969 data shows that in 
only 17 percent of married couples did each spouse contribute at least 
92 See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at tbls. 16, 18 (reporting on the James Aim 
& Leslie Whittington study, The Rise and Fall and Rise . .. of/he Marriage Tax, 49 NAT. 
TAXJ. 571 (1996». 
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one third of earnings, the measure of parity in incomes that is 
associated with the gre~test incidence of marriage penalties today.93 
But by 1996, some 33.9 percent of working age marriages were in this 
category - almost a doubling over a twenty-six year period - and 
some 90 percent of them were also marriage penalty couples.94 The 
conclusion is clear. Holding the tax law and its penalty and bonus 
producing provisions constant, a comparison of the married couples of 
1996 with the married couples of 1969 demonstrates that it is the entry 
of married women into paid employ'ment that created the conditions in 
which penalty and bonus effects are felt. The decline of the sole 
earner marriage has resulted in the growth of marriage penalties. 
Significant as these trends in the paid employment and 
earnings of married women are, they do not represent the patterns 
seen in all groups over the past _ thirty years. Married African-
American women were already _ in the labor force in greater 
proportions than were White women in 1969 and hence were more 
likely to have been in marriage penalty couples even then.95 Today, 
married Black women are still more likely to be in a dual earner 
marriage than a White woman although the gap has narrowed 
substantially since the middle of the century. But there are other 
differences as well. A higher proportion of African-American wives 
earn at least half as much as their husbands do. Professor Dorothy 
Brown attributes these different patterns of marriage and employment 
to a number of factors, including the smaller proportion of African-
American men in the highest salary quartiles. Whatever the reasons, 
the effect on marriage bonuses and penalties is rather direct. With 
fewer sole earners among black couples eligible to file joint returns, 
disproportionately fewer marriage bonuses are seen and more 
penalties paid.96 
Fairness is-one of the criteria by which a tax system is judged. 
93 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
94 SuCBO STUDY, supra note 4, at tbls. 16, 18 compare supra note 9. 
95 See CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN tbl. 2.1 (1990) (showing a 50% labor force participation 
rate for married women of Color in 1970 and a 38.5% rate for married White women in 
the same census). 
96 See Brown, supra note 79. 
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Fairness in taxation is generally understood to mean that taxpayers 
with equal ability to pay should pay equal amounts of tax.97 This is a 
rule of practical politics as much as it is a tenant of moral philosophy. 
Taxes that are perceived as being unfair can only be extracted with 
great effort and at great cost. Taxes are only collectible when they are 
accepted as being reasonably, although perhaps not perfectly, 
equitable. Little inequities should be expected and generally will be 
ignored. Larger inequities are more difficult to ignore, even when 
they may not be purposeful. When many taxpayers are subjected to 
outcomes that they view as unfair, the integrity of the entire tax 
system may be in question. Tax theorist Michael Graetz has 
concluded that marriage penalties are a particular threat to the income 
tax. He finds that "the American public rightly loses respect for the 
law" when it is seen to so widely require couples "to pay higher taxes 
solely because they have married.,,98 This observation, and indeed the 
current discussion of marriage penalties, may suggest that ideas about 
the standards for measuring fairness in the taxation of married couples 
are changing in the United States. 
D. Development of the Joint Return System 
The very discussion of marriage penalties and bonuses 
proceeds from a premise that is antithetical to the joint return - the 
idea that fairness in taxation requires the recognition of the individual 
income characteristics of husband and wife. The joint return of today 
is the instrument of quite a different vision of tax equity - the goal of 
equal taxation of married couples with equal incomes. It came into 
the income tax in 1948 and its development since then has been 
surprisingly haphazard for an issue of such fundamental importance to 
a tax system as the design of the 'unit of taxation. Both the theory and 
the practice of the joint return are under attack today in the debate 
97 See. e.g., MICHAEL 1. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 31 (3d ed. 1995) (note introducing criteria for 
evaluating taxes). 
98 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 7, 39-
40 (1997) (arguing that tax compliance and perception of consistency of tax system with 
moral values and social norms are linked) . 
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over marriage penalties and marriage bonuses. 
1. The Choice of the Joint Return 
The adoption of the new joint return filing status in 1948 
represented the explicit tax policy choice to make the equal taxation of 
married couples with equal incomes the governing principle in the 
taxation of marriage. The new joint return, which required husband 
and wife to aggregate incomes, ended several controversies 
concerning the taxation of married couples. It largely erased the 
. disparities in the taxation of married couples in the two different 
marital property regimes, ending the long controversy over the impact 
of community property law. It also ended what the Treasury saw as a 
larger problem of widespread tax evasion in which wives were the 
foils of tax shirking husbands.99 
Prior to the 1948 joint return husband and wife were treated as 
separate individuals in the income tax except to the extent that they 
were required to share a married couple's personal deduction. lOo The 
99 Several sources support the conclusion that Treasury's concerns about tax 
avoidance by married couples went beyond the community property issue. The central 
theorist of the 1948 joint return, Harvard Law School Professor Surrey, argued that 
inequities in taxation of married couples resulted if couples with different income 
configurations but the same total incomes did not bear the same tax burden. In Surrey's 
analysis the outcome is inequitable whether the difference arises from marital property 
law, the division of income producing property or family partnerships. He describes his 
per capita joint return proposal as "equalizing the tax treatment of married couples 
regardless of the character of their income or their geographical location." Stanley S. 
Surrey, Family Income and Federal Taxation, 24 TAXES 980, 982-84, 987 (1946). 
Accord Boris Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 
1397, 1416 (1975) (discussing the Senate Finance Committee Report in 1948). In its 
attacks on income splitting through family partnerships in the 1930s and 1940s, the IRS 
treated wives who worked full time in the family business as making no separable 
economic contribution. See also Carolyn Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax 
Law and Gender Roles in the 1940s, Legal History Program, Working Papers, Series 2, 
May 1987,30-63 (history of family partnership cases). 
100 The relationship between the individual and married couple's personal 
deduction varied over the years between 1913 and 1948. When the married couple's 
deduction was greater than the unmarried person's, a sole earner couple had a marriage 
bonus to that extent. The dual income couple suffered a marriage penalty whenever the 
married couple's deduction was less than twice the individual's. See Symposium: Panel 
II: Observing Money, Marriage and Taxation, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 127, at 127-
28 (1999) (remarks of Ann F. Thomas quantifying the amount of marriage penalty and 
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same progressive tax rate schedule applied to everyone, so although 
aggregation of income by married couples was permitted on a 
voluntary basis, it generally was disadvantageous, exposing income to 
higher rates than would apply if each spouse reported individual 
income only.IOI However, in this system of individual taxpayers, 
disaggregating income could be very advantageous. If, for example, a 
spouse with $] 0,000 of income in the 50 percent marginal surtax 
bracket could shift that amount to a spouse whose marginal tax rate on 
this sum would be only 25 percent, half the tax otherwise due would 
be saved. Tax brackets were often quite high in this era; during both 
world wars, they rose above 70 percent. 102 But even at lower rates, 
many taxpayers sought what Stanley Surrey (the tax theorist who was 
the architect of the 1948 joint return) called "the thrill that comes from 
sliding down a progressive rate scale."I03 
In ] 930 married couples living in the eight community 
property law states succeeded in establishing the right to split their 
incomes from all sources into two equal shares when filing their 
individual income tax returns. Their theory was that community 
property law gave the wife an interest in half the marital community 
even though the husband earned, controlled and managed all property 
and income during the marriage. The Supreme Court sustained this 
marriage bonus in 1913}. See, e.g., Tariff Act of October 3, 1913,38 Stat. 114, 168 
(codified as I.R.C. § IIA (19\3»; see also GLADYS BLAKEY & ROY BLAKEY, tHE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX tbl. 20 (1940) (compiling the personal exemptions for married and 
unmarried taxpayers and dependents from 1913 through 1939). 
101 A married couple was permitted to file a different kind of joint return 
between 1918 and 1948 but its primary benefits were that it allowed losses of one spouse 
to offset gains of the other and, if combined adjusted gross income was greater, a large 
charitable contribution might be possible. See Bittker, supra note 99, at 1400, n.20. The 
Internal Revenue Service tried to compel joint return filers accept joint and several 
liability for tax due for the year but was unsuccessful until Congress enacted an 
authorizing provision in 1938. See Beck, supra note 20, at 458-59. 
102 . See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, sllpra note 100, at tbls. 20-21; GRAETZ & 
SCHENK, sllpra note 97, at 9. Prior to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; the tax rates 
were a composite of the normal tax and the surtax. . 
103 See Surrey, supra note 99, at 980. The 1948 joint return was widely 
called the Surrey Plan and generally traced to his 1946 proposal, originally. delivered as a 
speech at the Thirty-ninth Annual Conference of the National Tax Association, published 
in Taxes. See e.g., Bittker, supra note 99, at 1412-1414. 
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view in Poe v. Seaborn in 1930. 104 
This ruling meant that a sole earner husband in, for example, 
a community property law state such as Texas paid tax on half his 
salary and his wife reported and paid tax on the other half, whether or 
not she ever saw or controlled a penny of it. By contrast if they lived 
in Indiana, which was a common law state, he alone would have been 
the taxpayer on all of his earnings. If he earned $15,000 and the rate 
schedule required a 20 percent tax on the first $10,000 and a 30 
percent tax on the next $5,000, he would have owed $3,500 in tax, 
living in Indiana. But living in Texas, the total tax was reduced to 
$3,000. The Texas sole earner and his wife each reported income of 
$7,500, keeping. the entire amount in the 20 percent bracket. Each 
paid a tax of $1 ,500. Indeed, they could each report up to $10,000 in 
the bottom tax bracket. The tax brackets for married couples in 
community property states functionally were twice as wide as those 
stated in the statutory tax rate schedule. 
In the same year another development in tax jurisprudence 
confirmed that the vast majority of married couples in the United 
States - those living in the common law states - were to be required 
to pay tax on the basis of those statutory rates and could not split 
income from salaries. The Supreme Court ruled that the Internal 
Revenue Service was correct in its view that the earner of income 
could not by private contract or agreement between the spouses shift 
any portion of his personal service income to his wife. Spouses in the 
40 common law states could make tax-effective transfers of income 
from property but only if they also transferred ownership and control 
of the property to the other spouse. 105 
By 1948 several states had adopted community property law 
in order to allow their residents to take of advantage of the Poe v. 
Seaborn exception and reduce their taxes. Other states were 
reluctantly considering doing the same but many called on Congress 
to solve for them what was described as the problem of geographic 
104 See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); see also Bittker, supra note 99, 
at 1399-1408 (discussing pre-I 948 taxation). Tax rates in the example in the text are not 
actual 1930 tax rates. 
105 See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. III (1930); Bittker, supra note 99, at 1399-
1408. 
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disparity in taxation. They looked to Congress to spare them the 
difficult choice between reducing taxes and giving wives rights that 
the legislatures only vaguely understood in the property of their 
husbands. 106 
Several solutions were available to Congress, including 
conforming the tax treatment of earned income, one way or the other, 
for the two marital property regimes. 107 Another possibility was to 
amend the federal income tax statute to specify that community 
property law would not determine the identity of the taxpayer, perhaps 
establishing actual control of income rather than vested interest as the 
test. Congress had not yet tried this approach in the income tax statute 
but there was reason to think that the Supreme Court would accept 
such a legislative decision fully.108 
106 Much of their reluctance came from concern about changing the substance 
of marital property rights and the possibility that it might give wives control over the 
property or income of their husbands. A few states repealed their new community 
property statutes after very brief experience. See Jones, supra note 99, at 15-28. The 
Senate Finance Committee asserted that the 1948 joint return would produce "substantial 
geographical equalization" in taxation. Bittker, supra note 99, at 1412 (quoting Senate 
Finance Committee). 
107 See Jones, supra note 99, at 62-68. Professor Jones reports a 1948 
proposal to allow income splitting on the basis of a marital partnership agreement and 
finds that it would have had the effect of reversing Lucas v. Earl. /d. See also discussion 
of Lucas v. Earl and Poe v. Seaborn in Bittker, supra note 99, at 1400-1408 (noting 
inconsistencies and suggesting that a different result in Lucas v. Earl would have 
improved tax equity). 
108 The emphasis that the Supreme Court put on control of income by the 
husband in United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926), in assessing the California 
marital property regime can be read as an invitation to Congress to speak to the issue and 
delineate the impact that it wished to see community property law have on taxation. But 
when Poe v. Seaborn reached the Court four years later, Congress had still not spoken to 
this question although the issue had been debated. See Thomas, supra note 20. While 
Surrey blames the Supreme Court for inconsistency in Poe v. Seaborn and Lucas v. Earl, 
he also acknowledges that "the judicial process is not the appropriate medium, and that a 
legislative solution is required." Surrey, supra note 99, at 984. By 1945 the Supreme 
Court had already sustained the efforts of Congress to reduce the tax benefits of 
community property in estate and gift taxation. As Professor Bittker suggests, the 
prospects of the Court sustaining legislation to reverse the impact of community property 
in the income tax were also good. Bittker, supra note 99, at n.60. But the political 
prospects for enactment of such legislation were poor; Surrey noted in 1946 that "the 
community property forces are adding to their congressional strength:' Surrey, supra 
note 99, at 984. 
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The solution to the community property problem that the 
Treasury had promoted during the Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
administration was simply to require married couples to file a 
common return in which husband and wife aggregated their incomes. 
The tax due on this mandatory joint return was to be determined by 
using the same rate tables that applied to unmarried taxpayers. For 
sole income couples in common law states the mandatory joint return 
would not have changed anything, but it would have ended the income 
splitting tax· benefits of the community property law regime. The 
mandatory joint return would also have imposed large marriage 
penalties on dual earner and other dual income couples. This was in a 
sense its purpose; the Treasury regarded the husband as the real 
economic owner of the income and any arrangement that attributed his 
income to anyone else as tax avoidance. 109 The mandatory joint 
return was shouted down in 1941 and 1942.110 
The version of the joint return adopted in 1948 went quite in 
the opposite direction. Although it required income aggregation, it 
also allowed income splitting. In effect it made the tax outcome of 
community property law applicable to all married couples in all 
marital property systems. To determine their tax liability on the joint 
return, husband and wife added their individual incomes together, 
divided the total in half and then computed the tax on one-half their 
109 See Surrey, supra note 99, at 980,984 (describing husband as source of 
earned income and capital accumulation and later, noting with approval judicial efforts to 
"build a wall around the husband with a variety of anti-avoidance rules"). 
110 For another description of the mandatory joint return proposal see Surrey, 
supra note 99, at 984. Women's groups including the National Federation of Business 
and Professional Women and the General Federation of Women's Clubs vigorously 
opposed the mandatory joint return. - See Jones, supra note 99, at 66-67; GENERAL 
FEDERATION OF WOMEN'S CLUBS CONVENTION RESOLUTION ON MANDATORY JOINT 
INCOME TAX (1942-1948) (copy on file with author). One opponent of the 1948 income 
splitting joint return described the rejection of the mandatory joint return in the following 
terms: "Every time the mandatory joint return issue has been raised, hosts of gold-plated 
suffragettes have descended on Congress to reenact their epic drama regarding women's 
rights, and claim that all will be lost if ever a wife must file a joint return with her 
husband and thereby be relegated to "economic slavery." The real issues thereby 
muddled, various moralists and misled church groups joined the battle and a deafening 
thunder of cries about marriage, morals, economic serfdom, and the like killed any further 
relevant determination or any action." Hearings on Reduction of Individual Income Taxes 
before Sen. Comm. on Finance, 80th Congo 279 (1948) (statement of Paul J. Foley). 
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aggregated income. They doubled the amount of tax on the one-half 
to determine the tax due on the whole on their joint return. I I I Married 
joint filers and unmarried individual filers used the same graduated 
rate schedule so the effect of the joint return was to give married 
couples the use of tax brackets that were twice as wide as those for 
unmarried individuals. 112 
The Republican controlled 80th Congress enacted the income-
splitting joint return l13 as part of a massive tax cut. It was the 
cornerstone of the third tax cut bill that the 80th Congress passed. 
President Truman vetoed all three bills, but the popularity of the new 
income-splitting joint return helped attract the· votes to over-ride the 
President's third tax cut veto: 14 The campaign slogan of the 
Republicans in the 80th Congress was "Had Enough?" and it spoke to 
their conservatism and their intention to reduce government spending 
and block the Democratic President's liberal and expensive domestic 
programs. I 15 The principle of unitary taxation of married couples, 
also pursued in the failed mandatory joint return proposals, was 
enacted at the cost of the loss of considerable progressivity in the 
income tax. I 16 
III Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, sec. 301-303, §§ 12, 23(aa)(1 )(A), 
(aa)(4), & SI(b), 62 Stat. 114-15 (passed April 2, 1948, over presidential veto). See also 
Jones, supra note 99, at 2. 
112 For example, if the lowest bracket taxed income up to $4,000 at the rate 
of 10%, and income above that amount at 20%, a married couple with $8,000 income 
filing the income splitting joint return would pay $800 tax while an unmarried person 
with the same income paid $1,200. The 1948 joint return puts $4,000 into the \0% 
bracket, calculates tax of $400 and doubles it to find a total tax of $800. In effect the 
splitting and doubling allows $8,000 to be taxed in a bracket intended to be $4,000 wide. 
I \3 Professor Jones uses the term "income splitting joint return" to describe 
the 1948 enactment and this article adopts this very useful and informative term as well. 
Jones, supra note 99, at I. 
114 1d. at 2, 63-68 (providing a detailed account of the Revenue Act of 1948). 
115 See ALAN BRINKLEY, THE UNFINISHED NATION: A CONCISE HISTORY OF 
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 787 (1997). 
116 It was part of the tax reduction bill that Congress enacted over the veto of 
President Truman and it carried an estimated revenue loss of $803.5 million. See Jones, 
supra note 99, at 63-64; Bruce Bartlett, The Marriage Penalty: Origins. Effects and 
Solutions, 80 TAX NOTES 1341, 1343, tbl. 3 (\ 998) (describing impact of the Revenue Act 
of 1948: "almost every married couple saw a sharp reduction in their marginal tax rate"). 
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But income aggregation advocates like Treasury Tax 
Legislative Counsel Stanley Surrey regarded at least part of the-tax cut 
as well spent because it introduced a better system: the system of 
equal taxation of married couples with equal incomes. He described it 
as the "one bright spot" in the tax bill that his administration had 
vetoed. 1I7 The Treasury regarded the husband as "providing both the 
dollars of income and the accumulation of capital producing 
additional dollars of income."lls Any doctrine or arrangement that 
moved taxable income (and tax liability) away from the husband was 
viewed as a tax avoidance device. According to Surrey, the 
Treasury's leading tax theorist at the time, "normally, the husband 
pays income tax" on all of "these dollars.,,119 Aggregating the 
incomes of husband and wife correctly collected the income into one 
taxpaying unit rather than allowing it to be divided between two units 
in a manner he regarded as artificial. The new joint return established 
this important principle. The tax cut aspects were part of the cost of 
establishing the principle. Moreover, Surrey indicated that he did not 
think full income splitting should be a permanent feature of the tax 
rates. 120 
2. Income Theory and the Joint Return 
Whatever political and practical ends its enactment in 1948 
117 See Bittker, supra note 99, at 1413 (quoting Surrey's appraisal of the 
Revenue Act of 1948: "The adoption of a presently acceptable solution to the family 
income problem represents the one bright spot in the Revenue Act of 1948"). 
lIS This is Surrey's premise in the 1946 proposal, made when he was Tax 
Legislative Counsel at Treasury. Surrey, supra note 99, at 980. 
119 Id. The 1948 joint return made the husband and wife liable for tax on the 
unit's income for the year through its imposition of joint and several liability. 
120 The Internal Revenue Service challenged the' wife's partnership in family 
businesses in cases in which the wife's role ranged from having babies to running the 
poultry department of the grocery store. See Jones, supra note 99, at 30-63 (describing 
the family partnership cases litigated in the 1940's). Surrey in his proposal for the joint 
return mentions family partnerships as one of the income splitting tax avoidance devices 
that demonstrated the importance of aggregation in the taxation of married couples. 
Surrey, supra note 99, at 981-82,985-87. On the issue of income splitting itself, in his 
1946 proposal Surrey took the view that "ability to pay" considerations would place the 
correct tax burden for married couples between "per capita" (split income) taxation and 
the mandatory joint return (unitary taxation). Id. 
50 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVI 
may have served, the income splitting joint return brought with it into 
the federal income tax a number of assumptions about marriage and 
tax theory that continue to affect tax policy and tax outcomes today. 
The income-splitting joint return had a substantial marriage bonus 
effect for sole earner couples.12I Even though it did not introduce 
systemic marriage penalties measured by changes in the tax burden of 
couples, the 1948 joint return did introduce the secondary earner or 
stacking problem. Aggregation of incomes for the spouses in the 
progressive income tax tended to increase effective tax rates for the 
low earner in the couple, who typicaIly was the wife. 122 
Despite the commitment to "equalize the treatment of married 
couples regardless of the character of their income," Surrey's initial 
proposal held out the possibility that dual earner marriages might be 
treated differently. Surrey apparently thought "the problem of the 
working wife" in a joint return should be solved with additional 
deductions although whether these would relate to additional costs of 
dual employment, child care or something else is not clear from his 
1946 proposal.1 23 
But the example of the dual earner marriage also presented 
another income theory issue that contained a deeper criticism of the 
goal of taxing couples with equal incomes equally. Surrey 
acknowledged that the "problem of the working wife" raised the issue 
121 See Surrey, supra note 99; accord Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Liberals, 
Loopholes, and Long-term Growth: Equity, Growth and Gender in Postwar Tax Policy, 
1948-1960, at 6-25 (unpublished paper presented at the American Society for Legal 
History Annual Meeting Oct. 21-23, 1999) (on file with author) (cited with Mr. Ventry's 
permission). 
122 Between 1948 and 1969 married taxpayers were still permitted to file as 
individuals on the basis of their separate incomes. While separate fllingmight reduce tax 
for the low earner, it usually increased the tax for the higher earner who had to forgo the 
benefits of income splitting on the joint return. Generally the joint return produced the 
lowest tax for the couple as a unit and also the lowest tax for the higher or primary earner. 
But for the lower or secondary earner, there was an increase in effective tax rates unless 
all joint return income was within the lowest bracket. For an early presentation of the 
stacking or secondary earner issue described here, see Harvey S. Rosen, Is It Time to 
Abandon Joint Filing?, 30 NAT. TAX 1. 423, 425-26 (1977) [hereinafter Rosen 1977]. See 
also text accompanying notes 134-135 infra. 
123 Surrey, supra note 99, at 984. 
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of "imputed income of the housewife.,,124 The problem is that the sole 
earner couple really has two economic incomes, the wages of the 
market earner and the imputed income of the housewife, and the tax 
law ignores the imputed income. 
In economic terms, the housewife contributes imputed income 
in the form of the goods and services that she produces in the home 
for home consumption. Hence the economic income of a couple 
composed of a housewife and a sole earner with market wages of 
$15,000 is actually more than the economic income of a dual earner 
couple with combined wages of $15,000. However the imputed 
income of the housewife has not been subject to tax in the federal 
income tax.125 Thus the housewife and her untaxed imputed income 
confers a double marriage bonus. Her economic income and its 
contribution to the couple's standard of living is tax free and marriage 
to her allows the sole market earner to reduce his taxes with her 
unused personal exemption, transferred standard deduction and 
married person's entitlement to the joint return tax rates. 126 
The choice of the joint return in 1948 was thus a choice to 
treat married couples with the same money incomes as equals and to 
ignore at least for the time being economic differences that existed 
between dual earner couples and sole earner couples. 127 In addition to 
these unresolved aggregation issues, the 1948 joint return left another 
tax equity problem for the future. The income-splitting feature of the 
new joint return created new disparities in the taxation of the married 
and the unmarried that were difficult to ignore. 
124 !d. 
125 See Staudt, supra note 36. 
126 For a fuller discussion of the marital transfers, see supra notes 28, 35-40 
and accompanying text. Tax incentives favoring housework can turn into disincentives to 
market work. If she were to venture into paid employment, the former housewife would 
have to earn more than the after tax value of her housekeeping or its purchased 
replacement to be show any economic improvement. See, e.g., Edward McCaffery, 
Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 
UCLA L. REv. 983, 1001-5 (1993) (discussing imputed income from home production). 
127 Dr. June O'Neill in her Keynote Address also uses the term money 
income to identify the absence of imputed income from the equal income standard. See 
O'Neill, supra note 5, at 120. The correct term in the federal income tax is gross income 
but is not used here because it is not as informative to non-technicians. 
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3. Time Line of Marriage Penalties and Marriage Bonuses 
The income-splitting joint return slashed marginal rates for 
married couples, delivering a tax cut of some $800 million to them. 128 
But the 1948 tax cuts left unmarried individuals with the old rate 
schedule. Comparing herself to a sole earner married couple with the 
same total income, an unmarried individual was required to pay from 
20 percent to almost 40 percent more federal income tax.129 Surrey as 
early as 1946 identified the need to find a better balance between 
married and unmarried taxpayers than the doubled joint return 
brackets provided. But Congress did not act to adjust the relationship 
between the two groups of taxpayers until 1969, during the first 
administration of President Richard M. Nixon.I3O 
Effective in 1971, new rate tables fixed the ratio between the 
unmarried individual's tax and the tax on the joint returns at the same 
income level at 1.2.131 This is the origin of the present pattern in the 
income tax treating the married couple as a tax unit that is greater-
than-one unmarried individual tax unit but less-than-two. It was the 
rebalancing of the relative tax burdens on married couples and 
unmarried individuals in 1969 that introduced systemic marriage 
penalties for dual income couples.132 With the widening of the rate 
128 See Bartlett, supra note 116, at 1341, 1343, tbl. 3 (describing impact of 
Revenue Act of 1948). 
129 See Bittker, supra note 99, at tbl. 3. 
130 See Surrey, supra note 99, at 985-987. Surrey discusses the issue at some 
length, concluding that on a consumption standard the correct tax for a married couple 
"lies between the liabilities produced by the per capita system and by the mandatory joint 
returns." Id. at 985. 
131 See Pamela B. Gann, The Earned Income Deduction: Congress's 1981 
Response to the "Marriage Penalty" Tax, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 468, 471-72 (1983) 
(discussing 1969 amendments). 
132 For a discussion of the singles penalty issue and the 1971 marriage 
penalties, see GRAETZ, supra note 98, at 31-34. The joint return did not go unchallenged 
in Congress in the 1950s and 1960s although the tax literature in this era tended to 
support it. See Ventry, supra note 121, at 6-25 (demonstrating that some reforms were 
regarded as loopholes benefiting the wealthy during the 1950s and I 960s). Blumberg 
notes marriage penalties in the child care deduction as well as stacking effects and the 
loss of one standard deduction. Blumberg, supra note 90, at n.35. The same change also 
made marriage bonuses somewhat smaller for sole earner couples because the joint return 
brackets were no longer twice as generous as the unmarried brackets. 
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brackets for unmarried individuals, the joint return no longer entitled 
married couples to doubled marginal brackets. Dual earner couples 
began to see that marriage had a tax cost. 1 33 
The 1969 amendments also restricted the filing status choices 
of married couples, cementing the hold of the joint return on married 
couples and with it the aggregation principle. While reducing the tax 
rates for s'ingles, Congress created a new and disadvantageous rate 
schedule for married persons who wished to file separately from their 
spouses. The new rate tables for married persons filing separately 
consisted of tax brackets that were half as wide as those for joint 
return filers (as they are under present law for this filing status). 
Spouses with separate incomes were no longer permitted to file as 
individuals using the rates applicable to unmarried persons, as they 
had been able to do between 1948 and 1969.134 
By forbidding married couples to use the new singles' rates, 
Congress cut off the possibility that the community property 
controversy would be re-opened by couples seeking to split marital 
income between separate tax returns at the newly reduced rates for 
unmarried individuals. The new, punitive rates for married separate 
filing increased the relative benefit of the joint return for married 
couples, further melding the economic identities of husband and wife 
for tax purposes. But for dual earner couples with relatively equal 
incomes, the new distinctions and new rate tables meant that marriage 
would increase their composite tax burden. The policy choice of 1948 
that required married couples with equal amounts of money income to 
pay the same amount of tax was preserved and perpetuated although at 
the cost of imposing a marriage penalty on dual earners and other dual 
income couples. 135 
Yet even apart from the new marriage penalty on dual income 
133 See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 98, at 34-38 (discussing the Boynters 
whose year-end divorce plan to reduce the marriage penalty attracted attention from the 
I.R.S., the courts and Congress in the 1970s). 
134 By filing separately, spouses were able to avoid the joint and several 
liability imposed on joint return filers. In the years between 1948 and 1969, separate 
filing by spouses rarely resulted in a lower combined tax bill than the joint return 
produced. See notes 20-25 supra and accompanying text. 
135 See GRAETZ, supra note 98, at 31-35; Bittker, supra note 99, at 1414-1415 
& 1428-1429. 
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couples that began in 1971, the joint return came under attack because 
of its role in creating tax disincentives for married women to enter or 
remain in paid employment. Legal scholars and economists during 
this period of women's rights advocacy began arguing for individual 
taxation and abandonment of the joint return. 136 Economists and legal 
scholars in the 1970s pointed out that the joint return system imposed 
high effective marginal tax rates on the earnings of wives who entered 
or re-entered the labor force, reducing the economic return on their 
work effort. 137 Because the joint return required the incomes of the 
two spouses to be aggregated, the earnings of the secondary worker 
were seen to be stacked on top of the income of the primary earner 
and taxed at rates starting with the highest marginal rate applicable to 
him.138 One feminist legal scholar argued that the tax disincentives to 
paid employment for married women seen in the limitations on child 
care deductions and the high effective rates created by aggregation of 
spousal incomes constituted gender discrimination. 139 
The secondary earner in the marriage, then as now, was 
assumed to be the wife in most instances both because of social 
expectations and because of lower earnings.140 Empirical data had 
136 See Blumberg, supra note 90, at 95; Rosen 1977, supra note 122. The 
Rosen article was entitled: Is It Time to Abandon Joint Filing? 
137 See e.g., Blumberg, supra note 90, at 50-59; Rosen 1977, supra note 122, 
at 427-428 (arguing that the joint return is economically inefficient and unduly 
burdensome to secondary workers). 
138 Stacking is a widely used term for this effect. See, e.g., Hearing on the 
Marriage Penalty Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Congo (1998) 
(statement of David Lifson, Vice Chair, Tax Executive Comm., American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants). Stacking can impose a much higher average rate of tax on 
the secondary worker's earnings than applies to the primary earner. If, for example, the 
husband's first $10,000 of income was taxed at 10% and his second $10,000 of income 
was taxed at the 30% rate, his average rate of tax would not be 30% but 20%, reflecting 
the lower rate that applied to him in the bottom bracket. But if his wife earned $10,000 
more, the aggregation of incomes in the joint return would make 30% her bottom tax 
bracket. Her average tax rate would be no less than 30% and might be higher if her 
income exceeded the ceiling of that bracket. 
139 See Blumberg, supra note 90, at 95. 
140 Accord McCaffery, supra note 125, at 992-994 (arguing that continuing 
wage gap between husbands and wives continues to place wives in the role of secondary 
earner); Rosen 1977, supra note 122, at 426 (pointing out the "social reality" that "it is 
assumed that the husband will work full time and the wife make her labor force decision 
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already established that the labor force partIcIpation of married 
women was quite responsive to increases in real net wages. This 
suggested to some economists that high effective tax rates, which 
would reduce net wages, would lower the amount of time that married 
women would spend in paid employment. The concern raised was 
that the high effective tax rate that the joint return imposed on married 
women was creating inefficiencies and changing the work choices that 
women would otherwise make: 41 
But some legal scholars and economists defended the joint 
return and even marriage penalties. Partly in response to a bill that 
proposed a "marriage-neutral federal income tax," Professor Boris 
Bittker developed what has become the classical statement of the 
competing considerations in the taxation of married couples.142 
Pointing out that tax neutrality concerning marriage could not be 
reconciled with the goal of equal taxation of married couples with 
equal incomes in a tax system with progressive rates, he described a 
"collision of objectives.,,143 Bittker argued that the correct policy 
choice was to retain aggregation and equal taxation of married 
couples, despite the appearance of marriage penalties. Marriage 
neutrality he found was inconsistent with what he described as "a 
dominant theme of tax theory for at least 50 years - the irrelevance 
of ownership within intimate family groups . . . together with its 
implication that taxpaying capacity is best measured by consolidated 
marital or family income.,,144 In his view, couples neutrality was the 
conditional on the husband's income"). 
141 See Rosen 1977, supra note 122, at 426. 
142 See Bittker, supra note 99, at 1395-6. Assistant Secretary of Treasury for 
Tax Policy, Edwin S. Cohen, in testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee 
in 1972 presented the analysis as a mathematical proof. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 
97, at 471 (presenting quotes of Edwin S. Cohen's 1972 testimony before the House 
Ways and Means Committee); see also Hearings on the Tax Treatment of Single Persons 
and Married Persons Where Both Spouses are Working Before the House Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 93rd Congo (1972) (statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant for the 
Treasury on Tax Policy). See also McCaffery, supra note 126, at nn.25-26; Zelenak, 
supra note 78, at 342-342. 
143 Bittker supra note 99, at 1395-6, 1430-3\. This statement IS regarded as 
the classical treatment of the issue. 
144/d. at 1396; accord Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of 
the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1573, 1590 
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better choice. 
In 1981, tax theory notwithstanding, Congress allowed dual 
earner married couples a deduction intended to recognize the 
individual incomes of the spouses and reduce marriage penalties. 
Dual earner couples filing joint returns were allowed to deduct up to 
$3,000 a year as an adjustment to gross income. The revenue estimate 
put the revenue loss from the dual earner deduction at $37.5 million 
over five years. 145 The dual earner deduction was included in the 
Economic Tax Recovery Act of 1981, the multi-year $251 billion tax 
cut for individuals that initiated President Ronald Reagan's supply 
side economics program to shrink the government and stimulate the 
economy with tax savings. The 1981 Reagan tax law enacted the 
largest cut in American history.146 
The legislative history of the Economic Tax Recovery Act of 
1981 prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation reported that 
Congress had been "obliged to make a distinction between one-earner 
and two-earner married couples" in order to alleviate marriage 
penalties that "undermined respect for the family by affected 
individuals and for the tax system itself.,,147 But the Joint Committee 
noted that the second-earner deduction reduced marriage penalties and 
improved work incentives "without abandoning the basic principle of 
encouraging joint returns.,,148 Although the dual earner credit did not 
eliminate marriage penalties, it did reduce them substantially.149 
However, the dual earner deduction also increased marriage bonuses 
for some dual earner couples, as advocates of individual taxation of 
( 1977) (defending the joint return on grounds that husband and wife pool income and 
"benefit more or less equally from the total available"). 
145 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 1981 JCS·71·81, at 33-37 (1981) [hereinafter GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF ERT A]. 
146 See id. at 17·19; see also BRINKLEY, supra note 115, at 909 ·912. 
147 See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 145, at 34. 
148 1d. at 35. 
149 See Harvey S. Rosen, The Marriage Penalty is Down But Not Out, 40 
NAT. TAX J. 567, 568 (1987) (commenting on findings of Feenberg) [hereinafter Rosen 
1987]. 
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married couples were quick to point out. ISO 
The bipartisan broad based tax reform of 1986 that flattened 
rates in President Reagan's second Administration also repealed the 
dual earner deduction that had been enacted five years before during 
his first Administration. The legislative history indicates that 
Congress expected that marriage penalties would be reduced by the 
effects of rate changes and changes in the standard deduction. lsl 
Subsequent analysis confirmed that both the incidence of marriage 
penalties and the average size of penalties were lower after 1986. But 
the same study also found that many married couples were still paying 
sizable penalties. For 1988, about 40 percent of married couples were 
found to. be paying marriage penalties averaging $1,100. Further, 
about 53 percent of married couples were experiencing marriage 
bonuses which averaged $609. In 1988 penalties were projected to be 
$24 billion and bonuses to be $17.4 billion.152 
Renewed interest in marriage penalties and bonuses prompted 
further scholarly inquiry into t~e impact of the joint return system in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. The impact of marriage penalties and 
marriage bonuses on marriage decisions and on the choice of work for 
married women again became the subject of wide discussion and 
concern. A new wave of economics and legal scholarship critical of 
the joint return on behavioral and theoretical grounds began in the 
early 1990s,153 just before the enactment of the 1993 Tax Reform Act 
which raised marriage penalties and bonuses to new heights. Much of 
150 See Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in 
Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REv. I (1980). 
151 See 1986 JOINT COMM. GENERAL EXPLANATION. supra note 39, at 19. 
The Republican Party won control of the Senate in 1980, and kept it until 1986, but the 
Democrats remained in the majority in the House throughout both of Reagan's terms in 
office. See BRINKLEY, supra note 115, at 909,915,921. 
152 See Rosen 1987, supra note 149, at 574. 
153 See e.g., Edward McCaffery, supra note 126; Marjorie Kornhauser, Love, 
Money and the IRS: Family Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 
HASTINGS LJ. 63 (\993); Julie A. Nelson, Tax Reform and Feminist Theory in the United 
States Context: Incorporating Human Connection, (unpublished paper prepared for 
conference on Emancipatory Economics and Tax Reform, University of Limburg, Feb. 
22, 1991) (copy on file in with author). Tax scholars also began to present the marriage 
penalty issue to wider audiences. See, e.g., Ann F. Thomas, Women and Taxes: The 
Costly Connection, RADCLIFFE Q., June 1993, at 9. 
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this criticism can be described as feminist because of its focus on the 
impact of the marriage penalty and bonus on the economic power and 
labor force participation of married women. Disincentives to paid 
employment and inequitable taxation of the second earner have 
continued to be the primary criticisms since the 1970s. However, a 
new generation of feminist scholars has also expressed concern about 
biases against recognizing the housewife's economic contribution. 154 
These critics have also questioned the theoretical premises of 
the joint return and the assumptions about the economics of marriage 
upon which supporters of the joint return have relied. 155 In addition to 
the feminist criticism, the joint return is being questioned on tax 
efficiency grounds as well. Here the argument is that the federal 
income tax should be neutral with respect to the choice between 
market work and housework for married women because it is a 
socially contested issue. 156 Continuing empirical research examining 
the impact of tax incentives and disincentives on the decision to marry 
and the divorce is beginning to indicate that women are influenced by 
tax outcomes in making these choices. 157 Empirical research has also 
reopened the question of whether husband and wife pool their 
incomes and consume as a unit or whether consumption depends on 
the source of income. 158 
4. Recent History - The 103rd and 1 04th Congresses 
The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, signed into law by 
154 See. e.g., Staudt, supra note 36, at 1571-1578 (advocating recognition of 
economic contribution of housewives through taxation and credit system); Anne L. 
Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 
COLUMBIA L. REv. 2001, 2001-2008 (1996) (arguing that benefits of individual filing are 
overstated and that feminist goals are not well served by tax reform proposals alone but 
require coordination and implementation with family allowances to support caregivers). 
155 See McCaffery, supra note 126; Kornhauser, supra note 153. 
156 Zelenak, supra note 78. See also David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing. 
Doctrine and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1627 (1999) (analyzing 
efficiency in doctrinal decision making and identifying the distinction between market 
income and imputed income as one of the important line drawing issues in the tax law). 
157 Aim & Whittington, supra note 6. 
158 See. e.g., Amy Ellen Schwartz, Whose Money Is It?, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
HUM. Rrs. 135 (1999). 
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President Clinton on August 10, 1993, substantially increased 
marriage penalties in the income tax and drew criticism from 
Congress and the media. The 1993 amendments added two tax 
brackets to the top of the income scale and expanded the earned 
income tax credits at the bottom. Because of the way they were 
structured, these changes affected many dual income couples 
adversely.159 The marriage penalty effects of the 1993 tax increases 
provoked comment from a surprising array of sources. Liberal 
Democrats such as Representative Barbara Kennelly (D-CT) and the 
Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues aired their critique of the 
new marriage penalties publicly. At the same time, the subject of the 
income tax marriage penalty made news in the conservative and 
financial press. 160 
Under the headline "Living in Sin to Cut Tax Bill Would 
Look Even Better to Some Under Clinton Plan," The Wall Street 
Journal published an article describing and analyzing the marriage 
penalty and marriage bonus effects of the President's proposed tax bill 
while it was still pending. 161 The country's leading financial 
periodical gave prominence to marriage penalties - featuring the 
long and detailed article on page one of its Money and Investing 
section. With the aid of a table prepared by KPMG Peat Marwick, 
one of the country's largest accounting firms and the auditor of many 
159 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. Law No. 103-66, sec. 13131(a) 
& 13201(a), § 32(a)(b), § I(a)-(e), 107 Stat. 415, 435, 458. In the earned income credit, 
joint return filers remained subject to the same income phaseouts as did unmarried 
individuals, causing dual income couples who married to lose some of the new tax 
benefits that would have come to them had they remained single. At the upper end, the 
breakpoints for the top two brackets for joint returns began to converge with the 
unmarried individual brackets, reducing bonuses and increasing marriage tax penalties. 
The top marginal rate of 39.6% began at $250,000 for both joint returns and unmarried 
individuals. See also Daniel R. Feenberg & Harvey S. Rosen, Recent Developments in the 
Marriage Tax, 48 NAT. TAX J. 91 (1995) (assessing impact of the 1993 tax law 
amendments); supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text concerning breakpoints. 
160 Rep. Kennelly Tells Clinton His Top Rate Hike Would Widen Marriage 
Penalty, DAILY TAX REpORT, March 12, 1993, at 0-15 (reporting remarks of Rep. 
Kennelly at meeting of members of Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues with 
President Clinton on March II, 1993). 
161 Ellen E. Schultz, Living in Sin to Cut Tax Bill Would Look Even Better to 
Some Under Clinton Plan, WALL ST. J., March 9, 1993, at Cl. 
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of the largest corporations, the Journal provided an estimate of 
marriage penalties for dual earner working couples at different income 
levels. For the low-income dual earners with $24,000 of combined 
income, it showed a marriage penalty of $4,040 and an effective tax 
rate of 45 percent, including Social Security tax. At the opposite end, 
the Journal reported that a dual earner couple earning $250,000 each 
would pay $27,150 to be married. The marriage bonus couple 
described was also affluent; with the husband earning $170,000 and 
the wife earning $12,000, marriage reduced their combined income 
tax burden by $4,464. 162 
Social conservatives in Congress seized the issue of marriage 
penalties and linked it to their concerns about family values and 
sexual morality. One of the earliest legislative responses was that of 
then-freshman' Representative Ernest 1. Istook, Jr. (R-OK), an 
outspoken advocate of school prayer and other issues on the agenda of 
the Republican social conservatives. 163 Mr. Istook's bill, introduced 
on February 2, 1994, decreed that "no husband and wife shall be 
required to pay more in income taxes under this subtitle because of the 
fact that they were legally married during a taxable year, then they 
would be required to pay if they had not been married." The Istook 
bill specified that its new policy for the taxation of married couples 
would be implemented by offering husbands and wives the annual 
option to use the filing status that the spouses "would otherwise have 
used" if they had not been married. 164 Joining him in the original 
introduction of the bill were sixteen Republican stalwarts, including 
Representative 1. Dennis Hastert (R-IL), the Speaker of the House in 
the 106th Congress. 165 Istook's proposal eventually gathered 62 co-
162 1d. 
163 See, e.g., Patrick B. McGuigan, Ernest Istook: The Final Installment, 
SUNDAY OKLAHOMAN (City Edition), Nov. I, 1992, at 30, (quoting Representative Istook 
expressing approval for "voluntary nonsectarian prayer being offered in a classroom 
setting," school vouchers, and family values and opposition to condom distribution to 
high school students). Rep. Istook was also the sponsor of the Religious Freedom 
Amendment bill, H.R.1. Res. 78, 105th Congo (1997), which called for a constitutional 
amendment to permit school prayer. 
. 164 H.R. 3851, 103rd Congo (1994) (introduced by Mr.lstook (R-OK), 
Feb.lO, 1994). 
'165 See, e.g., Hastert Corrals Fractious GOP to Pass $ 792 Billion Tax Cut, 
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sponsors. 166 Representative Istook's bill was the only one that 
addressed itself to the income tax marriage penalty in the I03 rd 
Congress. Indeed, it was the first general marriage tax penalty relief 
biB introduced in Congress since 1981.167 
By September 27, 1994, the income tax marriage penalty was 
close to the top of the agenda of Representative Newt Gingrich (R-
GA) and the insurgent conservative Republicans in the House. Repeal 
of the income tax marriage penalty appeared as one of the planks in 
their Contract with America. Three hundred fifty Republican 
candidates in the 1994 congressional bi-election were reported to have 
signed the Contract. Having gained control of the House, in the 104th 
Congress they began introducing the ten reforms that they had 
promised. In observance of their pledge, signers of the Contract 
introduced the Contract With American Tax Relief Act of 1995, 
which called for a marriage tax penalty reduction through a dual 
earner credit. The Contract with America biBs generally offered the 
same solution - a dual earner tax credit of up to $145.168 Marriage 
tax penalty relief of the far reaching kind that Representative Istook 
had proposed was not seen in the bills introduced in the 104th 
84 TAX NOTES 495 (1999) (describing Rep. Hastert's roll as Speaker of the House). 
166 H.R. 3851; Bill Summary & Status for the 103rd Congress (visited 
Dec.ll, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
167 There were two marriage tax penalty relief proposals for the benefit of 
senior citizens in the intervening Congresses. In 1983, during the 98th Congress, Senator 
Boren proposed an amendment to the Social Security Act Amendments of 1983 that 
would have eliminated the phaseout marriage penalty in the taxation of Social Security 
benefits. It did was not agreed to in the Senate. See S. Arndt. 124, 98th Congo (1983) and 
proposed as Arndt. to H.R. 1900, 98th Congo (1983); Bill Summary & Status/or the 98th 
Congress (visited Dec. 11,1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. In the IOlst Congress, 
Representative Ritter introduced a bill to "eliminate the marriage penalty for senior 
citizens in the standard deduction" and also to remove the phaseout marriage penalty in 
the taxation of S.ocial Security benefits. Senior Citizens' Tax Fairness Act of 1990, H.R. 
4904, IOlst Congo (1990). 
168 Compare Contract with America Tax Relief Act of 1995, H.R. 1215, 
104th Congo (1995), § 102 (introduced by Mr. Archer (R-TX» and Tax Fairness and 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1995, H.R. 1327, § 6102, 104th Congo (1995) (introduced by 
Mr. Kasich (R-OH». American Dream Restoration Act, H.R. 6, 104th Congo (1995), 
introduced by Representatives Crane (R-IL), Nussle (R-IA), and Salmon (R-AZ), offered 
a different formulation, allotting a total budget of $2 billion to marriage penalty relief. 
Their bill called for the Secretary to determine the dollar amount each year. 
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Congress. 
II. MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF PROPOSALS IN THE 1 05TH AND 106TH 
CONGRESSES 
In the 105th and 106th Congresses, policy makers have shown 
more interest in the income tax marriage penalty than at any time 
since 1981 when the short-lived dual earner deduction was enacted. 
More than forty-five measures aimed at providing marriage tax 
penalty relief were introduced in the three most recent sessions of 
Congress. Both Congresses put marriage penalty relief proposals into 
major legislation but neither Congress succeeded in enacting its 
proposals into law. The various bills advanced different solutions to 
the marriage penalty, often more than one at a time. Over the course 
of the last three years, two parallel trends have developed. Defying 
the dictates of tax theory concerning the inconsistencies of couples 
neutrality and marriage neutrality, Congress has shown strong interest 
in retaining and enhancing the joint return but at the same time 
making it optional by allowing dual income couples to elect to be 
taxed on the basis of individual incomes. 
The solutions to the marriage penalty that Congress has been 
pursuing indicate both a continuing commitment to the joint return 
and skepticism about its fairness in all instances. The idea of an 
optional combined return of individual incomes, which received 
substantial support in both Congresses, represents a significant 
departure from the theory and practice of the joint return. It would 
allow married couples with equal total incomes to be taxed quite 
differently, depending on how the income was earned or owned 
within each marriage. Yet framed as an alternative to the joint return, 
it confirms that the aggregation system is a valid method of taxing 
some couples. From the point of view of theory, the divergent and 
sometimes internally inconsistent proposals for marriage penalty relief 
present a confused picture. Some simply re-enforce the aggregation 
principle in the taxation of married couples while others promote 
dissaggregation by offering filing options. From the perspective of 
tax politics, these diverse proposals suggest a concern to try to 
accommodate the pressing claims of dual earner married couples for 
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equitable treatment without disturbing the now-traditional tax benefits 
of the joint return for sole earner couples. 
The high level of interest in income tax marriage penalties in 
the 10Sth and 106th Congresses can be attributed to a number of 
factors. Since 1993, marriage penalties have been a more tangible and 
more visible concern of taxpayers. The substantial increases in the 
marriage penalty effects of the income tax after the 1993 amendments 
and the ever-larger numbers of dual earner married couples who pay 
penalties have both contributed to moving the discussion of the issue 
from the academic tax and economics literatures to the center of the 
political arena again. 169 An important event in this transition was the 
decision of the insurgent Republican fiscal and social conservatives to 
include the repeal of the marriage penalty in their Contract with 
America campaign in 1994.170 Another significant factor has been the 
availability of quantitative data from the Congressional Budget Office 
and the General Accounting Office concerning the incidence, 
distribution, and magnitude of marriage penalties. 171 
The analysis that follows of trends in the marriage relief 
proposals in the IOSth and 106th Congresses looks at the bills 
themselves and the impact that the proposals would have if enacted 
rather than at the less specific discussions of goals and concerns that 
surrounds the legislative process. Although the party politics of the 
marriage tax penalty debate is not the focus of this article, a few 
observations about the political context are necessary. Legislative 
proposals for marriage penalty relief have come from both 
Republicans and Democrats, but Republicans have dominated the 
field as they have generally done in tax legislation in the three most 
recent Congresses. 
Since the 1994 congressional elections, the Republican Party 
169 See. e.g., CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 8; Feenberg & Rosen, supra note 
159. See also supra text accompanying notes 92-96 (discussing increases in the number 
of dual earner couples and the impact of this trend on marriage penalties). 
170 See supra text accompanying notes 163- 68. 
171 See CBO STUDY, supra note 4 (analysis of statutory sources of marriage 
penalties upon which it relies); GEN. ACCT. OFF., Income Tax Treatment of Married and 
Single Individuals, GAO/GGO-96-175 (September 1996). See also Bruce Bartlett, The 
Politics of the Marriage Penalty, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. 1. HUM. RTS. 185 (discussing the 
influence of the CBO Study). 
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has maintained a majority in both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate, pursuing an agenda of tax cuts and other fiscal policies at 
odds with those of the President and his Democratic Party. Although 
the first session reduced the capital gains tax and enacted the child 
credit promised in the Contract with America, the second session of 
the 10Sth Congress, riven by the bitter partisan politics of the 
presidential impeachment, did not enact any of the major pieces of tax 
legislation that the majority Republican leadership sought. J72 By the 
beginning of 1999, a budget surplus of as much as $ 3 trillion was 
projected for the ensuing ten years. Early in the fiscal year 2000 
budget process, President Clinton made clear his intention to veto any 
bill that attempted to cut taxes before his goals for Social Secu~ity, 
national debt reduction, and other fiscal reforms are accomplished. J73 
He made good his threat in his September veto of the 1999 tax cut 
bill. 
The President's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget proposal, released in 
early February 1999, did not include any recommendation for general 
marriage penalty relief. However, it did call for an expansion of the 
dependent and child care credit, which primarily applies to dual earner 
couples, but the Administration identified this proposal simply as 
"[m]aking Child Care More Affordable.,,174 Although he did not 
directly address the issue of marriage penalties, Secretary of the 
Treasury, Robert E. Rubin, in his testimony before the House Ways 
and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, made it 
clear that the Administration was not particularly interested in the 
172 See note 229 infra for a fuller discussion of the failed 1998 tax cut bill. 
173 See. e.g., House Republicans in Quandary Over Approach to Tax Policy, 
DAILY TAX REPORT, Feb. II, 1999, at GG-I (quoting Rep. Callahan (R-AL) "We don't 
have the votes to override a veto, which the president is going to do to any tax cut"); 
Appearance o/GOP Unity on Budget, Taxes May Hide Key Disagreements, DAILY TAX 
REPORT, Feb. 2, 1999, at GG-13; Lott's Radio Address, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 31-25, 
Feb. 13, 1999 available in LEXIS Fedtax Library, TNT file. 
174 The Administration proposed to extend this non-refundable tax credit to 
all parents of infants, without regard to whether the parents were in paid employment or 
whether they had child care expenses. Hence stay-at-home parents of infants under the 
age of one year and working parents whose infants were cared for by other family 
members would have been eligible for a partial credit. See DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE PROPOSALS 23-
25 (1999). 
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issue. Secretary Rubin told the Senate and House tax writing 
committees that "tax burdens for working families are at record lows 
for recent decades.';175 Ii has been against this background of 
anticipated presidential vetoes, and in the 1 06th , the anticipated budget 
surplus, that members of both' the majority and minority parties in 
Congress have made their proposals for marriage penalty relief. 176 
The bills analyzed here were found by means of word searches 
on THOMAS and the tEXIS bill tracking service. They are bills that 
are self-identified as marriage penalty relief measures.177 Floor 
amendments that were not agreed to generally are not included in the 
survey. Support and interest in bills that have not been enacted is 
difficult to measure. In the discussion below, assessments of interest 
and support for the different ideas ·about marriage penalty relief are 
based not only on the endorsement of the tax writing committees or 
the inclusion of a proposal in major legislation - which indicates 
interest on the part of Congressional leadership as well as member 
support - but also on the number of co-sponsors of the bills of 
individual members. The number of bills that proposed a particular 
idea is also considered a measure of support for the solution advanced. 
Co-sponsors are reported both by the LEXIS bill tracking service and 
in the THOMAS database. Neither measure can be regarded as 
politically conclusive; both can fairly be regarded as representative of 
current congressional sentiment. 
The future of the joint return system of marriage penalties and 
marriage bonuses is unclear at this time. Where the ,next Congress 
175 Treasury Secretary RobertE. Rubin Testimony Before the Senate Finance 
Comm., Text· as Prepared for Delivery, Feb. 2, 1999, (visited Dec. II, 1999) 
http://treas.gov/press/releases. 
176 See e.g., SENATE FIN. COMM., REpORT ON THE TAXPAYER REFUND ACT OF 
1999 (S.1429), S. REp. No. \06-120, reprinted in BNA TEXT SuPP., July 27, 1999, at Sc 
110 . [hereinafter REpORT ON THE TAXPAYER REFUND ACT]' See infra text 'accompanying 
notes 252,302-307 (discussing veto). 
177 The bills and proposals aimed at adapting retirement savings tax 
incentives to the work patterns of women in the labor force and t~e provisions addressing 
divorce-related issues are not within the scope of this' article. These subjects are 
addressed in' the Senate Finance Committee Report and Minority Views under the 
heading "Enhancing Fairness for Women." See also, Symposium: Forum on Women and 
Social Security: What Would Equity Look Like?, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 217 
(1999). 
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will find consensus and, indeed, whether it will forge a new 
agreement on the taxation of marriage remains to be seen. The current 
crop of Congressional marriage penalty relief proposals suggest an 
interest in enhancing the marriage bonus value of the joint return and 
reducing marriage penalties at the same time, an expensive program 
by any measure. Whatever direction the income tax takes on the 
question of marriage penalties and marriage bonuses, it will be 
important to understand the competing ideas from among which 
policy choices are made. Whether the choice is to change the joint 
return system broadly or narrowly or to leave it alone, the alternatives 
considered along the way will illuminate the tax and social policy 
content of the decisions reached. Observing Congress in the midst of 
the process is an opportunity to listen to policy makers both speaking 
to their constituencies and thinking out loud through their legislative 
proposals. 178 
178 The motivation of legislators is the subject of an extensive political 
science and law and economics literature. Explanations of the motivations for 
introducing legislation in this literature range from the altruistic and pluralist public 
interest view of competing ideas and beneficial compromises to the more cynical view of 
public choice theory which sees legislators as beholden, perhaps financially, to interest 
groups who in turn are competing for advantage. Professor Shaviro has pointed out that 
other, non-monetary benefits of a more directly political nature can accrue to legislators 
who introduce bills or co-sponsor them. These intangible benefits include enhancing 
reputation for presenting innovative ideas, for leadership skills in advocacy and 
developing consensus, and for intellectual leadership shown by mastery and knowledge of 
difficult subject matter as well as the opportunity to exercise power. Introducing 
legislation can also be a means of symbolic communication with constituents and thus a 
means of promoting their own re-election by advocating laws that large numbers of voters 
in the Member's district like. Both of these categories of benefits can be reaped without 
regard to the actual impact of the legislation and, indeed, whether or not it is enacted. See 
Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public (:hoice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative 
Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980's, 139 U. PA. L. REv.l, 3-11 (1990) 
(arguing that both public interest and public choice theory offer incomplete explanations 
for tax reform legislation, ignoring the inherent value and benefit for the legislator of 
legislating as a means of symbolic communication and an exercise of power, benefits that 
may not depend on the actual impact of the legislation sponsored). The naming of bills 
may be an important part of the symbolic communication. Many of the measures 
described below that would only modestly reduce marriage penalties bear the title 
"Marriage Penalty Elimination Act." 
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A. The Proposals - Summary and Scorecard 
The multitude of income tax marriage penalty relief measures 
introduced during the three most recent sessions of Congress can 
usefully be divided into eight major categories. In terms of the impact 
on the marriage penalty and its sources in the federal income tax law, 
the specific proposals pursued by Congress during these three years 
have ranged from very narrow to over-broad. The chronological 
development of the legislation and the trends in congressional 
sponsorship and support for the different marriage penalty relief 
proposals over the past three years are described in detail in the next 
section. Figure A below provides a summary analysis in tabular form 
of the scope and impact of the major categories of proposals to reduce 
income tax marriage penalties and some of the important variations. 
Proposals to revive the dual earner deduction of the 1980s 
formed one of the major categories of penalty relief solutions 
presented in legislation during the 1997 to 1999 period. 179 
Amendments that sought to reduce EITC phaseout marriage penalties 
were found in a number bills and represent another approach. 180 
Proposals for comprehensive elimination of the marriage penalty 
made up a third and quite different category of marriage penalty relief 
ideas. The specific proposal introduced in these bills was the optional 
combined return of individual incomes, a hybrid approach to income 
measurement and liability composed of features of both the individual 
and joint return filing statuses. I 81 
179 For a fuller discussion of the dual earner deduction in the 1980s see text 
accompanying note 145, supra; for a discussion of the dual earner deduction proposals 
and bills see text accompanying note 205, infra. See a/so Appendix - Tables 3 & 4 infra, 
listing the bills introduced in the three sessions and noting the categories of proposals in 
each. . 
180 See text beginning at note 277, infra. for a discussion of the EITC relief 
proposals; see a/so Appendix - Tables 1 & 2 infra for a listing of the EITC relief bills 
introduced in each chamber during the session. 
181 See text beginning at note 213, infra; Appendix - Tables 3 & 4 for a 
listing of bills introducing the optional combined return in each session and notation of 
sponsorships. The term optional combined return of individual incomes is introduced in 
this article as a convenient and distinguishing name for this proposal which in the bills 
introducing it is generally called "a combined return of income taxes" or "combined 
return under which each spouse is taxed using the rates applicable to unmarried 
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The five other major proposals can be broadly described as 
attempts to re~establish the fuller income~splitting results of the 1948 
joint return, in whole or in part. One of the proposals in this group did 
indeed call for an income splitting combined return to be created as an 
optional fiI ing status for married couples. 182 Another proposal would 
have produced much the same results as the income splitting 1948 
joint return but took the approach of combining changes in the 
structures of the standard deduction and of the rate tables to achieve 
this outcome. These proposals for structural income splitting would 
have made the joint return standard deduction equal to double th~ 
amount allowed to unmarried individuals and at the same time would 
have revised the tax rate tables to make the brackets for joint return 
filers twice as wide as thoseJor unmarried individuals. 183 
Proposals to restructure only the standard deduction and give 
joint return filers a doubled deduction formed another separate and 
significant category of bi.1ls.~84 Another group of bills proposed to 
revise the rate tables only and give joint return filers. brackets double 
in width to those for unmarrieds. 185 Yet another group of proposals 
following this theme would have doubled only the lowest bracket for 
the joint reiurn. 186 
individuals." See, e.g., The Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S.1314, 105th Congo (1997). 
182 See text beginning at notes 2'25, 269 infra for a fuller discussion of the 
proposal: see also Appendix- Tables 3 & 4 for listing of bills introducing income splitting 
combined return and co-sponsorships. 
183 See text beginning at notes 237, 268, 273, infra for a fuller discussion of 
structural income splitting proposals; see also Appendix-Tables 3 & 4 for list of bills 
proposing both standard deduction doubling and bracket doubling This article introduces 
the term structural income splitting for this proposal to indicate both its impact and 
technical form. The bills themselves do not include any designation or name for the 
combination of amendments they propose. 
184 See text 'beginning at note 197 infra for a fuller discussion of the 
proposals to allow joint filers a doubled standard deduction; see also Appendix-Tables 3 
& 4 for a listing of the bills that made this proposal as a separaie relief measure and in 
tandem with bracket doubling in a structural income splitting proposal. . 
185 See text beginning at note 240 infra for a fuller discussio~ of the bracket 
doubling proposals; see also Appendix-Tables 3 & 4 for a listing of bills proposing 
bracket doubling both as a separate solution to marriage penalties and as part of structural 
income splitting. ' , 
186 See beginning at· note 270 infra for a discussion of proposals for doubling 
the lowest bracket for joint return filers; see also Appendix-Tables 3 & 4 for a listing of 
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Figure A provides a comparison and summary of the scope 
and impact of these eight major categories of relief proposals and 
includes four additional proposals, for a total of twelve. Two of the 
additions represent important variations of the major proposals. The 
proposal made by Senator Gramm to create a new deduction from 
gross income (GI) for joint return filers is in concept in the same 
category as the proposal to allow joint return filers a standard 
deduction equal to twice the deduction for unmarried filers. Both 
would remove the marriage penalty feature of the standard deduction 
by increasing deductions for joint return filers. The Gramm proposal 
varies from the doubling proposal in four ways. It measures the 
marriage penalty in the standard deduction against the amount for 
heads of household deduction as well as against the unmarried 
individual's deduction. It positions its anti-penalty deduction as a 
subtraction from gross income so that it will reduce adjusted gross 
income and thus also encompass relief from phaseout penalties and 
the EITC marriage penalty in particular. The deduction also is 
available whether or not the standard deduction is claimed and hence 
may be used by more taxpayers. Finally, it places an income limit on 
the relief, a restriction that is not present in any of the other proposals 
to eliminate the marriage penalty element of the standard deduction. 187 
Including the Gramm variation as a separate category in Figure A 
provides a basis for comparing the impact of measures with income 
limitations to those without and also demonstrates the greater impact 
of measures that reduce AGI as compared to those that have their 
effect below the line only. 
For purposes of the scope and impact analysis, Figure A 
divides the category of EITC marriage penalty relief measures in two, . 
presenting the proposals that would reduce phaseout penalties only for 
dual earner couples as a solution distinct from a general increase in 
phaseout ceilings for all joint return filers. In terms of scope this 
distinction is important and points out that a policy choice to reduce 
the EITC marriage penalty can be made in both a focused manner or 
bills making this proposal. 
187 Compare S. Arndt. 2686, 105th Congo (1998) with Save Social Security 
and Taxpayer Relief Act of 1998, H.R. 4597, I05th Congo (1998). For a discussion of the 
doubling proposal, see text beginning infra note 192; see also Appendix - Table 3, infra. 
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as part of a general increase in EITC credits for married couples. 
Two additional categories are also presented in Figure A -
the proposals to eliminate the phaseout marriage penalty in the 
deduction for higher education loan interest payments and the 
proposals to expand the child care tax credit. Both are considered too 
specific in their focus to warrant inclusion in the group of major 
marriage penalty relief proposals but are included here for comparison 
and to provide a fuller picture of the range of proposals under 
consideration in Congress. 188 Congressional support for the eight 
major categories of proposals, as evidenced in bills introduced and co-
sponsorships, is analyzed and presented in summary form in tables 
one through four in the appendix. 
I gg For a discussion of the amendments to IRe section 221 (1999) proposed 
in 1999 to remove the phaseout marriage penalty in the education loan interest deduction, 
see supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also infra note 302. For a discussion of the 
child care phaseout penalty and proposals to expand the child and dependent care credit, 
IRe § 2 I (1999), see supra note 65 and text; see also text accompanying notes 255, 283-

































out relief for 
joint returns 
ElTC phase-
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, A SOLE EARNER COUPLE CANNOT FALL INTO THE MARRIAGE PENALTY CATEGORY BUT DUAL EARNER 
COUPLES WHOSE EARNINGS ARE VERY UNEQUAL CAN HAVE MARRIAGE BONUSES AND ALSO QUALIFY FOR 
DUAL EARNER DEDUCTIONS. 
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In assessing the scope and efficacy of the proposals introduced 
as marriage penalty relief measures, six criteria are used: (l) the 
marriage penalty focus; (2) the extent of phaseout penalty relief; (3) 
the extent of EITC (earned income tax credit) penalty relief; (4) the 
generality of application; (5) the recognition of the individual incomes 
of the spouses; and (6) whether marriage bonuses are increased. 
Figure A uses these criteria to rate each of the twelve categories of 
proposals. 
Proposals that are restricted in their impact to reducing the 
marriage penalties in current law are described as having an efficient 
marriage penalty focus. Those proposals that would result in a tax 
reduction for all joint return filers, spending fiscal resources to 
enhance marriage bonuses to sole earner couples while providing 
incidental relief to dual earner or dual income married couples, are 
rated as inefficient or having a poor marriage penalty focus. 
The tax credit and deduction phaseouts tend to be based on 
adjusted gross income. Hence the extent of phaseout penalty relief is 
determined by whether the proposed amendment has its impact 
"above the line," reducing AGI, or would alter the phaseout formula 
in a particular tax credit or deduction provision. The phaseout of the 
EITC is based on AGI and also on a different measure, earned 
income. To reduce the EITC marriage penalties, which can be 
unusually severe, targeted amendments are required. For this reason, 
determining the impact of a proposal on the EITC marriage penalty 
requires a separate evaluation. 189 The criterion generality of 
application assesses whether the proposal offers income tax marriage 
penalty relief broadly or only to a particular group of married couples. 
Relief targeted to a given income class or source of income would not 
be rated general relief. 
The fifth criterion, the extent of recognition of the individual 
incomes of the spouses goes to the heart of the aggregation issue. The 
present joint return system aggregates the earnings and income of 
husband and wife, treating dual earner and sole couples with the same 
money incomes as having comparable economic power and ability to 
189 See text beginning at note 61 supra for a discussion of phaseout marriage 
penalties. Adjusted gross income [AGI] is defined in I.R.C. section 62 (a) (1999). See 
text beginning at note 49 supra for a discussion of EITC marriage penalties. 
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pay tax. The aggregation precept disregards the empirical data 
confirming that most couples do not pool their earnings but tend to 
regard the earner as the owner of his market income. Moreover, by 
equating sole earner and dual' earner couples, the joint return system 
ignores the real economic costs of having two wage earners rather 
than one, tending to devalue the work effort of married women both in 
the home and in paid employment. 19o Proposals to measure income 
tax liability or to extend marriage penalty relief on the basis of 
individllal incomes are rated as recognizing individual spouses, those 
that base relief on joint return income are rated as not recognizing 
individual spouses. . 
The final criterion is not a measure of marriage penalty relief 
but instead tracks the impact of the proposal on marriage bonuses. It 
is somewhat duplicative of the question of marriage penalty focus but 
provides a .specific assessment of the outcome for marriage bonuses. 
B. The Trends 
1. The 10Sth Congress 
During the 10Sth Congress twenty-four bills and numerous 
resolutions aimed at marriage penalty relief were introduced. The 
Congressional Budget Office released its study of marriage and the 
federal income tax during the first session and the House Committee 
on Ways and Means held hearings on the marriage penalty during the 
Sec on session. 191 Although Republican members introduced most of 
the' penalty reduction bills, Democrats introduced seven: In both 
chambers, Republicans remained in the majority and the atmosphere 
in Congress was fiercely partisan much of the time. But during this 
Congress, several marriage penalty relief bills enjoyed substantial 
190 See text at notes 117-127, 136-144, 153-57 supra for a fuller discussion 
of aggregation theory and the joint return. 
191 CBO STUDY, supra note 4; Hearings on the Marri~ge Penalty Before the 
House Comm. On Ways and Means, 105th Congo (1998). Among those testifying were 
Dr. O'Neill, Professor Michael Graetz, Dr. Daniel Feenberg, Bruce R. Bartlett and the 
President of the AICPA, who advocated dissaggregation as the fairest approach and the 
dual earner credit as the simplest. Jd. 
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bipartisan support. 192 
Despite the high level of interest. in reducing it, no marriage 
penalty relief provisions were included in either the Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 1997 or the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, the 
two major tax reform measures enacted in the 105th Congress. 193 
Moreover, while many members of the l05 th Congress denounced 
marriage penalties, the tax legislation enacted added to the number of 
marriage penalty provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. 194 
Ideas about marriage penalty relief in the l05th Congress 
ranged from the narrowly targeted to the expansively over-inclusive. 
Revenue costs also varied widely from $6 billion to $25 billion or so. 
The trends in the two sessions were quite different and merit 
individual analysis. Table 3, printed in the Appendix, traces these 
trends in the two sessions and over the l05th Congress as a whole. It 
provides a summary and analysis of twenty-four bills described 
below, encompassing the eight major categories of general income tax 
marriage penalty relief proposed. 195 The trends in the House from 
192 For much of the 105th Congress, all other business, including tax reform 
had to compete with the impeachment process for the attention of the members. See, e.g., 
Cheryl Bolen, Senate to Pursue 'Dual Track' Approach; Do Legislation, Impeachment 
Simultaneously, DAILY TAX REPORT, Dec. 15, 1998, at N-I (describing efforts of Senate 
Republican leadership to decide whether to schedule only impeachment proceedings or 
try to work on legislative business in the mornings and impeachment in the afternoons). 
193 The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685; The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-
34, III Stat. 788. 
Conservative Republican members made frequent statements to the press 
about their intentions to eliminate the marriage penalty during the 105th Congress. See, 
e.g., Heidi Glenn, Congress Returns to Its Go-Nowhere Agenda, 78 TAX NOTES 407 
(1998) (quoting Senator Ashcroft (R-Mo) "This onerous tax on marriage penalizes the 
traditional family. We must promote this institution, not punish it"). In the same article 
Tax Notes also reported the plan of the Conservative Action Team in the House to include 
"full elimination of the marriage penalty" in their budget plan. Id. 
194 For example, the 1997 Act added several credit phaseout provisions 
including that in the child credit. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
195 Figure A, supra, analyzes twelve categories of marriage penalty relief 
proposals. In Appendix - Tables I through 4, two pairs o(the Figure A categories have 
been consolidated (deduction from GI for joint return up to $50,000 with the standard 
deduction doubling and the two versions of EITC phaseout relief) and two have been 
elimi.nated (the §221 education loan interest deduction phaseout relief proposal and the 
child care tax credit expansion). See also supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
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1997 through 1999 are presented separately in Table 1 and those in 
the Senate in Table 2, both also in the Appendix. 
a. The first session, 1997 
In the first session of the 10Sth Congress, nine marriage 
penalty relief bills were introduced, six in the House and three in the 
Senate. 196 All but one were introduced by Republicans. The bills 
advanced four different solutions to the income tax marriage penalty: 
a dual earner deduction or credit; an increase in the standard deduction 
for married couples; a new optional filing status for married couples; 
and a return to the 1948 version of the joint return with full income 
splitting. The bill that had the strongest support in the House was the 
proposal of Representative Weller (R-IL) for optional taxation of 
individual incomes in a combined return. Of the Senate bills, the split 
income proposal introduced by Senator Faircloth (R-NC) had the 
largest number of co-sponsors. None of the nine bills became part of 
major legislation during the session. 
\. Doubled standard deduction 
In the House, Representative Joseph K. Knollenberg (R-MI) 
introduced a general tax reduction bill that included a proposal to 
make the standard deduction for married couples filing joint returns 
equal to twice the deduction allowed to unmarried individuals. The 
biII also proposed to make the standard deduction for married persons 
filing separate returns equal to the deduction for an unmarried 
individual.197 Knollenberg's bill had 14 co-sponsors by the end of the 
session; all were Republicans. 198 The proposed doubling of the 
196 In addition, House Bill 242, introduced by Mr. Neal (D-MA) on January 
7, 1997, proposed the elimination of the marriage penalty in old I.R.C. § 121, the 
provision allowing a one-time exclusion of gain from the sale of the principle residence 
by taxpayers over the age of 55. See H.R. 242, 105th Congo (1997). Old I.R.C. § 121 
was repealed by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, III Stat. 788 and 
replaced by new I.R.C. § 121. New I.R.C. § 121 allows the exclusion of up to $500,000 
in gain from the sale of a principal residence for married couples filing joint returns and 
$250,000 for other taxpayers. I.R.C. § 121 (1999). 
197 Taxpayer Relief and Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 2718, 105th Congo §§ 
3(a), (1), (2) (1997). 
198 H.R. 2718. 
76 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVI 
standard deduction would remove one of the structural features of the 
marriage penalty. But such a change would also substantially increase 
marriage bonuses. Its impact extends well beyond reversing the 
marriage penalty itself, which is only experienced by dual income 
couples. The doubling proposal was not limited in any sense to the 
marriage penalty couples. The effect of the proposal for a doubled 
standard deduction simply would be to give a tax cut to all married 
joint filers who ele.ct the standard deduction. 
Under present law the standard deduction for joint filers 
creates both marriage bonuses for sole income couples and marriage 
penalties for dual income couples. It allows joint filers a deduction 
that is greater than the amount allowed for an unmarried individual 
but less than the total deduction that two unmarried individuals could 
c1aim. 199 By setting the level of the joint filers' deduction at twice the 
amount for unmarrieds, the portion of the marriage penalty arising 
from the standard deduction would be eliminated. But the marriage 
bonus effect of the standard deduction would be increased as well. 
For sole earner married couples who are already using a standard 
deduction that is 60 percent larger than what they would be entitled to 
use as singles, the doubling would result in a marriage bonus of 100 
percent. If the bill were applicable for 1999, it would give all married 
couples filing joint returns that did not itemize their personal 
deductions an additional deduction of $2,900. 
It is difficult to estimate the ultimate cost of such a proposal. 
However, the estimated revenue cost for a similar proposal made in 
1998 that also included an additional deduction for the blind and 
elderly was about $6 billion a year. The House Ways and Means 
Committee estimated that the somewhat broader 1998 proposal would 
affect 48 million married individuals but did not indicate how many 
would just be receiving additional marriage bonuses. Ways and 
Means did note that six million additional individuals were expected 
to use the standard deduction if it were doubled.2oo 
199 See examples in notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text. 
200 HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM. REPORT, H.R. Doc No. 105-739, 
reprinted in BNA TEXT SuPP., Sept. 25, 1998, at S-25, S-26, S-58. Although 72 percent 
of all taxpayers use the standard deduction, it appears to be used by a lower percentage of 
joint return filers. See CBOSTUDY, supra note 4, at 15. The CBO estimates that there 
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Increasing the standard deduction would have little impact on 
the other sources of the marriage penalty. The standard deduction 
only reduces taxable income and does not affect adjusted gross 
income. But adjusted gross income is the measure used to determine 
eligibility for the earned income credit, child care credit and in most 
other phaseouts.201 Moreover, allowing a doubled standard deduction 
for all joint return filers across the board is a solution that is both over 
inclusive and narrow in scope. Some but not all of the revenue loss 
would reduce marriage penalties, most would go to marriage bonus 
couples. And even though inefficient, poorly focused and expensive, 
it is a solution that addresses only one source of the penalty and hence 
would leave much of the marriage penalty firmly in place. The CBO 
study estimated that 51 percent of the revenue cost of both doubling 
brackets and the standard deduction would go to marriage bonus 
couples. No estimate was provided of the effect or cost of doubling 
the standard deduction by itself, but the CBO notes that the standard 
deduction is an important contributor to the marriage penalty in lower 
income couples?02 
The choice of the standard deduction as the focus of marriage 
penalty relief may have the appeal of simplicity but it can lead to 
erratic and inequitable results. While some 70 percent of returns 
claim the standard deduction, another 30 percent do not because 
taxpayers have chosen to itemize their deductions instead. Although 
disproportionately more higher income taxpayers choose to itemize 
than do low income taxpayers, there are important variations based 
upon state of residence. Taxpayers in such high tax states as New 
York and California elect to itemize more frequently, at the rates of 
36% and 34.8% respectively, and at lower income levels than do 
taxpayers in low tax states like Texas, which has no state income tax. 
Only about 18.4% of federal income tax returns filed in Texas in 1997 
were 54.67 million married couples filing tax returns in 1995. /d. at tbl. C-4. The 
General Accounting Office [hereinafter GAO] report found that 25.15 million married 
taxpayers filing jointly used the standard deduction in 1992. See GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra 
note 171, at appendix V. 
201 See I.R.C. §§ 32(a)(2), 21(a)(2) (1999). See also 1998 EFFECTIVE 
MARGINAL RATE STUDY, supra note 40, at 4-10. 
202 CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at 51. 
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claimed itemized deductions.203 
Further, reliance on the standard deduction to deliver marriage 
penalty relief may impose unintended costs on lower income couples. 
The itemized deduction for medical expenses is heavily used at lower 
income levels. More than 49 percent of the tax returns that in 1997 
claimed the itemized deduction for medical and dental expenses 
reported AGI below $30,000. Some 2,799,965 tax returns were in this 
category.204 Why marriage penalty relief should not also be available 
to taxpayers who do not elect the standard deduction because, for 
example, they have a catastrophic accident in a given year and itemize 
their medical expenses is not clear. 
II. Dual earner deduction or credit 
Two different versions of the dual earner deduction were 
proposed in the first session. Early in 1997, Representative Sam 
Johnson (R-TX) proposed a dual earner credit of up to $145 for joint 
return filers.20S Like the dual earner tax credit proposal in the 
Contract with America, the statutory dollar limit was further limited 
by the amount of marriage penalty on earned income. Eleven other 
Republicans joined Johnson as co-sponsors when the bill was 
introduced. Later in the session, Representative Wally Herger (CA-R) 
introduced H.R. 2593, proposing an above the line dual earner 
deduction very similar to the one that had been in effect from 1981 
through 1986.206 The proposed amendment would have permitted a 
deduction from gross income of up to $3,000 for dual earner married 
couples filing joint returns. The deduction was further limited by the 
earned income of the low earner?07 Herger's dual earner deduction 
203 See INTERNAL REv. SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 153-205 
(Spring 1999) [hereinafter SOl BULLETIN]. 
204 See id. 
20S Tax Freedom for Families Act of 1997, H.R. 1584, 105th Congo § 202 
(1997) (introduced by Mr. Sam Johnson (R -TX» (credit to reduce marriage penalty). 
206 See text accompanying notes 145-150 supra. 
207 Marriage Penalty Relief Act, H.R. 2593, 105th Congo § 2 (1997) 
(introduced by Mr. Herger (R-CA» (restoration of deduction for two-earner married 
couples); compare GENERAL EXPLANATION OF ERTA. supra note 145 and I.R.C. § 221 
(prior to repeal in 1986), reprinted in I INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, INCOME TAXES 4861-
69 (CCH, June 25, 1999). 
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bill attracted 188 co-sponsors - 51 Democrats and 137 Republicans. 
Representative Barbara Kennelly (D-CT) introduced the measure with 
Herger.208 Judged by the number of co-sponsors, the Herger dual 
earner deduction was the runner-up in the House. 
The CBO Report estimated that restoration of the dual earner 
deduction, which is what Herger proposed, would cost about $9 
billion in lost revenue.209 About 80 percent of the revenue cost would 
be applied to reduce marriage penalties. But about 10 percent of the 
tax reduction arising from the dual earner deduction would go to joint 
return filers already receiving marriage bonuses. The Congressional 
Budget Office predicted that the greatest impact of the dual earner 
deduction would be felt in the $50,000 to $100,000 aggregate income 
range?IO It would not have much affect on the marriage penalty at 
lower incomes because in addition to the $3,000 ceiling, the dual 
earner deduction is limited to 10 percent of the earnings of the low 
earner. 
Restoring the dual earner deduction would reduce aggregate 
marriage penalties by about 32 percent.211 Although in amount the 
$2,900 extra standard deduction that Representative Knollenberg 
proposed is very close to the $3,000 maximum that the restored dual 
earner deduction would allow, the two deductions are quite different 
in their impact on marriage penalties. The dual earner deduction 
reduces adjusted gross income and hence could reduce the marriage 
penalty impact of the earned income tax credit, child care deduction 
and other phaseouts which are calculated with reference to adjusted 
gross income. The increase in the standard deduction would not 
reduce marriage penalties as much as the dual earner deduction would 
because the standard deduction has no impact on adjusted gross 
income. It simply reduces taxable income.212 
208 H.R. 2593. 
209 CBO STUDY, supra note 4 at Summary tbl. 4. 
210/d. at 51-52, Summary tbl. 4, fig. 8. CBO estimates that 3% would go to 
unaffected couples and 7% to penalty couples, but in amounts in excess of their penalties. 
Id. 
211 Id. at Summary tbl. 4. 
212 See I.R.C. §§ 32(a)(2), 21(a)(2) (1999); compare I.R.C. §§ 62 and 63 
(1999). See also Figure A, supra. 
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III. Optional combined return of individual incomes 
Three bills in the House and one in the Senate proposed a 
new, optional separate return filing status for married couples that 
recognized the individual income of each spouse as the pasic measure 
of ability to pay tax. This innovative alternative to the joint return 
would allow married couples to elect on an annual basis whether to 
file a joint return or the new optional combined return of individual 
incomes.213 The optional combined return would allow husband and 
wife to determine their separate taxable incomes and then calculate 
the tax due on each income using the rate tables for unmarried 
individuals. The sum of the two tax computations would be the tax 
due from the couple?14 It is an efficiently focused penalty relief 
proposal because only couples who otherwise would incur marriage 
tax penalties are likely choose this alternative. But the proposed 
separate filing status would not eliminate all marriage penalty effects 
because in the form proposed important features of the joint return 
system would be retained. 
The disaggregation of incomes in the tax computation would 
eliminate the marriage penalty effects of the progressive tax rate 
tables, the standard deduction and all other features that affect the 
determination of taxable income. Income of one spouse would no 
longer be stacked on top of the income of the other in determining the 
initial amount of tax payable.215 However, the opti'onal combined 
return of individual incomes as proposed did retain some features of 
the joint return, including joint and several liability for tax. Further, 
213 Compare Taxpayer Justice Act of 1997, H.R. 3059, 105th Congo (1997) 
(introduced by Ms. Jackson-Lee (D-TX»; Marriage Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 2456, 
105th Congo (1997) (introduced by Mr. Weller (R-IL»; H.R. 2462, 105th Congo (1997) 
(introduced by Mr.Kasich (R-OH»; and Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S. 1314, 105th 
Congo (1997) (introduced by Mrs. Hutchinson (R-TX» (section 2 -Combined returns to 
which unmarried rates apply). See also Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S. 1285, 105th 
Congo (1997) (introduced by Mr. Faircloth (R-NC» (section 2 - Combined return to 
which unmarried rates apply). The term "optional combined return of individual 
incomes" is developed and introduced in this article. See supra note 181. 
214 H.R. 2456 (proposing new § 6013A to the Internal Revenue Code). The 
citations here are to the proposed new LR.C. section. 
215 F d' . d If' I" h . or Iscusslon an examp es 0 marriage pen a ties In t e progressive rate 
tables and standard deduction, see supra text accompanying notes 42-48, 26-33, 136-41. 
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the new married separate filing status did not attempt to reverse the 
marriage penalties in the various tax credit phaseouts or the EITC. 
. The optional combined return of individual incomes is a 
distinct departure from the joint return and its goal of equal tax for all 
married couples. with the same total income. It would allow 
differentia~ion bet~een couples and would result in two married 
couples 'with the same total incomes paying different amounts of tax, 
if, for example, one was a sole earner couple and the other was a dual 
earner couple. Th'e dual earner couple would generally pay less tax 
than the sole earner couple unless all income was within the lowest 
marginal bracket.216 All married couples with dual incomes, whether 
the sources of i~come are earnings or investments, would be eligible 
to make the election' to report individual incomes on a combined 
return. 
The four bills proposing the optional combined return were 
identical, although one was introduced by a Democrat, Representative 
Jackson-Lee (0-TX), and the others by Republicans. In the Senate, 
Mrs. Hutchinson's (R-TX) bill found twelve co-sponsors. But in the 
House, Representative Weller's (R- IL) bill had very wide support. It 
. . 
attracted 238 co-sponsors, the largest following among all of the anti-
penalty bills in the first session of the 105th Congress.217 
The optional filing proposal is a hybrid, allowing 
disaggregati<?n of incomes some of the time but retaining the joint 
return's concepts of tax liability and aggregation for most phaseouts. 
The option to use the unmarried individual rate tables and 
dissaggregate income was conditioned upon filing a combined return. 
Apart from the separate income and tax table computations, the 
combined return was to be treated as if it were a joint return.218 The 
proposal specified that tax credits would continue to be "determined" 
and applied against the couple's joint tax liability "as if the spouses 
had filed a joint return.,,219 Thus the combined return would not have 
216 This conclusion assumes that the combined return allows each spouse an 
unmarried individual's standard deduction, which was the effect of the proposals. 217 . 
. H.R. 2456; Bill Summary & Status for I05th Congress (visited 
Dec.ll, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 218 . 
H.R. 2456 (proposed sections 6013A (a)( I) & (e». 
219 H.R. 2456 (proposed section 6013A(d». The provision speaks of 
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reduced the marriage penalty effects of the many tax credit phaseouts 
based on joint return AGI. Other features of the joint return, including 
joint and several liability would apply to the combined filing. 
Reducing pre-credit tax by means of the optional combined 
return would have the effect of making any earned income credits 
more valuable because this credit is refundable. But the optional 
combined return would not have alleviated the marriage penalty 
effects of the EITC phaseout. The married couple with two incomes 
of $11,000 each would continue to have to aggregate incomes in 
determining the earned income tax credit and they would find that 
marriage still reduced their earned income credits by $2,817, or 12.8 
percent of their AGI.220 
One important issue that the proposal leaves somewhat 
unresolved is the allocation of income from property. The approach 
to identifying separate income that the optional combined return takes 
might have the effect of reopening the old controversy about 
community property that the adoption of the joint return in 1948 was 
intended to end. Earned income is to be taxed to "the spouse who 
rendered the services." Income from property is to be "divided 
between the spouses in accordance with their respective ownership 
rights in such property.,,221 For married couples, ownership rights in 
property are still determined by the marital property law of the 
jurisdiction in which they reside. Community property law differs 
from state to state and ownership rights can sometimes be found in the 
absence of control.222 Because control is the general standard in the 
applying the credits against "the joint liability of the couple for tax." !d. 
220 See supra note 55. 
221 H.R. 2456 (proposed section 60I3A(b)(I) & (2». 
222 Community property law continues to be regarded as different from 
common law on these questions even though most common law states have adopted 
equitable distribution concepts that arguably give spouses interests in property to which 
they do not have title during the marriage. The old law allowing or even requiring 
income splitting for tax purposes by couples in the community property law system 
remains in effect except where Congress has specifically provided that community 
property laws will not apply. Unless the intention is to reopen the possibility of 
differences in taxation based on different marital property law systems, it may be 
necessary to introduce the concept of control along with ownership. See Beck, supra note 
20, at 465-467 (discussing the continuing impact of Poe v. Seaborn and community 
property law in the income tax). Professor Beck argues that its main impact has been to 
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tax law for assigning tax liability, there is a potential for contlict if 
state law rights arise when tax concepts of control are not satisfied.223 
The intention may be to deal with this issue in regulations but it is too 
sizable an issue for such a delegation.224 
IV. Income splitting joint return 
Senator Faircloth (R-NC) proposed an optional combined 
return that would have permitted married couples to choose to be 
taxed on the basis of the income-splitting joint return that was in 
effect from 1948 to 1970. Although the structure of his proposal was 
the same as the Weller bill's, the content was quite different. Like the 
Weller combined return, the Faircloth version allowed husband and 
wife to elect to determine their incomes separately and then apply the 
tax tables for unmarried individuals. But the Faircloth version defined 
the separate income of each spouse as "one-half of the taxable income 
computed as if the spouses were filing a joint return." A doubled 
standard deduction was also to be allowed. Thus it called for a return 
to income splitting, 1948 style. Apart from this very significant 
difference, the Faircloth optional combined return followed the Weller 
proposal, retaining the joint return features and the marriage penalty 
effects of the credit phaseout rules. 
Like the prototype 1948 income splitting joint return, the 1997 
Faircloth proposal would eliminate marriage penalties in the rate 
structure itself and also, like the 1948 proposal, it would create 
substantial marriage bonuses. The present rate tables with their more-
than-one, less-than-two bracket differential already give sole income 
couples marriage bonuses. But the Faircloth income splitting 
make married women in community property law jurisdictions who file separate returns 
liable for tax on half the income of their husbands. He also notes seven provisions in the 
Internal Revenue Code which contain the override language directing implementation 
"without regard to community property laws." /d. 
223 See Kornhauser, supra note 153, at 74-77; accord Susan Kalinka, Federal 
Taxation o/Community Income: A Simpler and More Equitable Approach, 1990 WIS. L. 
REv. 633, 633-35 (1990) (arguing for a change in the "settled principle" in federal income 
taxation that control of property is irrelevant in taxation of community property). 
224 The Joint Committee Staff report notes that "It is not clear whether 
ownership rights would be determined without regard to community property laws." 
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO 
PROPOSALS TO REDUCE THE MARRIAGE TAX PENALTY, JCX-I-98, at n.14 (1998). 
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approach would increase marriage bonuses by doubling the marginal 
brackets for all married couples and their standard deduction. 
Measured by reference to the married couple, all joint return filers 
would seem to be able to reduce taxes on the basis of the Faircloth 
income splitting combined return. For unmarried taxpayers, it would 
also re-introduce the singles penalty differential supposedly redressed 
in the 1969 amendments. Senator Faircloth's income splitting 
combined return attracted 39 co-sponsors in the Senate.225 
The Faircloth proposal for an income splitting· combined 
return is another example of an approach that is both over-inclusive 
and limited in its impact on the marriage penalty. Retaining as did the 
Weller proposal the joint return for determining applicability of tax 
credits, the Faircloth income splitting return would have no impact on 
phaseout penalties or the EITC marriage penalties. Yet it would 
increase the marriage bonuses of virtually all bonus couples. The 
Congressional Budget Office analysis of a comparable proposal 
suggests that the revival of the income splitting joint return would cost 
about $25 billion and that 51 percent of that revenue loss would be 
caused by tax reductions that further increased marriage bonuses.226 
v. Other thoughts about marriage penalties 
Members of Congress expressed interest in exploring 
alternatives to the current joint return system in several resolutions 
also introduced in this session. Senator Kerrey (D-NE) included in 
Senate Bill 1096, the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and 
Reform Act of 1997, a provision that would have required the 
Treasury and the Comptroller General to each conduct a study of 
separate filing. He asked for recommendations for eliniinating the 
marriage penalty, dealing with community property. issues, and 
"reducing the burden for divorced and separated taxpayers." 
Representative Portman (R-OH) introduced an identical bill in the 
225 See Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S.1285, 105th Cong.· (1997) 
(introduced by Mr. Faircloth (R-NC), Oct. 9, 1997) . 
226 See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at Summary tbl. 4. The CBO estimate· is 
an evaluation of the doubling of marginal brackets and standard deductions, which is the. 
effect of the Faircloth proposal. Like the Faircloth proposal, it would appear to leave ihe 
impact of credit phaseouts on· marriage penalties unchanged, i.e., still in effect. 
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House on July 30, 1997, the day before Senator Kerrey introduced his 
bill.227 
Other resolutions expressed a general concern about the 
impact of the tax system on marriage and family. Senator Faircloth, 
who had introduced the bill calling for the re-creation of the 1948 split 
income version of the joint return, also included the marriage penalty 
issue in his outline of nine goals for "any new Federal tax system." 
Number seven on his list was the direction that any new tax "not 
penalize marriage or families." The provision was part of his Tax 
Code Elimination Act of 1997?28 
b. The second session, 1998 
In the second session of the 10Sth Congress interest turned in 
an entirely different direction. Both the House and the Senate 
strongly endorsed the idea of restructuring the standard deduction to 
in effect remove its marriage penalty feature. But while each chamber 
approved such a measure in 1998, the two specific proposals that 
passed were quite different in scope and impact. Proposals for more 
comprehensive relief also attracted substantial support. The House 
and Senate favored very different approaches to this solution as well. 
The doubled standard deduction proposal appeared in six bilIs 
in the House, including the 1998 Taxpayer Relief Act, which passed 
the House and then floundered in the Senate. This proposal attracted 
the most co-sponsors among the various ideas for marriage penalty 
relief introduced in the House during the session. In the Senate, a 
different proposal for removing the marriage penalty element in the 
standard deduction gained approval as an amendment to the Universal 
Tobacco Settlement Act. The version that the Senate approved was 
targeted to low and middle income levels and structured as an above 
the line deduction reducing adjusted gross income and phaseout 
227 The Kerrey bill called for studies of the "feasibility of treating each 
individual separately for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986." S. 1096, I05th 
Congo (1997). It is not clear whether his interest was in mandatory or optional separate 
taxation. Rep. Portman's bill was H.R. 2292, 105th Congo (1997). 
228 Internal Revenue Service Oversight, Restructuring and Tax Code 
Elimination Act of 1997, S. 1555, I05th Congo (1997) (introduced November 13, 1997). 
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penalties. 229 
Measured by the co-sponsor interest in individual bills, the 
House leader was again a bill introduced by Congressman Weller. 
His 1998 proposal took a quite different approach than had the 
focused and efficient solution advanced in his 1997 bill. In the second 
session Mr. Weller's bill proposed structural income splitting - the 
doubling of the standard deduction and tax rate brackets for joint 
return filers. In the Senate, few co-sponsors emerged for any of the 
bills. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson's bill reintroducing the optional 
combined return of individual incomes proposal tied with the Gramm 
joint filers' deduction amendment for most co-sponsors in the session. 
Each bill only attracted four co-sponsors. 
The array of proposals introduced in this session included both 
new ideas about marriage penalty relief and solutions that had been 
seen before. The new proposals were, first, an increase in the income 
ceiling of the earned income tax credit specifically for married 
couples and second, structural income splitting through doubling of 
the standard deduction and marginal rate brackets for joint filers. 
Doubling of the lowest bracket entered the field of competing 
solutions to the income tax marriage penalty. The dual earner 
deduction and the optional combined return proposals were also 
reintroduced. Overall, sixteen different bills and measures addressed 
themselves specifically to the marriage penalty issue.23o 
I. Doubled standard deduction 
The proposal to increase the standard deduction for joint 
returns as a form of marriage penalty relief, which had been 
229 See Appendix-Table 3 infra. For an account of the legislative history of 
the 1998 Taxpayer Relief Act (H.R. 4579, 105th Congo (1998» in the House and Senate, 
see Clinton Signs Omnibus Spending Bill Containing Tax Extenders. Some Ta'C Breaks, 
DAILY TAX REPORT, Oct. 22, 1998, at GG-2 (noting that "Senate GOP leaders had sought 
to bring up for Senate floor consideration an $80 billion tax cut package (H.R. 4579), but 
lacked the votes needed to prevent a threatened filibuster and to override an expected 
presidential veto of the measure."). See Appendix - Table 2 infra for a listing of the 
major marriage penalty relief proposals introduced as amendments to the Universal 
Tobacco Settlement Act, S.1415, 105th Congo (1997). 
230 See Appendix - Table 3 infra for a listing of the bills introduced in the 
Second session with notation of sponsorship interest in leading bills and proposals; see 
also Figure A supra for a summary of the impact of each category of proposal. 
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introduced in one bill in the first session of the 105th Congress, was re-
introduced in ten bills and measures in the second session. These ten 
new bills and measures had broad bipartisan support. Seven of the 
bills proposed the doubling of the standard deduction alone231 and 
three proposed it in combination with a doubling of marginal brackets 
for joint return filers.232 Democrats Rangel (D-NY) and Gephardt (D-
MO) introduced bills to provide marriage penalty relief by giving joint 
return filers a doubled standard deduction as did Republicans Nancy 
Johnson (R-CT) and Weller (R-IL) and House Ways and Means 
Chairman Archer (R-TX). 
The ten bills and amendments advocating an increased 
standard deduction took a number of different approaches to achieving 
that end. The Archer bill, H.R. 4579, which passed in the House on 
September 26, 1998, provided simply that the standard deduction for 
joint return filers would be twice the amount for unmarried 
individuals.233 Archer's bill was very similar to the Knollenberg 
proposal of the prior year. The 1998 bills of Representatives Rangel 
and Nancy Johnson also provided for a doubling based on the existing 
statutory amounts of the standard deductions.234 But five of the bills 
proposed to increase the base amount of the standard deduction for all 
four filing statuses as well as to allow joint return filers a doubled 
deduction?35 Yet another of these proposals, an amendment twice 
231 See H.R. 3524, 105th Congo § I (1998) (introduced by Representative 
McDermott (D-WA»; Marriage Penalty Reduction Act, S. 1989, 105th Congo § 2 (1998) 
(introduced by Senator Ford (D-KY»; Tax Relief for Working Americans Act of 1998, 
H.R. 4542, 105th Congo § 101 (1998) (introduced by Mrs. N. Johnson (R-CT); 1998 
Taxpayer Relief Act, H.R. 4579, 105th Congo § 101 (1998) (introduced by Mr. Archer (R-
Texas»; Save Social Security and Taxpayer Relief Act of 1998, H.R. 4597, 105th Congo § 
101 (1998) (introduced by Mr. Rangel (D-NY); S. Arndt. 2686, 105th Congo (1998) and 
S. Arndt. 2437, 105th Congo (1998), both amending the Universal Tobacco Settlement 
Act, S. 1415, 105th Congo (1997), both offered by Mr. Gramm (R-TX). 
232 Gephardt 10 percent Tax Act of 1998, H.R. 3620, 105th Congo § 102 
(1998) (introduced by Mr. Gephardt (D-MO»; Marriage Penalty Elimination Act of 1998, 
H.R. 3734, 105th Congo § 3 (1998) (introduced by Mr. Weller (R-IL»; Marriage Penalty 
Elimination Act of 1998, S. 1999, 105th Congo § 3 (1998) (introduced by Mrs. 
Hutchinson (R-TX». See also discussion of structural income splitting at note 237 infra. 
233 H.R.4579 § 101. 
234 Compare H.R. 4579 § WI with H.R. 4542 § 101 and H.R. 4597 § 101. 
235 Compare H.R. 3524 § I with S. 1989 § 2, H.R. 3620 § 102, H.R. 3734 § 
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offered by Senator Gramm to the Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, 
proposed an increase in the joint filers' deduction but restricted it to 
those with adjusted gross incomes of $50,000 or less. The Gramm 
proposal made the anti-penalty increment of the standard deduction an 
adjustment to gross income. As an above the line deduction, the 
Gramm proposal would have reduced adjusted gross income of 
eligible joint return filers and hence reduced phaseout penalties. It 
also included a provision that specifically provided relief from the 
EITC phaseout for joint return filers eligible for the new deduction.236 
II. Structural income splitting 
One of the more significant developments in the second 
session was the emergence of a marriage penalty relief proposal that 
can be described as structural income splitting. In the 1997 session, 
one Senate bill that received considerable support had tried to re-
create the tax computation method of the 1948 joint return, restoring 
to married couples full income splitting. This bill was not 
reintroduced in the second session but members in both chambers 
proposed bills that achieved substantially the same effects. Rather 
than changing the joint return provisions of the tax law, these 
structural income splitting bills proposed to reach the same tax 
outcome by a coordinated restructuring of both the standard deduction 
and the tax rate tables. The standard deduction was to modified to 
provide joint return filers with an allowance equal to double the 
amount given to unmarried individuals. At the same time, the tax 
tables were to be redesigned to create a new joint return rate schedule 
in which the tax brackets would be twice as wide as those for 
unmarried individuals. Another related development was seen in the 
bills which proposed widening some or all of the of tax brackets for 
joint return filers. Five bills introduced in the second session 
proposed to give married couples some or all of the benefits of the 
1948 version of the income.splittingjoint return.237 
3, andS. 1999 § 3. 
236 S. Arndt. 2686. See also Lawrence Zelenak, Gramm Marriage Penalty 
Fix Needs Some Fixing of Its Own, 79 TAX NOTES 1515 (1998) (pointing out the Gramm 
Amendment's cliff effect). 
237 Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1998, H.R. 3151, 105th Congo § 3 (1998) 
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Three of the proposals in this category, which were introduced 
by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson and Representatives Gephardt and 
Weller, would have given joint return filers the entire structural 
income splitting package of doubled marginal brackets and doubled 
standard deductions.238 In essence this combination replicates the 
1948 joint return as far as income computation and pre-credit taxes 
were concerned. But neither of these changes would affect the 
phaseouts or other marriage penalties that were determined on the 
basis of adjusted gross income. Standard deductions and rate tables 
do not have any impact of adjusted gross income. In terms of 
reducing marriage penalties, the CBO found the split income approach 
would remove about 44 percent of penalties. Weller's bill had 58 co-
sponsors in the House, fifty-seven Republicans and one Democrat. 
Overall, this approach is an expensive and inefficient way to 
reduce marriage penalties. The cost of structural income splitting is 
high. The 1997 Congressional Budget Office report estimated that 
doubling brackets and standard deductions would cost about $25 
billion. These adjustments are in substance across the boards tax cuts 
and the CBO' s prediction that some 51 percent of the tax savings 
would be received by marriage bonus couples confirms this 
observation.239 In comparison the dual earner deduction, which is also 
criticized for being somewhat inefficient, would have a revenue cost 
of only $9 billion and would remove about 32 percent of the penalty. 
Only about 10 percent of the revenue cost for the dual earner form of 
marriage penalty relief would leak out to marriage bonus couples. 
(introduced by Mr. Thune (R - SD) on Feb. 3, 1998) (increases the 15% bracket and 
doubles this bracket for joint returns); H.R. 3620 § 101 (offers a general reduction in 
rates; all joint return brackets double individual); H.R. 3734 § 2 (section 2 - all joint 
return brackets double individual); S. 1999 §2 (all joint return brackets double 
individual); Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1998, S. 1569, 105th Congo § 2 (1998) 
(introduced by Mr. Coverdell (R-Ga), Jan. 27, 1998) (increases the 15% bracket and 
doubles this bracket for joint return; same as H.R. 3151). See also Appendix-Table 3 
infra. 
238 H.R. 3620 §§ 101, 102 (general reduction in rates; all joint return brackets 
double individual; raises standard deduction); H.R. 3734 §§ 2, 3 (all joint return brackets 
double individual; raises standard deduction); S.1999 §§ 2, 3 (all joint return brackets 
double individual; raises standard deduction). See also Figure A supra; Appendix - Table 
3 infra. 
239 CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at Summary tbl. 4. 
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The other two bills, those of Representative Thune and 
Senator Coverdell, attempted something less than full structural 
income splitting, focusing instead on marginal tax brackets alone. 
These identical bills would have created a 15 percent bracket with a 
ceiling of $70,000 for joint return filers and $35,000 for unmarried 
individuals?40 In the upper brackets, the post-1969 relationship of 
more-than-one, less-than-two was maintained. So marriage penalties 
remained above the $70,000 level but were eliminated from the rate 
table structure for married couples with incomes up to that level. 
Neither bill proposed to alter the standard deduction. Some 44 
percent of joint return filers in the $20,000 to $50,000 income group 
pay marriage penalties and 54 percent receive bonuses.241 Like the 
larger vertical adjustment proposed by Gephardt and the others, the 
newly widened bottom bracket would redress some marriage penalties 
but would also increase marriage bonuses for many couples. 
Ill. Optional combined return of individual incomes 
Senator Hutchinson reintroduced her proposal for an optional 
combined return of individual incomes in the second session of the 
105th Congress. She later also proposed structural income splitting 
through doubled brackets and doubled standard deductions as 
described above. Although the combined return of individual incomes 
bill attracted only four co-sponsors in the Senate in 1998, it tied with 
the Gramm joint filers deduction for most heavily co-sponsored bill in 
the session. In the House this proposal, which had gathered 271 co-
sponsors in 1997, was not reintroduced in 1998.242 
240 H.R. 3151 § 3 (increases 15% bracket and doubles this bracket for joint 
returns); S. 1569 §2 (increases 15% bracket and doubles this bracket for joint return; same 
as H.R. 3151). 
241 CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at Summary tbl. I. . 
242 See Half and Half: Tax Relief and Debt Reduction Action of 1998, S. 
1711, 105th Congo (1998) (introduced by Mrs. Hutchinson (R-Texas), March 5, 1998) 
(proposing optional combined return of individual incomes). Senator K.B. Hutchinson's 
structural income splitting bill was Senate Bill 1999, 105th Congo (1998). See also 
Appendix - Table 3 infra for a comparison of the bills introduced in the first and second 
sessions of the 105th Congress. 
1999] APR/MER 91 
IV. Dual earner deduction or credit 
The solution to the marriage penalty that had drawn 188 co-
sponsors in the first session of the 105th Congress attracted little 
interest in the second session. In the debate over the Universal 
Tobacco Settlement bill, Senator Daschle (D-SD) proposed the dual 
earner deduction as an amendment. Structurally similar to the dual 
earner deduction repealed in 1986, the Daschle proposal allowed 
much larger deductions but phased out entirely at $60,000 of joint 
adjusted gross income. The amendment was rejected in the Senate. 
Senator Daschle also introduced his dual earner proposal in a separate 
bill.243 
v. Earned income tax credit relief 
In the first session of the 105th Congress, none of the marriage 
penalty relief proposals addressed the substantial marriage penalties 
that can arise in the earned income tax credit. During the second 
session, EITC phaseout penalty relief provisions were included in 
three bills, two in the Senate and one in the House. 
In the House, Representative Neal (D-MA) introduced a bill 
that targeted marriage penalty relief at the earned income tax credit 
phaseout. The marriage tax penalties at this level are notoriously 
large, averaging 7.6 percent of income but ranging as high as 25 
percent. The Neal proposal would have lifted the starting point of the 
phaseout from $11,610 to $16,020 for married couples filing a joint 
return. Seventeen Democrats co-sponsored the measure.244 In the 
Senate, EITC marriage penalty relief also received attention for the 
243 See S. Arndt. 2688, 105th Congo (1998), amending Universal Tobacco 
Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Congo (1997) (offered by Mr. Daschle (D-SD) on June 10, 
1998) (professing "to provide a deduction for two-earner married couples ... "); S. 2147, 
105th Congo (1998). The Daschle dual earner deduction bases the phaseout on "the 
taxpayer's" modified adjusted gross income but elsewhere refers to the earned income of 
"the spouse." !d. The import seems to be that the ceiling is based on the joint return and 
not on the income of the low earner spouse. See also Appendix - Table 3 infra for a 
comparison of the proposals introduced and co-sponsorship interest in the two sessions. 
244 For a fuller discussion of EITC marriage penalties, see supra notes 49-60 
and accompanying text. See also H.R. 3995, 105th Congo (1998) (introduced by Mr. Neal 
(D-MA), June 4, 1998); Bill Summary & Status report for I05th Cong. (/998), (visited 
Dec. II, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
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first time in the IOSlh Congress. Both the Gramm amendments and 
the Daschle amendment and bill made special provision to address the 
earned income credit and sought to have the deductions they were 
proposing reduce the EITC phaseout marriage penalties. However, 
the focus of the marriage penalty relief being proposed differed from 
bill to bill. The Daschle proposal was limited to dual earner couples, 
at least potentially marriage penalty couples. But the Gramm and 
Neal proposals would have increased EITC eligibility for joint filers 
who were sole earner couples as well as dual earners, hence removing 
penalties and adding to bonuses at the same time. 245 
VI. The sense of the Congress 
In addition to the many bills and proposals, members of 
Congress again expressed their thoughts about the marriage penalty in 
resolutions as they had done in the first session. These resolutions 
were more specific in their content. While expressing very grave 
concern about the possibility that the income tax was influencing 
marriage behavior, the resolutions also voiced concern about the 
creation of tax disincentives for traditional family structures. 
The Senate resolved that "a simple and fair federal tax system 
is one that ... does not penalize marriage or families." The same 
resolution went on to express its concern about the impact of marriage 
penalties on society. Noting the findings of the Congressional Budget 
Office on the percentage of married couples paying penalties and the 
average size of those penalties, the resolution added a piece of data 
from another source. It reported that there had been a very substantial 
increase in the percentage of unmarried couples between 1970 to 
1996. The Senate in its resolution drew its own conclusions about the 
behavioral effects of marriage penalties. It found that "This penalty is 
one ofthe factors behind the decline of marriage" and resolved to start 
reducing it. This resolution passed in the Senate on April 2, 1998.246 
A few weeks before, on February 11, 1998, the House of 
245 See S. Arndt. 2688; S.1415; S. Arndt. 2686, 105th Congo (1998) and S. 
Arndt. 2437, 105th Congo (1998); see also Appendix - Table 3 infra and Figure A sllpra. 
246 Concurrent Senate Budget Resolution for FY 1999 - 2003, S. Res. 86, 
105th Congo §§ 302, 326 (1998) (epacted). The fin9ing that 0.5% of couples were 
unmarried couples in 1970 and that 7.2% were unmarried in 1996 is unattributed. 
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Representatives had passed a resolution expressing the sense of 
Congress that "the federal government should acknowledge the 
importance of at-home parents and should not discriminate against 
families who forgo a second income in order for a mother or father to 
be at home with their children.,,247 More clearly perhaps than the 
technical solutions to the marriage penalty that it debated, these 
resolutions express the conflict for Congressional policy makers 
between the claims of sole earner married couples for their now 
traditional marriage bonuses and the increasingly pressing tax equity 
claims of dual earner couples. 
In the 1997 session, the House appeared to be interested in 
proposals that were more narrowly focused on reducing taxes for 
marriage penalty couples. The two ideas about marriage penalty relief 
that attracted substantial interest, the dual earner deduction and the 
optional combined return of individual incomes, both had this effect. 
Moreover, the interest shown in these proposals indicated a 
willingness to consider differentiating between married couples on the 
basis of the individual incomes of husband and wife. On the other 
hand, the more expansive and less targeted combined return proposal 
that simply reduced taxes on all married couples by re-introducing 
complete income splitting gathered more support in the Senate than 
did the idea of combined returns of individual incomes?48 
The next year, in the second session, both the House and 
Senate were attracted to the more over-inclusive solutions. Both 
chambers approved proposals to double the standard deduction. At 
the same time, the most over-inclusive solution, structural income 
splitting, gained supporters in the House and the Senate. By the end 
of the second session, the 105th Congress seemed focused on 
benefiting the sole earner married couple as much as it was working 
on marriage penalty relief for the dual earner couple.249 
2. The 106th Congress 
The first seven months of the I06th Congress saw almost as 
247 H. Con. Res. 202, 105th Congo (1998) (enacted). 
248 Compare Figure A supra and Appendix - Table 3 infra. 
249 Compare Figure A supra and Appendix - Table 3 infra. 
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many marriage penalty relief proposals as had been made in the two 
prior years put together. From January 6, 1999 through July 29,1999, 
twenty separate bills and three important floor amendments 
addressing the income tax marriage penalty were introduced.250 
During the entire 105th Congress, twenty-four bills had been 
introduced. As in the 105th Congress, proposals described as marriage 
penalty relief by their sponsors ranged from full income splitting to 
the dual earner deduction. The I06th Congress had an interest in 
changing specific joint return phaseouts and in general tax cuts, also 
sometimes identified as marriage penalty relief. More than half the 
bills proposed two or more anti-penalty provisions. In this riot of 
marriage penalty relief proposals, one Senator introduced two bills on 
the same day, offering two alternative formulations of the same 
solution.251 
This intense legislative interest in the income tax marriage 
penalty culminated in August in the passage of the Taxpayer Refund 
and Relief Act of 1999, the $792 billion Republican tax cut bill that 
250 For consistency, only the version of the tax cut bill House Bill 2488 
reported by the Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee's Senate 
Bill 1429 are included in the count of bills that were introduced in the 106th Congress. 
Unless otherwise noted, neither of the engrossed tax cut bills in the House and Senate (the 
versions that passed in the respective chambers) are included in the count or in the 
analysis of introduced measures that follows. The conference bill is not counted as an 
introduction either. On January 6, 1999, Rep. Joseph Knollenberg (R-MI) for the third 
time introduced (in H.R. 108, 106th (1999) ), his proposal for a doubled standard 
deduction for joint returns. See Marriage Penalty Relief Act, H.R. 108, § 2, 106th Congo 
(1999). Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY) introduced House Bill 2646 on July 29,1999, a bill 
which also proposed a double standard deduction for joint returns and expansion of the 
dependent care deduction. See Common Sense Family Tax Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 
2646, §§ 101, 102, 106th Congo (1999). See infra Appendix - Table 4. 
251 Compare the structural income splitting proposal in the Marriage Tax 
Penalty Elimination Act of 1999, S. 12, 106th Congo (1999) (introduced by Mrs. 
Hutchinson (R-TX), Jan. 19, 1999) and the income splitting combined return proposal in 
the Marriage Tax Elimination Act of 1999, S. 15, 106th Congo (1999) (introduced by Mrs. 
Hutchinson (R-TX), Jan. 19, 1999). Senator Hutchinson was not alone in her enthusiasm 
for marriage penalty relief of this nature. She was joined by 18 co-sponsors in Senate Bill 
12 and 12 co-sponsors in Senate Bill 15. On July 30, 1999, Senator Hutchinson also 
introduced the floor amendment to Senate Bill 1429 that added the doubled standard 
deduction to the Senate's tax cut bill. See S.Amdt. 1472, I06th Congo (1999); see also Bill 
Summary & Status Reports, l06th Congo (1999), (visited Dec. II, 1999) 
<http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
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President Clinton vetoed on September 23, 1999. The vetoed bill 
itself adopted four different marriage penalty solutions.252 The 
Senate, in its version of the bill, had approved five anti-penalty 
proposals, including the optional combined return of individual 
incomes.253 Even more clearly than in the 105th , there was strong 
Congressional interest in simultaneously augmenting the benefits of 
the joint return and in permitting individual taxation of spouses. 
Despite the inconsistency of these two ideas of tax equity, the Senate 
demonstrated that it was capable of holding both at the same time, at 
least for awhile. In substance, the vetoed tax cut bill proposed 
structural income splitting for middle income taxpayers, with 
additional marriage penalty relief for upper income taxpayers through 
the doubled standard deduction and earned income tax credit relief for 
married couples at the lower end of the income range. 
In the aftermath of the veto of the 1999 tax cut bill, the 
question of what Congress will do about marriage penalties and 
marriage bonuses remains open, perhaps not to be addressed again 
until after the elections in the year 2000. In this fluid setting, the ideas 
and interests of individual members expressed in the bills that they 
introduced are even more important to understanding the direction of 
policy development in this area. During the first session of the 106th 
Congress, Representative Weller for the third time introduced the 
individual House Bill that attracted the greatest number of co-
sponsors in the session. The structural income splitting program that 
he introduced for the second time was also the most popular proposal 
in the House, measured by number of co-sponsors. In the Senate, 
Mrs. Hutchinson's structural income splitting bill also had the greatest 
number of co-sponsors of any single bill. But the group of proposals 
for relief from EITC marriage penalties, contained in four bills in the 
Senate, found more co-sponsors?54 
252 See infra note 282. 
253 . 
See Remarks on Returning Without Approval to the House of 
Representatives the "Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999," 35 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. 
Doc. 1793 (Sept. 23,1999); also Congress Clears and Keeps its $792 Billion Tax Cut, 84 
TAX NOTES 807 (1999). For a fuller discussion of the vetoed bill, see infra text 
accompanying note 300; Appendix - Table 4 infra. 
254 See Appendix - Table 4 infra for a listing of the bills introduced in the 
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Before examining the marriage penalty solutions selected by 
the majority leadership in the vetoed Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act 
of 1999, the trends in the individual member's bills are surveyed 
below. Eight specific types of marriage penalty relief proposals were 
proffered in the 106th Congress. They were: the doubled standard 
deduction for joint returns; structural income splitting; income 
splitting combined return; dual earner deduction; EITC phaseout 
penalty relief for joint returns; expansion of child and dependent care 
deduction for dual earners, phaseout penalty relief for the education 
loan deduction; and optional combined reporting of individual 
incomes. Rate flattening developed more of a following as a solution 
to income tax marriage penalties and is also discussed below in the 
text although it is not here classified as a major category of marriage 
penalty relief and hence is not included in the tabular summaries. 
Table 4, printed in the Appendix, maps the trends in twenty-
three different measures introduced in 1999 and all versions of the 
vetoed tax cut bill. The shifts in sponsorship interest in the eight 
major categories of proposals from session to session are presented in 
summary form in Tables I and 2, also in the Appendix.255 
a. Doubled standard deduction 
In the 106th Congress interest in doubling the standard 
deduction for joint return filers remained strong. Eighteen of the 
twenty-three marriage penalty relief bills and significant amendments 
introduced in 1999 would have given joint return filers a standard 
deduction equal to at least twice that allowed to unmarried 
individuals. Eight of these bills sought to incorporate the doubled 
standard deduction into a broader relief proposal; the remainder 
confined themselves to proposing amendments to the standard 
deduction allowance as the primary form of marriage penalty relief. 
In all instances the doubled allowance was available to all joint return 
filers whether or not they were dual earner or dual income couples. 
Hence all the proposals had the effect of increasing the marriage 
second session and a count of the co-sponsorships of the leading bills and proposals. To 
compare the 1999 session with the I05th Congress, see Appendix - Tables 1 & 2, infra. 
255 See note 195 supra for a comparison of the categories of proposals in 
Figure A supra and Appendix - Tables I through 4 infra. 
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bonus as well as reducing marriage penalties. Doubling the standard 
deduction was a feature of the House Ways and Means Committee's 
tax cut bill from its inception.' The proposal was added to the Senate 
Finance Committee's bill only as a floor amendment. 
Ten bills offered the doubled standard deduction as the only 
form of general marriage penalty relief.256 . In four bills in this group, 
an . expansion of the child and dependent care credit was also 
proposed, arguably a form of marriage penalty relief for dual earner 
married couples but only applicable to those with children under the 
age of 13 or other qualified dependents. Democrats introduced thre!! 
of the four bills with the child care feature?57 The House Ways and 
Means Committee's tax cut bill, the Financial Freedom Act of 1999, 
was among those that offered general marriage penalty relief only 
through the doubled standard deduction.258 Like another Republican 
sponsored bill introduced in the Senate, the Ways and Means 
Committee bill included a general tax rate cut as wel1.259 
Representative Kleczka's bill, one of seven in 'the House that 
proposed general marriage penalty relief through th~ doubled standard 
256 Financial Freedom Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Congo §§ III, 112 
(1999) (introduced by Mr. Archer (R-TX), July 16, 1999); Family Tax Reduction Act of 
1999, H.R. 2085, 106th Congo §§ 2, 5 (1999) (introduced by Ms. Hooley (O-OR), June 9, 
1999); Marriage Penalty Elimination Act of 1999, S. 284, 106th Congo § 2 (1999) 
(introduced by Mr. McCain (R-AZ), Jan. 21, 1999); Marriage Penalty Relief Act, H.R. 
108, 106th Congo §2 (1999) (introduced by Mr. Knollenberg (R-MI), Jan. 6, 1999); H.R. 
725, 106th Corig. (1999) (introduced by Mr. Kleczka (0-WI), Feb. II, 1999); Tax Relief 
for Working Americans Act of 1999, S. 1160, 106th Cong: § 101 (1999) (introduced by 
Mr. Grassley (R-IA) and Ms. Feinstein (O-CA»; Tax Relief for Working Americans Act 
of 1999, H.R. 2020, 106th Congo §§ 101, 102 (1999) (introduced by Mrs. Johnson (R-
CT»; Common Sense Family Tax Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2646, 106th Congo §§ 101, 
102 (1999) (introduced .by Mrs. McCarthy (0- NY), July 29, 1999); Pro-Family, Pro-
Growth, Pro-Reform Tax Reduction Act of 1999, H.R.2574, 106th Congo §§ 702, 703 
(1999) (introduced by Mr. Maloney (O-CT), July 20, 1999). . 
257 H.R. 2085, §§ 2, 5; H.R. 2646, §§ 101, 102; H.R .. 2574, §§ 702, 703; 
2020, §§ 10 I, 102. See also I.R.C. § 21 (1999). 
258 The Ways and Means Committee bill also included, and identified as 
marriage penalty relief, a proposal to raise the phaseout staJ:1ing point for the student loan 
interest deduction ofI.R.C. section 221 for joint return filers. H.R. 2488, §§ III, 112. 
259 The Senate bill, S. 799, also proposed a widened lowest bracket in all 
filing categories. S. 799, I06th Congo §§ 1,2,3 (introduced by Mr. Nighthorse (R-CO) 
April 14, 1999). 
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deduction only, had 154 co-sponsors, the largest number in this 
category of bi lls?60 
In 1999 the support in Congress for focusing marriage penalty 
relief on a restructured standard deduction was strong and bipartisan. 
The Ways and Means Committee bill passed in the House as 
introduced, without adding any additional ideas about general 
marriage penalty relief.261 In the Senate, the Democratic minority on 
the Senate Finance Committee proposed an overall increase in the 
standard deduction and restructuring it to double the joint return 
allowance in order "to address the marriage penalty for couples who 
do not itemize." The minority views also proposed a comparable 
reduction in the income subject to phaseout in the earned income tax 
credit for joint return filers "to provide a similar benefit.,,262 This 
proposal was not offered as a bill but as a floor amendment to the 
Senate Finance Committee's bil1.263 
The eight remaining introductions of the proposal combined a 
doubled standard deduction with other substantial income tax law 
amendments that were identified as marriage penalty relief. The 
doubled standard deduction was a feature of the five bills that 
proposed 1948 style income splitting in one form or another.264 With 
260 See Bill Status Report Data Base for 106th Congress, (visited Dec. II, 
1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
261 Compare Financial Freedom Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Congo § 101 
(1999) (introduced by Mr. Archer (R-TX), July 16, 1999) with Financial Freedom Act of 
1999, H.R. 2488 (Engrossed House bill), 106th Congo § 10 I (1999) (passed by the House, 
July 22,1999). Both versions of the bill included broad-based tax reduction through tax 
rate cuts. 
262 TAXPAYER REFUND ACT OF 1990 (S. 1429), S. REp. No. 106-120, 
reprinted in BNA TEXT SUPP., July 27, 1999, at S-II 0 and S-112. 
263 S.Amdt. 1442, §§ 101, 201, 106th Congo (1999), amending S. 1429, 
106th Congo (1999) (introduced by Mr. Breaux (D-LA), July 29, 1999). Senator Breaux's 
amendment was withdrawn after debate. See Bill Status Report Data Base for 106th 
Congress (visited Dec. II, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
264 Four bills proposed structural income splitting. See S. 12; Marriage Tax 
Elimination Act of 1999, H.R. 6, 106th Congo (1999) (introduced by Mr. Weller (R- IL ), 
Feb. 10,1999); American Values Tax Savings Plan for the 21 51 Century, H.R. 2350, 106th 
Congo §§ 10 I, 102 (1999) (introduced by Mr. Sam Johnson (R-TX), June 6, 1999); Top 
Ten Terrible, H.R. 2414, 106th Congo (1999) (introduced by Mr. Tancredo (R-CO), July 
I, 1999). The income splitting combined return proposal of the Marriage Tax Elimination 
Act of 1999, S. 15, 106th Congo (1999) (introduced by Mrs. Hutchinson (R-TX), Jan. 19, 
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the amendment that added it to the Senate Finance Committee's bill, 
the doubling proposal became one of four changes identified as 
marriage penalty relief measures in the Taxpayer Refund Act of 
1999.265 One of the floor amendments offered by the Democratic 
leadership to the Senate Finance Committee's bill would have both 
increased the standard deduction by 60 percent and made the joint 
return allowance double the amount for unmarried individuals.266 
Senator Moynihan's (D-NY) proposal included a similar increase in 
the joint return filers' standard deduction along with a dual earner 
deduction.267 
b. Structural income splitting and the income splitting combined 
return 
In the first session of the 106th Congress, eight bills in addition 
to the vetoed tax cut bill introduced amendments to the Internal 
Revenue Code that would have had the effect of re-creating income 
splitting along the lines of the 1948 joint return. Five of the bills 
proposed structural income splitting for all joint filers. Three of the 
bills would have confined the effects of income splitting to the lowest 
marginal bracket. Moreover, both the version of the tax cut bill that 
the Senate passed and the conference bill presented to the President in 
substance proposed income splitting for the lowest bracket taxpayers. 
Representative Weller re-introduced his proposal for full 
structural income splitting, a concept which was echoed in' several 
other bills. It gathered an even greater following in 1999 than it had 
in 1998 - 232 members of the House joined him as co-sponsors in 
the 106th while only 58 had in the 105th Congress. Twenty-six of the 
1999) had a similar effect. 
265 Senate floor amendment to Senate Bill 1429 proposed by Senator K.B. 
Hutchinson. Senate Amendment 1472, was agreed to on July 30,1999. See Bill Status 
Report Data Base for J06th Congress (visited Dec. II, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
See also S. 1429 (as introduced); H.R. 2488 (Senate Engrossed Amendment); Appendix -
Table 4 infra. 
266 S. Arndt. 1442 (the Breaux Amendment). 
267 S. Arndt. 1384, 106th Cong., §§ 101, 102 (1999) (introduced by Mr. 
Moynihan (D-NY), July 28,1999) (amending S. 1429). 
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co-sponsors in the l06 th Congress were Democrats.268 Four'other bills 
either made the same proposal as Weller's did - to both double 
standard deduction allowance and double the width of the marginal 
rate brackets for joint return filers - or called for its equivalent, an 
income splitting combined return.269 
A scaled-down version of structural income splitting' found 
more support from congressional leadership in both parties than did 
the Weller proposal. The Democratic minority report in the Senate 
Finance Committee (and one of the Democratic leadership's 
amendments to the Senate tax cut bill) proposed a substantial amount 
of income splitting for the lowest bracket joint return filers through a 
combination of bracket widening at that level and doubling of the 
standard deduction.270 Two bills, both introduced by Republicans, 
made similar proposals.271 . 
The version of the Senate Finance Committee's tax cut bill 
which passed in th~t chamber would also have created significant 
income splitting effects at the. lowest taxable income levels through 
the same mechanisms.272 The tax cut bill that emerged from the. 
Conference "Committee would have fully implemented structural 
income splitting in its expanded bottom tax bracket.273 
268 H.R. 6. The bill summary report listed 232 co-sponsors. See Bill 
Summary Report of the J06th Congress, (visited Dec. I I , 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov>. 
269 Structural income splitting proposals: S. 12; H.R. 2350, § 10 I, 102; H.R. 
2414. The income splitting combined return proposal of the Marriage Tax Elimination 
Act of 1999, S. 15, 106th Congo (\ 999) (introduced by Mrs. Hutchinson (R-TX), Jan. 19, 
1999) had a similar effect. 
270 See REPORT ON THE T AXPA YER REFUND ACT, supra note 176, at S-I 10; 
see also S. Arndt. 1442, S.Amdt. 1384. . 
271 S. 799, §§ 1,2,3 106ih Congo (1999) (introduced by Mr.Nighthorse (R-
CO), April 14, 1999) (section I (reduces all tax rates); section 2 (lowest bracket widened); 
and section 3 (standard deduction doubled»; Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 
767, 106th Congo § 3 (1999) (introduced by Mr. Thune, Feb. 12, 1999) (widens lowest 
bracket and doubles it for joint return; ceiling $70,000). The Thune bill did not propose 
doubling the standard deduction. 
272 In the fgrm introduced, S'. 1429 called for a flatten.ing of tax rates and 
broad-based tax cut through the widening of the bottom bracket. The doubling of the 
standard deduction was added by Mrs. Hutchinson's amendment. See S. Arndt. 1472. 
273 See Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488 (Enrolled Bill), 
106th Congo §§ 101, III (\999) (vetoed by President Clinton, Sept. 23, 1999). 
1999] APR/MER 101 
c. Dual earner deduction 
,Interest in reviving the dual earner deduction in the 106th 
Congress continued to be limited largely to Democrats. Senator 
Daschle (D-SD) and Representative Lampson (D-TX) again 
introduced bills to provide a dual earner deduction that phased out at 
$60,000 of adjusted gross income.274 Senator Moynihan (D-NY), in 
his failed floor amendment to the Senate Finance Committee's tax cut 
bill, proposed a somewhat different version of the dual earner 
deduction?75 All three of these dual earner proposals also would 
have reduced the marriage penalties in the EITC phaseout, but only 
for dual earner couples.276 
d. Earned income tax credit 
The 106th Congress gave much more attention to the marriage 
penalty effects of the earned income tax credit than had the 105th 
Congress. Three bills and two floor amendments introduced marriage 
penalty relief amendments to the earned income tax credit provision. 
Interest in the Senate was more substantial than in the House. In the 
Senate, the Republican leadership as well as the Democratic 
leadership proposed EITC relief measures. However, these 
introductions did not all represent the same idea about marriage 
penalty relief in the earned income tax credit. Some provided for a 
general increase in the EITC for married couples by creating new and 
higher phaseout limits for joint return filers while others targeted 
274 Income Security Enhancement Act of 1999, S. 8, 106th Congo § 202 
(1999) (introduced by Mr. Daschle (D-SD), Jan. 19, 1999) (section 202 - dual earner 
credit with phaseout at AGI of $60,000); Income Security Enhancement Act of 1999, 
H.R. 1453, 106th Congo § 202 (1999) (introduced by Mr. Lampson (D-TX), April 15, 
1999) (section 202 - dual earner deduction with phaseout at AGI of $60,000). The 
Daschle bill had 10 co-sponsors. 
275 The Moynihan proposal had a $95,000 income phaseout ceiling' and 
provided for minimum deductions of up to $4,350. S. Amdt. 1384, §§ 101, 102, 106th 
Congo (1999), (introduced by Mr. Moynihan (D-NY), July 28,1999). It followed the 
minority alternative described in the Senate Finance Committee's report. See REPORT ON 
THE TAXPAYER REFUND ACT, supra note 176, at S-112. 
276 All three of these dual earner deduction proposals included specific EITC 
phaseout relief provisions. 
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phaseout penalty relief to dual earners in the lowest income range. 
In the Senate Finance Committee, both parties proposed to 
make specific provision for joint return filers in the earned income tax 
credit to alleviate marriage penalties. The majority and the minority 
proposed different technical approaches but they had similar impact. 
The Senate Finance Committee bill increased the phaseout starting 
and ending points for the earned income tax credit.277 The 
Democratic minority report proposed to carry its increases in the 
standard deduction into the earned income tax credit to reduce the 
income used in applying the phaseouts.278 Senator Breaux's CD-LA) 
floor amendment to the Senate Finance Committee's bill included the 
same proposal.279 The Senate approved the Finance Committee's 
earned income tax credit proposal in the tax cut bill that it passed and 
the same provision was included in the enrolled bill vetoed by the 
President.280 
Like the other provisions designated as marriage penalty relief 
in the vetoed Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, the 
amendment to the earned income tax credit would have increased 
marriage bonuses as well as reducing marriage penalties. The 
increased phaseout starting and ending points were to apply to all joint 
return filers whether they were marriage penalty couples or sole 
earner couples. In contrast, the three proposals for dual earner 
deductions also would have reduced the marriage penalty in the 
earned income ta~ credit, but only for couples who were dual 
earners.281 The dual earner deduction and its EITC marriage penalty 
relief proposals were more focused and more efficient, but the 
estimated revenue cost of the more expansive marriage penalty relief 
S-112. 
277 See S. 1429, § 202 (EITC joint return relief). 
278 See REPORT ON THE TAXPAYER REFUND ACT, supra note 176, at S-II 0 and 
279 Compare S. 1429 and S. Arndt. 1442. 
280 Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, (Engrossed Senate 
Amendment), 106th Congo § 202 (1999) (passed in Senate July 30, 1999); Taxpayer 
Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488 (Enrolled Bill), 106th Congo § 115 (1999) 
(vetoed by Pres. Clinton, Sept. 23, 1999). 
281 See supra notes 274-276 and accompanying text (discussing Daschle, 
Lampson and Moynihan dual earner bills). 
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proposal for the earned income tax credit was a modest $1.3 billion 
per year.282 
e. Expansion of the child and dependent care credit 
In the 106th Congress, the proposal to enlarge the child and 
dependent care credit emerged as an additional form of marriage 
penalty relief. The President's Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Proposal 
made in February 1999, suggested expanding the non-refundable child 
and dependent care credit for dual earner married couples and sole 
earner parents and the parents of infants. The Joint Committee Staff 
Comments on the President's Budget Proposal noted that an increase 
in the dependent care credit "can be thought of as a proposal to 
decrease the marriage penalty for families with children." The 
Clinton Administration had also proposed increasing the dependent 
care credit in the 1999 budget.283 
The Senate Finance Committee's tax cut bill sought to expand 
child care tax credit much along the lines of the President's budget 
proposal.284 Four other bills in addition to the Senate Finance 
Committee's bill proposed to expand the child and dependent care 
credit. Democrats introduced three.285 With a floor amendment that 
improved upon the President's proposal of a new credit for parents of 
infants under the age of one year, the expansion of the child care tax 
credit was 'approved by the Senate in its tax cut bill and also in the 
conference bill vetoed by the President.286 Considered as marriage 
282 . 
See 1999 JOINT COMM. CONF. BILL SUMMARY AND REVENUE ESTIMATES, 
supra note 2, at S-II. 
283 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS 
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 43, JCS-I-99 
(1998). 
284 Compare S.1429, § 204 with JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, at 37-43. 
285 Common Sense Family Tax Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2646, 106th Congo 
(1999) (introduced by Rep. Carolyn McCarthy (0- NY), July 29, 1999); Pro-Family, Pro-
Growth, Pro-Reform Tax Reduction Act of 1999, H.R. 2574,106th Congo § 703 (1999) 
(introduced by Mr. Maloney (D-CT), July 20, 1999); Family Tax Reduction Act of 1999, 
H.R. 2085, 106th Congo § 5 (1999) (introduced by Ms. Darlene Hooley (D-OR), June 9, 
1999); Tax Relief for Working Americans Act of 1999, H.R. 2020, 106th Congo § 102 
(1999) (introduced by Mrs. Johnson (R-CT» (28 co-sponsors). 
286 See H.R. 2848 (Engrossed Senate Amendment) § 204 (1999); JOINT 
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penalty relief, expansions in the child care credit are under inclusive 
and are not generally applicable to marriage penalty couples. This 
credit is only applicable to dual earner couples with qualifying 
dependents and would not result in a general reduction in marriage 
penalties. 
But nonetheless it is also an approach that has a relatively 
efficient marriage penalty focus. While not all dual earner couples are 
marriage penalty couples, according to the CBO Report, about 76 
percent are. Moreover, if sole earner couples are excluded from the 
scope of the provision, the efficiency rating improves again. All sole 
earner couples may not receive bonuses, but none of them pay 
penalties. To the extent that the proposal to expand the child and 
dependent care credit is used to provide an infant year supplement to 
all parents, including sole earner couples, the efficiency and penalty 
focus rating would diminish. 
f. Flatteners 
Income tax flattening proposals have been a significant part of 
the congressional tax reform landscape in recent years. In 1999, 
flattening the income tax became more closely associated with 
marriage penalty relief in the bills introduced. One bill in the Senate 
described its proposal to widen the bottom· marginal bracket - for 
unmarried individuals as well as for joint returns - as an effort "to 
mitigate the marriage penaIty.,,287 Four bills and amendments 
COMM. ON TAXATION, COMPARISON OF HOUSE AND SENATE VERSIONS OF TAX CUT BILL 
(H.R. 2488), WITH JCT REVENUE ESTIMATES, reprinted in BNA TEXT SUPP., Aug. 4, 
1999, at S-10 [hereinafter JOINT COMM. COMPARISON]; Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act 
of 1999, H.R. 2488, § 114 (1999) (Enrolled Bill). The extension to parents of infants 
includes a caption containing the words "stay at home parents" but the operative language 
of the provision would make it applicable to all parents of qualifying children whether 
family members are the caregivers or undocumented paid care arrangements are used. 
The wide approval which met the proposal to expand the child care tax credit for working 
parents is particularly significant in the context of the efforts of the previous Congress to 
establish tax policy that was neutral on the question of the labor force participation of 
parents. The child credit enacted in 1997 provides up to $500 per child in tax credits, 
generally non-refundable, that are available to stay at home parents as well as dual earner 
parents. 
287 Share the Surplus Tax Reduction and Simplification Act, S. 1379, \06th 
Congo § 12 (1999) (introduced by Mr. Domenici (R-NM) July 15, 1999). 
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proposing other forms of marriage penalty relief, including the Senate 
Finance Committee's tax cut bill, also proposed bracket widening at 
the bottom of the rate tables.288 Flat tax advocates with increasing 
frequency in the past two years have also advanced the claim that a 
flat income tax would eliminate marriage penalties.289 
Widening the brackets and flattening out the marginal rate 
structure of the income tax somewhat reduces marriage penalties, 
however it does not eliminate them. The reduction occurs because the 
impact of aggregation of incomes is lessened. For example, if the 
upper limit of the bottom bracket were raised to $70,000 for joint 
return filers, as one bill proposed, only dual earner couples whose 
combined incomes exceeded that _ amount would see marriage 
penalties arising from the marginal brackets themselves in calculating 
pre-credit incom~ tax liability.290 From an historical perspective, the 
suggestion that flattening will reduce marriage penalties in the joint 
return system is a familiar one. This was the argument for repeal of 
the dual earner deduction made in 1986 when the federal income tax 
was flattened by the consolidation of brackets and rate reduction. 
Then as now, flattening brackets reduces the marriage. penalty 
somewhat but does not eliminate it. Flattening would not affect the 
288 . 
S. 799, § 2; S. 1429 (amendment to S 1442); H.R. 767, § 3; Taxpayer 
Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429 (Senate Finance Committee Bill); Taxpayer Refund Act of 
1999, H.R. 2488, §§ 102,201,202,204 & 209 (Engrossed Senate Amendment) (passed in 
Senate July 30, 1999) (section 102 - lower bracket increased - broad based tax relief 
designation; section 201 - combined return of individual incomes; section 202 - EITC 
joint return relief; section 204 - dependent care credit expanded; infants added; and 
section 209 - doubles joint return standard deduction. . 
289 See Hearings o'n the Marriage Penalty Before the House Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 105th Congo (1998) (statement of Bruce Bartlett). . 290 . 
See H.R. 767 (proposing the $70,000 bottom bracket). A dual earner 
couple with two $35,000 taxable incomes would find the 15% rate applicabI~ to the entire 
amount. The present ceiling of $43,050 on the bottom bracket for joint returns would put 
$26,050 of their income into the 28% bracket. Widening of the bottom bracket would 
reduce the amount of income tax and the cost of marriage tax penalties for those with 
incomes above the lowest bracket as well, because more of their income would be taxed 
at the lower rate. See REpORT ON THE TAXPAYER REFUND ACT, supra note 176, at S-I \0 
(minority views, criticizing Senate Finance Committee majority bill's widening of the 
lowest bracket by $4,000 for joint returns and $2,000 for unmarrieds). The Senate 
Finance bill raised the upper limit of the bottom bracket by $2,000 for unmarried 
individuals and $4,000 for joint return filers. 
106 N.Y.L. SeH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVI 
penalties that arise from the rest of the joint return system, such as 
those caused upon marriage by the loss of part of the standard 
deduction or a portion of the earned income tax credit.291 
Even the flattest taxes being proposed would continue to 
impose a higher effective tax rate on the secondary earner in the 
couple and with it, continue some of the tax incentives for housework 
and tax disincentives to market employment. The general flat tax 
proposals, such as those of Representatives Armey and Senator 
Shelby, combine flattening of rates with a per capita personal 
exemption that would reduce, if not eliminate, marriage penalty 
effects for the couple as a unit.292 Yet the flat tax proposals retain 
aggregation of incomes for married couples and with it, marriage 
bonuses and some progressivity in average tax rates. For example, in 
the Shelby-Armey flat tax, unmarried taxpayers are entitled to a 
personal exemption of $11,000 and a married couple (without 
children) is allowed an exemption of $22,000.293 Although the stated 
tax rate in the Shelby-Armey flat tax proposal is 17%, there are in 
effect two marginal brackets. The personal exemptions create a 
bottom bracket with a tax rate of zero and hence varying average rates 
of tax depending on how much income there is above the exemption 
level.294 
If removing tax disincentives that affect the choice of work for 
married women is one of the reasons to seek marriage neutrality,295 
the solution will not be found in the flat taxes. Stacking the income of 
the wife, generally the spouse seen to be the secondary earner, on top 
of the income of the husband, results in a higher tax rate for her than 
for him. His income is seen to absorb the personal exemptions of both 
291 For a discussion of the continuance of marriage penalties after the 1986 
reforms, see Rosen 1987, supra note 149, at 568. 
292 See Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1997, S. 1040, 105th Congo 
§ 101 (1997) (introduced by Mr. Shelby (R-AL»; Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act 
of 1997, H.R. 1040, 105th Congo § 101 (1997). 
293 S.1040,§ 101; H.R. 1040, § 101. 
294 An exemption of $22,000 and a stated tax rate of 17% would result in an 
average rate of tax of 8.5% on $44,000 of income and an average rate of tax of 12.75 % 
on $88,000 of income. 
295 Professor Zelenak made this argument persuasively in his 1994 article. 
See Zelenak, supra note 78. 
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and her income is seen to bear the full stated rate of tax.296 The 
couple does not pay a larger total tax because of their marital status, 
but the secondary worker still sees a higher effective tax rate when 
substituting market employment for home production. This problem 
arises when there is aggregation of incomes if there is any amount of 
progressivity. If progressivity cannot be eliminated completely, the 
solution would seem to be disaggregation, a return to the individual 
taxation of husbands and wives. 
g. Optional combined return of individual incomes 
In the 106th Congress, the optional combined return of 
individual incomes gained significant support. It was the chief form 
of marriage penalty relief in the tax cut bill that the Senate Finance 
Committee originally introduced. This proposal to create an 
alternative to the joint return for dual income couples also won the 
approval of a majority of the Senate. It was included in the version of 
the Senate's tax cut bill that passed in that chamber.297 
But the optional combined return of individual incomes did 
not survive the Conference Committee. In its place the Conference 
Committee approved the doubling of the lowest marginal tax bracket 
for joint returns.298 This substitution of the income splitting lowest 
bracket for the optional combined return of individual incomes took 
place in the negotiation of the differences between the House and 
Senate tax cut bills. In a process not unfamiliar to observers of tax 
legislation, the Conference Committee settled differences by taking an 
approach to the taxation of married couples that had not been 
approved in the tax cut bill of either the House or the Senate. 
The proposal for the optional combined return of individual 
incomes was included in the Finance Committee's tax cut bill in much 
296 See Rosen (1977), supra note 122 (discussing stacking and the impact of 
marriage penalties on the labor supply of married women). 
297 Compare Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429 (Senate Finance 
Committee bill) and H.R. 2488 (Engrossed Senate Amendment), §201. 
298 See 1999 JOINT COMM. CONF. BILL SUMMARY AND REVENUE ESTIMATES, 
supra note 2, at S-II (comparing the engrossed bill from the House and the engrossed 
amendment from the Senate with the Conference bill results in the category entitled 
"Marriage Penalty Relier'). 
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the same form as it had been proposed in the first session of the losth 
Congress by Representative Weller and Senator Hutchinson.299 Tax 
credits were still to be determined and applied on the basis of a joint 
return income aggregation, .but taxable income and the regular federal 
income tax were determined as if the couple was unmarried. In 
describing its proposal for optional filing, the Senate Finance 
Committee indicated its intention to take "a comprehensive approach" 
to the reduction or elimination of marriage penalties. The optional 
combined return of individual incomes was both more comprehensive 
and more targeted toward marriage penalty couples than any of the 
other proposals introduced during the three sessions of Congress. 
Revenue estimates indicated that it would cost about $24 billion in the 
form proposed.30o Revenue estimates of the cost of the income 
splitting for the lowest bracket and a doubled standard deduction for 
all joint return filers in the Conference Bill were not provided on an 
annual basis and hence a comparable measure is not available.301 
h. The Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999 - the vetoed tax cut 
bill 
The bill that the President vetoed on September 23,1999, 
299 The Senate Finance Committee's version added language providing that 
income from jointly owned property was to be allocated 50-50 between husband and 
wife. The impact of this change on the community property issue is not clear. It tends to 
suggest that community property principles are to be followed in determining whether a 
spouse has income. If that is its meaning, the impact of the combined return of individual 
incomes would be very different in New York than in California or Texas. See text 
accompanying notes 106-110 slIpra. Compare Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, S. 1429, § 
201 (Senate Finance Committee bill) and Marriage Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 2456, 
105th Congo (1997) and Marriage Tax Elimination Act, S. 1314 105th Congo (1997). 
Taxpayer Refund Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, (Engrossed Senate Amendment), §§ I 02, 201, 
202, 204, & 209 (section 102 - lower bracket increased - broad based tax relief 
designation); section 201 - combined return of individual incomes; section 202 - EITC 
joint return relief; section 204 - dependent care credit expanded); and section 209 -
doubles joint return standard deduction). 
300 ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE T AXPA YER REFUND ACT OF 1999, AS 
ApPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE ON JULY 21, 1999, S. REP. No. 106-120 
( 1999). 
301 ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 
2488 (JCX-61-99 R), at I. A total of $112.881 billion is shown for 2000-09. Id. 
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called for some $792 billion in tax cuts over the next ten years. More 
than $121 billion of the tax cut proposed by the Taxpayer Refund and 
Relief Act of 1999, some 15 percent, was allocated to marriage 
penalty relief provisions.302 Like the majority of the marriage penalty 
relief bills in the 106th Congress, the tax cut bill addressed itself to a 
number of different features of the problem but shied away from 
thorough-going solutions. Moreover, with the exception of the $5 
billion or so aimed at expanding the dependent and child care credit, 
the remainder of the more than $115 billion revenue cost would have 
gone to a collection of the least efficient forms of marriage penalty 
relief. 
Different proposals for marriage penalty relief came to the 
Conference Committee from the House and Senate. The choices of 
the Conference Committee on the marriage penalty question were the 
doubled standard deduction for joint filers, a double-size bottom tax 
bracket for the joint return, increased earned income tax credits for 
joint filers and an expanded child care credit with special provision 
for stay-at home parents of infants.303 In effect, the Conference 
Committee constructed a bill that would have given middle income 
married taxpayers the benefits of structural income splitting on the 
1948 model, at least for determining pre-credit tax liability. The 
vetoed tax cut bill gave upper income married taxpayers the valuable 
opportunity to claim the doubled standard deduction at their higher 
302 . See 1999 JOINT COMM. CONF. BILL SUMMARY AND REVENUE ESTIMATES, 
supra note 2, at S-31 (showing $121.95 billion for four items: (I) doubling the standard 
deduction; (2) doubling the lowest bracket, together totaling $ 112.881 billion; (3) 
increasing earned income tax credit phaseout starting and stopping points for joint returns, 
$4.163 billion; and (4) expanded dependent care credit, $4.9 billion). Unlike the others, 
the description of dependent care expansion in the table did not use the words marriage 
penalty. The alternative minimum tax [AMT] and its marriage penalty are not included in 
this sum nor is the marriage penalty discussed above. The energetic efforts to repeal the 
entire AMT for individuals suggest that it raises broad-based tax reduction issues rather 
than marriage penalty issues despite the inclusion of the penalty buzz word in the 
legislative materials. [d, at S-33, pt. III. 
303 Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Congo (1999) 
(Enrolled Bill), (vetoed by Pres. Clinton, Sept. 23, 1999) (section 101 - lowest bracket 
doubled for joint return; section III - doubles joint return standard deduction; section 
115 - EITC joint return relief; section 114 - dependent care credit expanded; infants 
added). 
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marginal rates and also the benefit of having more income taxed in the 
expanded bottom bracket. But the marriage penalty effects of the 
upper four tax brackets would have remained. Similarly, itemizers at 
all income levels would have seen relatively little marriage penalty 
relief. Married couples in the earned income tax credit range were to 
be given the opportunity to reduce penalties or increase bonuses, 
depending on where they stood under current law. 
The marriage penalty solutions proposed in the Conference 
Committee's bill were among those rated the least efficient by the 
CBO Study. Structural income splitting in the CBO projections was 
expected to deliver about half of its revenue cost to couples who were 
not paying marriage penalties at al1.304 Nor was the amendment 
proposed for the earned income tax credit ~my more focused on 
marriage penalty couples. While marriage penalties would have been 
reduced by each of these proposals, the reduction in penalties almost 
seems incidental to the enhancement of marriage bonuses that also 
would have resulted. The expansion of the child and dependent care 
credit would have helped dual earner couples but only if they had 
qualifying dependents. The picture of the taxation of married couples 
that emerges from the Conference bill is one of continuing penalties 
and increased bonuses and erratic and unintended consequences. 
Indications of the dominance of the trend toward using 
marriage penalty relief provisions to justify a general tax cut for 
married couples can be seen in the development of the Senate's tax 
cut bill as well as in that of the House. The House leadership in the 
Ways and Means Committee adopted one of the broadest and least 
efficient forms of marriage penalty relief - the doubled standard 
deduction. The Senate Finance Committee's bill started in a different 
direction, with the most narrowly targeted form of marriage penalty 
relief, the optional combined return of individual incomes. But the 
addition of the Senate floor amendment to double the standard 
deduction suggested strongly that the Senate was pursuing two 
different agendas at the same time. It was making an effort to 
accommodate dual earners but it also took the opportunity to try to 
304 See CBO STUDY, supra note 4, at Summary tbl. 4. 
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reduce taxes for sole earner married couples?05 
The Senate bill as introduced already provided a doubled 
standard deduction for marriage penalty couples through the optional 
combined return of individual incomes. Couples electing the optional 
combined return determined their individual pre-credit tax liability by 
using the standard deduction for unmarried individuals as well as the 
rate table for unmarrieds.306 The restructuring of the standard 
deduction itself pursuant to the floor amendment only served marriage 
bonus couples who would not be electing the optional combined 
return. 
The impact of the proposals made in the vetoed tax cut bill on 
the marriage penalty is consistent with the trend of the other bills 
introduced in the 106th Congress. The year 1999 saw growing support 
for general tax cuts for married couples presented in the guise of 
marriage penalty relief. Sole earner couples stood to benefit from 
almost all of the penalty relief proposals introduced in the first session 
of this Congress even though they already receive substantial 
marriage bonuses and pay no marriage penalties.307 
But nonetheless, interest in providing an alternative filing 
status for dual earner and dual income couples that would recognize 
individual income as the basis for taxation was visible and substantial 
in the Senate. A similar level of support for individual taxation of 
husbands and wives had also been seen in the House in 1997, at the 
beginning of this three year run of marriage penalty relief proposals, 
when Representative Weller's proposal for the optional combined 
return of individual incomes gathered more than 200 co-sponsors. 
Amidst the movement toward general tax cuts for married couples, the 
proposal for an alternative to aggregation stands out as an expression 
of skepticism about the entire enterprise of joint return taxation. 
Finally, it seems worth noting that despite the trend toward 
describing tax reduction broadly applicable to joint return filers as 
marriage penalty relief, the tax cut bill did distinguish its proposal for 
a general flattening of the bottom bracket from marriage penalty 
305 Compare Appendix - Table 4 infra with Figure A supra. 
306 S. 1429, 106th § 201 (1999). 
307 Compare Appendix - Table 4 infra with Figure A supra. See also CBO 
STUDY, supra note 4, at Summary tbl.2. 
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relief. The widening of the lowest bracket for the benefit of 
unmarried individuals and heads of household was identified as broad 
based tax reduction. The proposal to lower the bottom rate from 15 
percent to 14 percent also appeared under the broad based' tax relief 
title.308 
CONCLUSION 
It would be unduly speculative to treat all of the tax reform 
proposals made in Congress over the past three years as indicative of 
considered policy choices, even on the part of their sponsors. The tax 
legislative process in these years,' especially since 1998, has taken 
place in an atmosphere of bitter and partisan disagreement about the 
federal budget. The tax reform and tax cut bills that Congress 
proposed in 1998 and 1999 were advanced under the threat, or 
perhaps the promise, of a presidential veto. Further, the prospect of a 
budget surplus made it possible to think about tax reform outside of a 
revenue neutral plan. Under these circumstances, the normal budget 
constraints may not have been at work, winnowing out the most cost-
effective solutions. Accountability for revenue loss in making policy 
choices is not a concern if many members are convinced that the bill 
will not become law in any event. But even under these conditions, 
legislative proposals represent at least a window through which the 
thinking of elected policy makers can be glimpsed. Indeed it may· be 
argued that the certainty of a veto encourages a more, complete 
expression of goals and preferences than ordinarily occurs. The ideas 
advanced in bills that have not become law are nonetheless ideas that 
have attracted the interest and support of policy makers. It is as ideas 
about marriage and the income tax that the anti-penalty proposals in 
the past three sessions of Congress are important. 
Most of the bills introduced in the past three years which 
identify themselves as marriage penalty relief would effectuate a 
general tax cut for all married couples who file joint returns. It would 
be easy to dismiss these proposals as political manipulation. Indeed, 
308 Compare 1999 JOINT COMM. CONF. BILL SUMMARY AND REVENUE 
ESTIMATES, supra note 2, at S-31, pt. IA & lB. 
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it is arguable whether an amendment that would direct less than half 
of its tax reduction effects to marriage penalty couples, as would the 
structural income splitting proposal, ought to be described as marriage 
penalty relief at all. But at the same time these bills offer important 
insights into the re-examination of tax policy toward marriage that 
appears to have e~gag'ed the attention of Congress since 1993. 
, The forty-seven' bills and amendments discussed above all 
claim to reduce or eliminate the marriage penalty. The attachment of 
the term marriage penalty to all of these proposals indicates the 
political potency of the issue. If nothing more, congressional policy 
makers who make use of the m~rriage penalty buzz word in their tax 
cut' proposals' are acknowledging the pressing claims of dual earner 
couples to more equitable tax trea'tment. Yet it remains a striking 
feature of the discourse that there appears to have been little interest in 
the most obvious solution to the problem of the marriage penalties 
created by the joint return system. Not a single bill proposing the 
repeal of the joint return or mandatory individual filing for married 
couples was introduced in these three sessions. The omission of this 
solution from the bills for marriage penalty relief is particularly 
noteworthy because from a revenue point of view repeal of the joint 
return is an 'attractive idea. If nothing else changed in the income tax, 
individual filing would end marriage bonuses and stop the loss of the 
$32 billion in tax reve'nue now going in that direction. This would be 
more than enough to offset the impact of forgoing the $28.8 billion in 
extra tax revenue that marriage penalty couples have been paying. 
But a fair distillation of the prevalent ideas in Congress about 
the taxation of marriage over the past three sessions confirms that the 
m<;lst revenue efficient solution has no visible supporters. None of the 
bills proposed threatened marriage bonuses at all. The impact of all 
but two of the solutions proposed would have been to increase 
bonuses substantially. The dual earner deduction and the optional 
combined return of individual incomes are the exceptions. The import 
of most of the marriage penalty relief bills introduced in the past three 
years is that the sole earner marriage, although diminishing in its 
representation in American family life, has found renewed support in 
Congress. The trends in marriage penalty relief proposals of the past 
three years suggest strongly that Congress is willing to spend money 
on marriage. 
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Appendix - Table I 
Income Tax Marriage Penalty Relief Bills Introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives 
1997 to' 1999 (105th Congress and I06th Congress, I" Session) 
INCOME TAX MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF PROPOSALS 
Bill number (spon5()f, party and SlTuctural income splitting 
state). Bill with most co-sponsors in Standard Tax Income lowest EITe Dual Optional 
session in bold; proposal with most deduction brackets splitting tax phaseout earner combined 
co-sponsors indicated by XX; if doubled for doubled combined bracket relief for deduction return of passed in either chamber, mar1<ed joint for joint return widened joint orcredtt individual 
with asten. (').' returns' returns overall returns incomes 
(§ 32) 
105n , CONGRESS, I" SESSION (1997) 
H.R. 2718 Knollenberg R-MI) X 
H.R. 1584 S.Johnson R-TX) X 
H.R. 2593 Herger R-GA) X 
H.R. 3059 Jackson-Lee (). TX) XX" 
H.R. 2456 (Weller R-IL) XX' 
H.R. 2462 (Kasieh R-OH) XX 
105'" CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION (1998) 
H.R. 3524 (MeOenmott ()'WA) XX 
H.R. 4542 (N. Johnson R-CT) XX 
HR. 4579 (Archer R-TX) XX • 
H.R. 4597 Rangel O-NY) XX 
H.R. 3995 Neal ()'MA) X 
H.R. 3151 Thune R-SO) X 
H.R. 3620 Gephardt ()'MO) X X 
H.R. 3734 (Weller R-IL) X X 
106'" CONGRESS, I" SESSION (1999) 
H.R. 6 (Weller R-IL) XX XX' • 
H.R.2350 (S.Johnson R-TX) XX XX 
H.R.2414 (Taneredo R-CO) XX XX 
H.R. 767 (Thune R-SO) X " X 
H.R.2.J88 (Archer R.TX) X • 
H.R.2085 (Hooley ()'OR) X 
H.R.l08 (Knollenberg R-MI) X 
H.R. 725 (Kleczka ()'WI) X 
H.R.2020 (N.Johnson R·CT) X 
H.R.2646 (C.McCarthy O·NY) X 
H.R. 2574 (Maloney_ ()'CT) X 
H.R. 1453 (Lampson (). TX) X' X 
HR. 2488 (EHB) m X • 
HR. 2488 (vetoed bill) cc· CC . C • C· 
• Bills identified by word searches on THOMAS and LEXIS Bill Tracking; number of sponsors from THOMAS 
Bill Summary data base. Multiple co-sponsorships by a member in a given session have not been eliminated. Bills 
introduced by Chairman of Ways and Means Committee in italics. C denotes Conference bill. 
b Amending I.R.C. § 63(c), (1999); would reduce taxable income only; phaseout penalties unaffected. 
, Amending I.R.C. § 62 (a) (1999), reducing AGI and phaseout penalties. 
d Proposal with most co-sponsors (271) in the House in 1997: optional combined return of individual incomes . 
• 1997 House marriage penalty relief bill with most co-sponsors (238). H.R. 2593 had second most (189). 
fProposal with most co-sponsors (145) in the House in 1998: doubled standard deduction as only general relief. 
• House Ways and Means Committee bill, 1998 Tax Relief Act; passed in House, no action in Senate. 
h Only lowest bracket doubled for joint returns. 
i 1998 House marriage penalty relief bill with the most co-sponsors (59). 
j 1999 House marriage penalty relief bill with the most co-sponsors (232). 
k Proposal with most co-sponsors (294) in the House in 1999: structural income splitting. 
I Dual eamer deduction phased out at joint return AGI of $60,000; EITC relief for dual earner only. 
m Enrolled House Bill, Financial Freedom Act of 1999, as passed in the House. 
"Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999. Enrolled Bill; vetoed by President, September 23,1999. 
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Appendix - Table 2 
Income Tax Marriage Penalty Relief Bills Introduced in the U.S. Senate, 1997-1999 
(I05th Congress and I06th Congress, 1st Session) 
INCOME TAX MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF PROPOSALS 
Bill number (sponsor, party and state). Structural income 
Bill with most co-sponsors in session splitting Income Lowest ElTe Dual Optional in bold; proposal with most co- Standard Tax splitting tax phaseout earner combined 
sponsors indicated by 1 I: ~ passed deducfn bo'ackets combined bracket relief for deducfn retum of in either chamber marked with doubled doubled return widened joint or credit' individual 
asterix(1·' tor joint for joint overall retums incomes 
retumsC returns (§ 32) 
105m CONGRESS, lIT SESSION (1997 
S. 1285 (Faircloth R.NC) 1 I"" 1 1 
S. 1314 (Hutchinson R-TXl I I I ..[ 
105m CONGRESS, 2'0 SESSION(1998) 
S.Amdt.2436 (Gramm R.AZ) , 
-1-1 ." -I 
S.Amdt.2686 (Gramm R-AZ) , -1-1 n' 
-I ' 
S.Amdt.2688 (Daschle 0-50)' ,[1 ,[ 
S. 1989 (Ford D-KYI U 
S. 1569 (Coverdeli R-GAl -I' ., 
S. 2147 (Daschle D-SDI ,[1 -I 
S. 1999 (Hutchinson R-TX) ,[ ,[ 
S. 1711 (Hutchinson R·TX) 
-"-I 
106m CONGRESS, 1n SESSION (1999 
S.12 (Hutchinson R·TX) .[ -I 
S.15 (Hutchinson R-TX) -I 
S. 284 (McCain R-AZI -I 
S. 1160 (GrassleylFeinsteinl ,[ 
S. 1379 (Donimici R-NM) ,[ 
S. 8 (Daschle D-SDI -1-1 ,m -I 
S. 799 (Nighthorse R-GOI -I -I 
S. J.l29 (Roth R-D/') "" , .", 
S.Amdll384 (MoY!1ihan O.NY) n ,[h ,[,[1 .[ 
S.Amdt. 1442 (Breaux D-LAI n ,[h -I -1-1 
S.Amdt 1472 (Hutchinson R-TXI' 
-I ' 
H.R. ].188 (ESA) " .,. " . "" . " . H..R. ].188 (I'etoed bill) P C • C • C • CC • 
• Bills identified by word searches on THOMAS and LEXIS Bill Tracking; number of sponsors from THOMAS 
Bill Summary data base. Multiple co-sponsorships by a member in a given session have not been eliminated. Bills 
introduced by Chairman of Committee on Finance in italic.,'. C denotes conference bill. 
b Amending IRC § 62(a), reducing AGI and phaseout penalties. Dual earner deduction to phased out at joint return 
AGI of $60,000 (Daschle proposals) or $95,000 (Moynihan). 
, Amending IRC § 63(c), would reduce taxable income only; phaseout penalties unaffected. 
d 1997 Senate marriage penalty relief bill and proposal with most co-sponsors (40). 
e Senate floor amendment to S. 1415, the Universal Tobacco Settlement Act. 
f Increase in joint return deduction phased out at joint return AGI of $50,000 in both Gramm proposals. 
• Proposal with most co-sponsors (8) in Senate in 1998: increase joint return standard deduction to at least double. 
h Joint return standard deduction more than doubled. 
; Only lowest bracket doubled. 
j Tied with S.Amdt.2686 for 1998 Senate maniage penalty relief bill with most co-sponsors (4). 
• 1999 Senate marriage penalty relief bill with most co-sponsors (18). 
1 ElTe phaseout relieffor dual earners only. 
m Proposal with most co-sponsors (28) in the Senate in 1999: EITC phaseout relief (not all limited to dual earners). 
n Senate floor amendment to S. 1429. 
o Engrossed Senate Amendment, amended version of S. 1429, passed by Senate; renumbered and renamed. 
P Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, Enrolled Bill; vetoed by President; September 23,1999. 
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Appendix - Table 3 
Income Tax Marriage Penalty Relief Bills Introduced in the IOS Ih Congress, 1997-1998 
INCOME TAX MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF PROPOSALS 
Bill number (sponsor. party and Structural income splitting 
sta1e). Bill with most co-sponsors in Standard Tax Income Lowest ElTe Dual Optional 
chamber in session in bold; deduction brackets splitting tax phaseout earner combined proposal with most co-sponsors doubled for doubled combined bracket relief for deduction return of indicated by XX or.f.f; K passed in joint lor jOint return widened' joint or credh b individual 
ehher chamber marl<ed with returnsC returns overall· returns incomes 
aslerix (') .• (§ 32) 
105m CONGRESS, In SESSION (1997) 
H.R. 2718 (Knolienbe!QR-MI) X 
H.R.1584 (S.Johnson R-TXI X 
H.R. 2593 (Herger R-GAI X· 
H.R. 3059 (Jackson-Lee O-TX) XX' 
H_R_ 2456 (Weller R·IL) XX 
H.R. 2462 (Kasich R-OHI XX 
S. 1285 (Faircloth R·NC) "" . S. 1314 (Hutchinson R-TXI J 
IOSn. CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION (1998 
H.R.3524 (McDermott D-WAI XX" 
H.R.4542 (N. Johnson R·eTI XX 
H.R. 4r9 (Archer R·TX) XY' 
H.R. 4597 (Rangel D-NYI XX 
H.R. 3995 (Neal D-MA) X 
H.R. 3151 (Thune R-SD) X 
H.R. 3620 (Gephardt D-MOI X X 
H.R. 3734 (Weller R·ILI Xl X 
S .. Amdt. 2436 (Gramm R-AZ) • JJ,mn .f 
S.Amelt. 2686 (Gramm R·AZ) '!" m. '!. 
S.Amdt. 2688 (Daschle D-SO) 
" D " P 
S. 1569 (Coverdell R-GAI 
" " S. 1989 (Ford D-KY) .f-[ 
S. 1999 (Hutchinson R-TXI .[ .[ 
S. 1711 (Hutchinson R· TXI 
" " S. 2147 (Daschle D-SD) 
" " 
• Bills identified by word searches on THOMAS and LEXIS Bill Tracking; number of sponsors from THOMAS 
Bill Summary data base. Multiple co-sponsorships by a member in a given session have not been eliminated. 
Bills introduced by Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee or Senate Finance Committee in italic.\'. 
Introduction ofpanicular proposal indicated by X (House) or.f (Senate). 
b Amending I.R.C. § 62(a), reducing AGI and phaseout penallies. 
, Amending I.R.C. § 63(c), would reduce taxable income only; phaseouts unaffected. 
d 1997 House marriage penalty relief bill with second most co-sponsors (189). _ 
, Proposal with the most co-sponsors (27 I) in the House in 1997: optional combined return of individual incomes. 
f 1997 House marriage penally relief bill with the most co-sponsors (238). 
• 1997 Senaie marriage penalty relief bill and proposal with the most co·sponsors (40). 
h Proposal with the most co-sponsors (145) in the House in 1998: doubled standard deduction as only general relief. 
; Only lowest bracket doubled for joint returns. 
j 1998 House marriage penally relief bill with the most co-sponsors (59). 
k Senate floor amendment to S.1415, the Universal Tobacco Settlement Act. 
, Increase in standard deduction phased out at joint return AGI of $50,000 in both Gramm proposals. 
m Joint return standard deduction to be more than double the unmarried individual amount. 
" Proposal with most co-sponsors (8) in Senate in 1998: increase joint return standard deduction to at least double. 
D EITC phaseout relief for dual earners only. -
P Dual eamer deduction phased out at joint return AGI of $60,000. _ 
q Tied with S. Arndt. 2686 for 1998 Senate relief bill With most co-sponsors (4). 
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Appendix - Table 4 
Income Tax Marriage Penalty Relief Bills Introduced in the I06th Congress, Ig Session (1999) 
INCOME TAX MARRIAGE PENALTY RELIEF PROPOSALS 
Bill number (sponsor, party and state). SlJuc:Iuraiincome 
Bin with most co-sponsors in chamber in solittina Income Lowest ElTe Dual Optional 
session in bold; proposal with most co- Standard Tax spritting tax phaseout earner combined 
sponsors indicated by XX or U; ~ deducfn brackets combined bracket relief for deducfn return of passed in eithtlr chamber marl<ed with doubled doubled return widened joint orcredrt b individual 
asterix (') .• for joint for joint overall returns incomes 
returns C returns (§ 32) 
106'" CONGRESS, In SESSION (1999 
H,R,6 (Weller R-ILI • XX n' 
H.R.2350 (S. Johnson R· TXI XX XX 
H.R. 2414 (Tancredo R-COl XX XX 
H.R. 767 (Thune, R-SOI X X 
H.R.U88 (Archer, R-TX) X" 
H.R.20a5IHoolev, D-ORI X 
H.R.l0a (KnolienberQ,R-MII X 
H.R.725 (Kleczka D-WI) X 
H.R.2020 IN.Johnson R-CTl X 
H.R.2646 IC.McCarthy, D-NYI X 
H.R. 2574 (Maloney, D-CTI X 
H.R. 1453 (lamoson, D-TXl ~ X' 
H.R. U88 (EHB) X· 
S,12 (Hutchinson, R-TX) , 
" " S.15lHutchinson R-TXI .f 
S. 284 (McCain R-AZl 
" S. 1160 (Grassley I Feinsteinl 
" S. 1379 lOonimici, R-NMI 
"-S. a rDaschle D-SO) "" ,. ,,> 
S. 799 (NiQhthorse, R-COI 
" " S. J.l29 (Roth, R-DE) "'-~ . ~. 
S. Arndt. 1472 (Hutchinson R-TX) " . S.Amdt.1384(Moynihan, D-NY) 
"'" 
",,) 
" > S.Amdt. 1442 (Breaux, ()-LA) 
" " 
u 
H.R.24BB (ESA) n 
-I" -I. 
-1-1 • -1- " 
H.R. 2488 (vetoed bill) C· C • ~. ~. 
• Bills identified by word searches on THOMAS and LEXIS Bill Tracking; number of sponsors from THOMAS 
Bill Summary data base. Multiple co-sponsorships by a member in a given session have not been eliminated. Bills 
introduced by Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee or Senate Finance Committee in itulic>'. 
Introduction of particular proposal indicated by X (House) or {(Senate). C denotes conference bill. 
b Amending I.R.C. § 62(a), reducing AGI and phaseout penalties. 
, Amending I.R.C. § 63(c), would reduce taxable income only; phaseouts unaffected. 
d 1999 House marriage penalty relief bill with most co-sponsors (232). 
'Proposal with most co-sponsors (294) in House in 1999: structural income splitting: 
r Only lowest bracket doubled for joint 'returns. 
• Dual earner deduction phased out at joint return AGI of $60,000 (H.R.1435 and S.8) or $95,000 (S.Amdt.l384). 
h Enrolled House Bill, Financial Freedom Act of 1999, as passed in the House. 
i 1999 Senate marriage penalty relief bill with most co-sponsors (18). 
j EITC phaseout relief only for dual earners. 
k Proposal with most co-sponsors (28) in Senate in 1999: EITC phaseout relief (not all limited to dual earners). 
I Senate floor amendment to S. 1429. 
m Standard deduction for joint return more than doubled. 
• Engrossed Senate Amendment, amended version ofS. 1429, passed by Senate; renumbered and renamed. 
• Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, Enrolled Bill; vetoed by President, September 23, 1999. 

